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AGENCY GENESIS AND THE ENERGY TRANSITION 
Sharon B. Jacobs* 
Commentators and policymakers frequently propose new govern-
ment agencies in response to novel or intractable problems. New agencies 
can refocus public attention on the problems they regulate. They can 
attract new talent and bypass calcified or captured channels. But they 
are also costly, and there is no guarantee that they will be more successful 
than their predecessors. 
This Article examines agency genesis at the state level. In the 
process, it expands recent thinking about the administrative separation 
of powers to the states. At the federal level, setting up agency rivalries 
within the executive branch can be an effective tool for mitigating presi-
dential power. But new state agencies have sometimes enhanced, rather 
than countered, gubernatorial authority. 
State energy policy offers a compelling context in which to explore 
questions about agency genesis. Energy-agency creation in the states is a 
story of addition, beginning with public utility commissions in the early 
1900s and culminating in the contemporary creation of new boards and 
bodies to manage the transition to a just, low-carbon energy economy. 
Drawing on the political science and public administration literatures, 
this Article explains the observed patterns of energy-agency creation and 
analyzes their effects on state energy governance. It offers prescriptions 
for managing multiple agencies in the same policy domain. And it 
cautions that the allure of agency genesis should not preclude reform of 
existing institutions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Creating new agencies is a tempting solution to new or intractable 
problems. Legal scholars are especially fond of prescribing new regulatory 
entities. Consider the following examples: Andrew Tutt recommends a new 
expert regulator modeled after the FDA to screen algorithms before they 
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can be put into use.1 Arti Rai and Stuart Benjamin advocate a new entity 
in the executive branch to promote innovation across federal agencies.2 
Cristina Rodríguez calls for a new, independent agency with authority over 
aspects of immigration policy.3 Glen Staszewski proposes a Federal Inaction 
Commission to police agency delay.4 
Policymakers appear equally enthusiastic about new agencies and 
offices, especially as a response to perceived government failure. Congress 
created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in the wake of 
the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008 to protect American consumers from 
Wall Street’s excesses.5 The Office of Homeland Security emerged as a 
promised safeguard of American well-being in the days following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks.6 President Richard Nixon established the EPA in 
response to growing public awareness of environmental degradation (and 
as part of his effort to rebrand himself as the “environmental candidate”) 
in the early 1970s.7 More recently, reflecting their different approaches to 
climate and energy policy, then-presidential candidate Joe Biden pro-
posed the creation of a new Environmental and Climate Justice division 
within the DOJ,8 while President Donald Trump reestablished the Arctic 
Energy Office within the Department of Energy (DOE).9 Other candidates 
in the 2020 presidential race proposed a raft of new agencies, including a 
Department of Peace and a Department of Cybersecurity.10 
                                                                                                                           
 1. Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 Admin. L. Rev. 83, 122 (2017). 
 2. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural 
Perspective, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2008). 
 3. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of Executive 
Control over Immigration Policy, 59 Duke L.J. 1787, 1791 (2010) (contending that a new, 
independent agency should set visa policy). 
 4. Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59 Emory L.J. 369, 372 (2009). 
 5. See David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who Does What Matters: 
Governmental Design and Agency Performance, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1446, 1485–86 
(2014) (explaining the creation of the CFPB in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis). 
 6. See Dara Kay Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar & Barry R. Weingast, Crisis 
Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates, 59 Stan. L. 
Rev. 673, 684 (2006) (explaining the creation of this office immediately after the attacks 
and before the creation of the larger DHS). 
 7. Richard J. Lazarus, Senator Edmund Muskie’s Enduring Legacy in the Courts, 67 
Me. L. Rev. 239, 240 (2015). 
 8. Umair Irfan, We Asked Joe Biden’s Campaign 6 Key Questions About His Climate 
Change Plans, Vox (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.vox.com/21516594/joe-biden-climate-
change-covid-19-president (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 9. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy Announces 
Establishment of Office of Arctic Energy (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.energy.gov/articles/ 
us-department-energy-announces-establishment-office-arctic-energy [https://perma.cc/B7 
QU-P4EH]. 
 10. Courtney Bublé, 2020 Democrats Have Plans to Add New Federal Agencies, Gov’t 
Exec. (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.govexec.com/oversight/2019/08/2020-democrats-
have-plans-add-new-federal-agencies/159311 [https://perma.cc/WLY8-RYLF]. 
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Certainly, agency genesis is an arresting way for politicians to signal 
attention to an issue. But when is it the best approach to managing new 
problems? And when is it mere window dressing?11 
The phenomenon of agency genesis is poorly understood and has 
never been the subject of scholarly treatment in its own right. This Article 
begins to remedy that deficit. It does so by exploring the phenomenon 
within a single domain: that of state energy agencies. State energy regula-
tion is a fruitful context in which to investigate agency genesis and its 
implications for several reasons. First, unlike environmental regulation, 
food safety regulation, and other areas where the federal government has 
preempted broad swaths of state authority, much of energy regulation 
remains within state control. The extent of state regulatory authority over 
energy has produced considerable innovation in administrative structures 
governing electricity, natural gas, and related areas. 
Second, the proliferation of state energy agencies has followed a 
remarkably stable path. State creation of energy agencies occurred in 
waves over the past century, beginning with the advent of public utility 
commissions (PUCs) in the early part of the twentieth century and 
culminating in the recent creation of climate- or energy transition–specific 
bodies.12 This permits more informed theorizing about the motivations for 
agency genesis. 
Notwithstanding these general trends, the diversity across states ena-
bles useful comparisons. Some states have delegated significant planning, 
education, and coordination functions to their state energy offices, for 
example.13 Others have created separate siting agencies for energy infra-
structure.14 One state, Colorado, recently created an Office of Just 
Transition to work with communities disproportionately impacted by the 
shift away from fossil fuels.15 
Investigating agency genesis also has important lessons for energy law 
and policy. It is past time for energy scholars to turn more serious attention 
to administrative arrangements. Energy commentators have focused 
significant attention on the question of whether monopolistic provision of 
energy services yields better outcomes than market competition.16 Mean-
while, the question of whether a single regulator or multiple regulators 
                                                                                                                           
 11. One scholar of government reorganization has concluded that agency genesis as a 
solution to policy challenges is “largely ineffective, and often has significant unintended 
negative consequences on the efficiency and effectiveness of government.” B. Guy Peters, 
Government Reorganization: A Theoretical Analysis, 13 Int’l Pol. Sci. Rev. 199, 199 (1992). 
 12. See infra section I.A. 
 13. See infra notes 89–95 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra section I.A.3. 
 15. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-83-503 (2020) (establishing an Office of Just Transition). 
 16. See generally William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low Carbon Future, 61 UCLA 
L. Rev. 1614 (2014) [hereinafter Boyd, Public Utility] (suggesting ways in which traditional 
monopoly regulation can promote electricity decarbonization); David B. Spence, Can Law 
Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 765 (2008) (considering how to 
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can better superintend private sector arrangements and implement public 
sector policy remains unexplored. This omission is surprising, especially 
since the relationship between regulator and regulated entity was originally 
such a strong driver of theory in the field.17 
This Article refocuses attention on the regulatory side of the energy 
equation. It builds on the newly vital literature on state administrative law 
by examining and questioning the law and policy of energy-agency genesis 
in the states. In doing so, it investigates how insights from the public 
administration, political science, and administrative law literatures on state 
government play out on the ground within a single policy domain. 
This Article has two major aims. First, it brings the question of agency 
genesis into sharp focus. Commentators have spilled much ink on the 
question of internal agency structure.18 But such treatments rarely address 
agency genesis head-on. By tackling the question of agency genesis 
directly, and by situating the theory in the context of a rich case study, this 
Article contributes to a more nuanced understanding of state adminis-
trative law dynamics and their effect on policy output. This Article also 
puts agency genesis in context, focusing on new agencies as members of 
regulatory ecosystems in which both coordination and friction are key to 
understanding policy dynamics. In this way, it adds dimension to the liter-
ature on the administrative separation of powers,19 which has thus far 
                                                                                                                           
balance the tradeoffs that come with increased competition in energy markets); David B. 
Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 973 (2017) (questioning the fervor 
with which some have pursued market competition in its idealized form); Joseph P. Tomain, 
The Past and Future of Electricity Regulation, 32 Env’t L. 435 (2002) (arguing in favor of 
increasing competition between energy providers in the states); Jacqueline Lang Weaver, 
Can Energy Markets Be Trusted? The Effect of the Rise and Fall of Enron on Energy 
Markets, 4 Hous. Bus. & Tax L.J. 1 (2004) (examining the impact of market manipulation 
on enthusiasm for increased competition). 
 17. See Boyd, Public Utility, supra note 16, at 1636–51 (narrating the rise of the “public 
utility” concept and PUCs and collecting sources). For the canonical treatment of this 
relationship in administrative law more broadly, defending the architectural choices of the 
New Deal agencies and noting the connection between private and public forms of 
institutional organization, see generally James M. Landis, The Administrative Process 
(1938). 
 18. For a sampling of recent treatments, see generally Brian D. Feinstein, Designing 
Executive Agencies for Congressional Influence, 69 Admin. L. Rev. 259 (2017) (suggesting 
design changes to agencies that would maximize legislative control); Jacob E. Gersen, 
Designing Agencies, in Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law 333 (Daniel 
A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010) (surveying the work of positive political 
theory on agency design); Kristin E. Hickman, Symbolism and Separation of Powers in 
Agency Design, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1475 (2018) (expressing skepticism about judicial 
refashioning of agency design through severance remedies); Ganesh Sitaraman & Ariel 
Dobkin, The Choice Between Single Director Agencies and Multimember Commissions, 71 
Admin. L. Rev. 719 (2019) (arguing that single-director agencies are preferable to 
multimember commissions). 
 19. See generally Sharon B. Jacobs, The Statutory Separation of Powers, 129 Yale L.J. 
378 (2019) [hereinafter Jacobs, Statutory Separation of Powers] (emphasizing the 
separation of statutory powers among federal agencies); Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, 
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taken federal agencies as its subject, by exploring relationships between 
multiple state agencies with related mandates. 
This Article’s second major aim is to provide an institutional analysis 
of the energy transition. Much existing scholarship on the transition fo-
cuses on its substance, giving less weight to questions about the institutions 
that will administer it.20 But structure and substance are not so easily 
compartmentalized.21 New agencies can shift power dynamics in favor of a 
state governor, thereby either increasing the rate at which decarbonization 
occurs or setting up roadblocks (depending on gubernatorial preference). 
New administrative bodies set up to advocate for particular perspectives 
can heighten the influence of previously underrepresented stakeholders 
in key regulatory proceedings. Moreover, increasing the number of state 
energy agencies can enhance the expertise available to tackle problems 
such as the rapid build-out of renewable energy infrastructure, compensa-
tion for the early retirement of fossil-fuel plants, and the more robust 
integration of demand-side resources into utility planning. 
Understanding the particular dynamics of state administrative govern-
ment in this context is all the more vital because state governments are 
                                                                                                                           
Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 515, 529–51 (2015) [hereinafter 
Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers] (focusing on political appointees, 
members of the civil service, and members of the public as the key actors in the 
administrative separation of powers); Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and 
Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
227 (2016) (same). For additional relevant literature, see Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal 
Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L.J. 
2314, 2322–42 (2006) (identifying internal checks and balances within the executive 
branch); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between the Internal and 
External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L.J. 423, 442–47 (2009) [hereinafter Metzger, 
Interdependent Relationship] (emphasizing ways in which the constitutional separation of 
powers can reinforce intra-executive branch checks). 
 20. See generally John C. Dernbach, Legal Pathways to Deep Decarbonization: Lessons 
from California and Germany, 82 Brook. L. Rev. 825 (2017) (offering examples of laws the 
United States might adopt to achieve decarbonization goals); Hari M. Osofsky, Jacqueline 
Peel, Brett McDonnell & Anita Foerster, Energy Re-Investment, 94 Ind. L.J. 595 (2019) 
(proposing corporate and security law changes to shift patterns of energy investment); 
Melissa Powers, An Inclusive Energy Transition: Expanding Low-Income Access to Clean 
Energy Programs, 18 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 540 (2017) (advocating expanded planning, 
partnership, and investment strategies for making clean energy options more accessible). 
For articles that do give weight to questions about institutions, however, see Hari M. Osofsky 
& Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 5–12 (analyzing 
overlapping federal, state, local, and private energy governance regimes); Shelley Welton, 
Grasping for Energy Democracy, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 581, 602–34 (2018) [hereinafter Welton, 
Grasping for Energy Democracy] (exploring options for more direct democratic input into 
energy transition decisionmaking); Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 267, 
313–28 (2017) (advocating more widespread public operation of electric utilities). 
 21. On the relationship between form and regulatory output, see, for example, 
Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Reorganizing Government: A Functional 
and Dimensional Framework 2 (2019) [hereinafter Camacho & Glicksman, Reorganizing 
Government] (“We proceed on the premise that institutional structures can significantly 
influence the fate of regulatory programs.”). 
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now on the front lines of electricity decarbonization. Behemoths like 
California are leveraging their considerable economic and regulatory 
might to banish carbon from their economies.22 Even states with less well-
established track records of environmental regulation, including Colorado,23 
Nevada,24 and New Jersey,25 are taking ambitious actions to mitigate 
carbon emissions from electricity generation. In total, fifteen states and 
jurisdictions have announced efforts to achieve electricity-sector carbon 
neutrality by midcentury.26 Energy-agency dynamics in these states offer 
clues about how their transitions will unfold. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I offers a descriptive history of 
state-energy-agency creation, beginning with the rise of PUCs in the 
Progressive Era.27 It then charts two subsequent waves of energy-agency 
genesis: the creation of state energy offices and siting boards beginning in 
the 1970s, and the more recent emergence of climate- and energy transi-
tion–specific bodies. This Part also tells a positive story of these waves, 
drawing on the public administration and political science literatures for 
insights into how and why new structural forms appear and diffuse across 
state lines. 
Part II explores the law and policy of state agency genesis. After setting 
out the legal mechanics of agency creation in the states, it proposes a 
normative framework for evaluating new agency creation. There are 
significant benefits to creating new agencies and offices to tackle new prob-
lems, among them the vigor of new agency actors, the signaling function 
                                                                                                                           
 22. For an overview of California’s strategies, see Michael Colvin, How to Decarbonize 
California’s Economy Without Breaking the Bank, EDF: Energy Exch. (June 25, 2019), 
http://blogs.edf.org/energyexchange/2019/06/25/how-to-decarbonize-californias-econ 
omy-without-breaking-the-bank [https://perma.cc/7TYQ-9UKZ]. 
 23. In addition to its goal of carbon-free electricity by 2050, Colorado seeks to reduce 
statewide greenhouse gas emissions to ninety percent below 2005 levels by the same date. 
U.S. Climate All., 2019 State Factsheets: Colorado (2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/ 
static/5a4cfbfe18b27d4da21c9361/t/5d8e51cbee8f446c5857a542/1569608140582/USCA
_2019+State+Factsheet-CO_20190924.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XXH-AYGD]. 
 24. Nevada’s goal is to become carbon neutral by 2050. U.S. Climate All., 2019 State 
Factsheets: Nevada (2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a4cfbfe18b27d4da21 
c9361/t/5d8e52bd98ac8952cb360222/1569608382779/USCA_2019+State+Factsheet-NV_ 
20190924.pdf [https://perma.cc/GT9U-DKBC]. 
 25. New Jersey has rejoined the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a 
cooperative carbon cap-and-trade scheme made up of states in New England and the Mid-
Atlantic region. See Welcome, Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, https://www.rggi.org 
[https://perma.cc/4NN9-MY7K] (last visited Oct. 25, 2020). 
 26. See David Iaconangelo, 100% Clean Energy Group Launches, with Eyes on 
Coronavirus, E&E News: Energywire (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/energy 
wire/stories/1062762687 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For a detailed description 
of state targets and deadlines, see Sophia Ptacek & Amanda Levin, Race to 100% Clean, 
Nat’l Res. Def. Council (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.nrdc.org/resources/race-100-clean 
[https://perma.cc/4BKT-9BMD]. 
 27. The term “energy” is broad and can encompass oil and gas regulation as well as 
transportation fuels. This Article focuses on electricity agencies. 
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of agency creation, the efficiency advantages of bypassing antiquated struc-
tures, and enhanced administrative checks and balances. But the frame-
work does not ignore the drawbacks of agency multiplicity, which include 
resource costs and coordination challenges. This Article does not take an 
ultimate position on reform versus reorganization of state energy agencies 
or of bureaucracy in general.28 Instead, it highlights the advantages and 
drawbacks of each approach in a way that can inform the decisions of state 
policymakers and other stakeholders. 
Part III describes the present moment in energy regulation and ex-
plains how the energy transition may exacerbate classic critiques of PUCs. 
Finally, Part IV applies the framework from Part II to assess how states’ 
architectural choices affect their abilities to meet the decarbonization 
challenge. Creation of new administrative bodies to complement PUCs has 
benefits. In addition to the classic advantages of vitality, signaling, and friction, 
some newer state energy agencies—especially state energy offices, but also 
siting boards and climate councils—can facilitate public participation and 
boast particular administrative strengths in planning and coordination 
that many PUCs lack. Nevertheless, new agencies are expensive, can take 
time to establish themselves, and make policy coordination more challenging. 
State agency creation might also result from political jostling for position 
and control rather than good governance inclinations. 
Part IV concludes by proposing guidelines for managing energy-
agency multiplicity. But enthusiasm for “the new” risks overshadowing 
debates about reinvention or restructuring of existing agencies. Part V 
therefore suggests opportunities for reforming state PUCs as either an 
alternative or complement to agency genesis. 
I. STATE ENERGY ADMINISTRATION 
For a long time, PUCs operated as the sole energy agencies in the 
states.29 From the inception of electricity systems until the energy crisis of 
the 1970s, regulation was bilateral. Monopoly electric utility companies 
were on one side, and the commissions were on the other. Beginning in 
the 1970s, however, states began to create additional agencies with respon-
sibilities for energy regulation. 
Section I.A describes the evolution of state energy agencies from the 
advent of energy regulation during the Progressive Era through the 
present day. Section I.B explores how theories of state agency design and 
                                                                                                                           
 28. For a comparable approach, see Camacho & Glicksman, Reorganizing 
Government, supra note 21, at 8 (professing no interest in “‘essentializing’ 
interjurisdictional relations” and emphasizing that “[a]llocational and structural choices 
will largely be context-specific”). 
 29. Many states also have oil, gas, and mineral regulators. But they are bracketed here 
because their task is to regulate the extraction of fossil fuels rather than the production, 
transportation, and use of energy. 
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policy replication from the public administration and political science 
literatures can help explain the observed patterns. 
A. Generative Periods of State Energy Administration 
During the early part of the last century, states created PUCs to regu-
late electric and gas utility companies.30 These energy regulatory agencies 
operated alone until the 1970s, when many states established energy 
offices to engage in statewide energy planning and management of energy 
grant programs. A few also created siting boards to deal separately with the 
environmental and other impacts of siting energy infrastructure. Most 
recently, several states have diversified their energy-agency ecosystems by 
creating special administrative bodies to advance decarbonization goals 
and to ensure a more just energy transition. 
1. State Public Utility Commissions. — State PUCs were “experiments” of 
the Progressive Era in the early part of the twentieth century—
experiments that endured.31 These commissions go by a variety of names, 
including Public Service Commissions and Corporation Commissions,32 
but their core duties are similar. The commissions regulate “public utili-
ties”—businesses that offer essential services like electricity, gas, and 
water.33 These utility service providers were seen as natural monopolies 
that could operate more efficiently if they had exclusive rights to serve 
customers within assigned territories.34 Strong regulators were therefore 
needed to ensure that monopoly utilities did not take advantage of the 
lack of competition to charge extortionist rates. 
Commissions oversee the entry and exit of utilities in the marketplace 
and regulate utility rates to ensure that they are “just and reasonable” and 
                                                                                                                           
 30. See Boyd, Public Utility, supra note 16, at 1640 (“Beginning with New York and 
Wisconsin in 1907, regulation by state commission spread rapidly across the country . . . . 
Ten years later, twenty-four states had enacted public utility legislation. By 1930, every state 
but Delaware had a public utility statute . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 31. Id. at 1646–47 (“The broad concept of public utility advanced by progressives and 
legal realists thus embodied a pragmatic approach to competition and markets in an era of 
rapid industrial change . . . .”); see also Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by 
Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 
1111, 1116 (2000) (“Throughout the Progressive Era and the New Deal, a multitude of new 
agencies were established using the ICC as their prototype.”). 
 32. For a full list of Commissions, see Regulatory Commissions, Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. 
Util. Comm’rs, https://www.naruc.org/about-naruc/regulatory-commissions [https://pe 
rma.cc/H45J-PQE2] (last visited Oct. 25, 2020). 
 33. As William Boyd chronicles, during this period, “public utility was seen as a 
common, collective enterprise aimed at managing a series of vital network industries that 
were too important to be left exclusively to market forces.” Boyd, Public Utility, supra note 
16, at 1635. 
 34. See Paul L. Joskow, Regulation of Natural Monopoly, in 2 Handbook of Law and 
Economics 1227, 1229 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). 
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not discriminatory or preferential.35 Essentially, commissioners seek to 
approximate what competitive rates for utility products and services would 
be. In most states, PUCs also grant certificates for the construction of new 
utility infrastructure (including power plants and power lines), oversee the 
siting of that infrastructure, and superintend longer-term utility plan-
ning.36 Each of these tasks in isolation, and certainly in combination, gives 
commissions a crucial role to play in determining the mix of generation 
technologies that utilities will use to satisfy customer demand. 
State commissions are not identical. Commission names vary from 
state to state.37 So too does the source of their authority. In several states, 
the commission is established by the state constitution, while in others it is 
a statutory creation.38 Some state commissioners are elected. Others are 
appointed.39 Commissions also vary in terms of their organization. For 
example, some state commissions include offices of consumer counsel 
within the commission, while in other states, these offices are housed 
within the state Attorney General’s office or elsewhere.40 But these com-
missions share one common attribute: Since their genesis, they have 
                                                                                                                           
 35. See Eric Filipink, Nat’l Regul. Rsch. Inst., Serving the “Public Interest”—
Traditional vs Expansive Utility Regulation 11–12 (2009), https://pubs.naruc.org/pub/ 
FA864C03-DC7D-B239-9E29-4D68D1807BE4 [https://perma.cc/KB6K-TSYF] (citing 
Charles F. Phillips, Jr., The Regulation of Public Utilities: Theory and Practice 132 (3d ed. 
1993)). 
 36. See Miles Keogh, Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Util. Comm’rs, A Thrill Packed Introduction 
to State Public Utility Commissions 9, 19 (2010), https://www.epa.gov/ 
sites/production/files/2016-03/documents/a_thrill_packed_introduction_to_state_public 
_utility_commissions.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZKS-JWJA] (transcript available at EPA, An 
Overview of State Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) for State Environment and Energy 
Officials (2010), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-03/documents/transcr 
ipt_-_state_public_utility_commission_overview_for_energy_and_environment_officials.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J4GB-R5EE]). 
 37. Compare Regul. Comm’n of Alaska, http://rca.alaska.gov/RCAWeb/home.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/UH5A-TPQC] (last visited Oct. 25, 2020) (Regulatory Commission of 
Alaska), with Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, https://www.azcc.gov [https://perma.cc/P5VH-CK3C] 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2020) (Arizona Corporation Commission), and Del. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, https://depsc.delaware.gov [https://perma.cc/GR7E-7AAF] (last visited Oct. 25, 
2020) (Delaware Public Service Commission). For a full list of state utility commissions, see 
Regulatory Commissions, supra note 32. 
 38. See Miriam Seifter, Understanding State Agency Independence, 117 Mich. L. Rev. 
1537, 1556 (2019) [hereinafter Seifter, Understanding State Agency Independence] (“The 
choice to constitutionalize an office has usually corresponded to its perceived import.”). 
 39. See Danielle Sass Byrnett & Daniel Shea, Nat’l Council on Elec. Pol’y, Engagement 
Between Public Utility Commissions and State Legislatures 2 (2019), https://www.ncsl.org/ 
Portals/1/Documents/energy/NCSL_NARUC_Engage_Leg_PUCs_34251.pdf [https://pe 
rma.cc/8R4G-PSCE] (observing that commissioners are elected by the public in eleven 
states). 
 40. Michael Murphy & Francine Sevel, Nat’l Regul. Rsch. Inst., The Role of Utility 
Consumer Advocates in a Restructured Regulatory Environment 9 (2004), https://pubs. 
naruc.org/pub/FA8626E1-0000-871D-4660-18F3E7238C8A [https://perma.cc/8KL2-45SZ] 
(describing the different positions of consumer advocates in state government and noting 
that more than half the states have an independent consumer advocate office). 
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remained the dominant actors in state electricity policy.41 Another com-
monality is that, like many other regulatory agencies established during 
the Progressive Era, PUCs enjoy a degree of independence from a state’s 
political leadership—especially from the state governor—and reflect the 
deep faith in the idea of expert administration championed by James 
Landis and others.42 
Over time, stakeholders and commentators have subjected PUCs to a 
variety of criticisms.43 The classic critique is that PUCs are too easily 
captured by the industries they regulate. According to this critique, utility 
companies engage in successful rent-seeking behavior at commissions, 
lining their own pockets at the expense of ratepayers.44 Marver Bernstein 
argued that commissions become more susceptible to industry influence 
over time, and that, as they age, “they tend to relate their goals and 
objectives to the demands of dominant interest groups in the economy.”45 
George Stigler concurred two decades later that “regulation is acquired by 
the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.”46 
While there have been critiques of the capture theory, including that its 
force is exaggerated,47 that the theory is oversimplified,48 and that the 
                                                                                                                           
 41. See Joel B. Eisen, Emily Hammond, Jim Rossi, David B. Spence & Hannah J. 
Wiseman, Energy, Economics and the Environment: Cases and Materials 83 (5th ed. 2020) 
(“[T]oday most utility regulation begins with a provision . . . that designates the enterprises 
to be regulated and the type of regulatory powers that may be exercised over them. State 
regulatory control is exercised by a specialized agency of government, which . . . may be a 
PSC or a PUC.”). 
 42. See Landis, supra note 17, at 23–24 (“With the rise of regulation, the need for 
expertness became dominant; for the art of regulating an industry requires knowledge of 
the details of its operations . . . .”); see also Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by 
Independent Commission 27, 51 (1955) (“[T]he [independent] commission seemed more 
promising than the executive departments with respect to the development of a high degree 
of expertness and the capacity to handle difficult and technical regulatory problems.”). 
 43. A substantial debate took place in the 1970s about the origins of PUCs, with some 
arguing in favor of public interest motivations, others that commissions addressed market 
failures associated with monopoly, and still others that utilities supported state public utility 
regulation as a response to what was seen to be less generous regulation by municipalities. 
See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3, 3 
(1971) (describing the debate and its major participants). 
 44. See, e.g., Barry G. Rabe, Statehouse and Greenhouse: The Emerging Politics of 
American Climate Change Policy 55 (2004) (noting that the Texas PUC “was widely 
perceived as a classic model of a ‘captured’ regulatory body” in the 1970s due to its 
eagerness to meet utility demands and absence of “concern for providing mechanisms for 
citizen or environmental group input”); James W. Fesler, The Independence of State Utility 
Commissions, II, 3 J. Pol. 42, 65–66 (1941) (“Utility commissions naturally tend to stress the 
judicial functions to the neglect of their function of protecting the consumer.”). 
 45. Bernstein, supra note 42, at 92. 
 46. Stigler, supra note 43, at 3. 
 47. Chris Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic 
Regulation”, in The Oxford Handbook of Classics in Public Policy and Administration 287, 
292–93 (Martin Lodge, Edward C. Page & Steven J. Balla eds., 2015). 
 48. Id. at 294. 
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empirical evidence Stigler offered is insufficient,49 the basic premise that 
regulated industries can influence their regulators, sometimes to excess, is 
so accepted today that “it all seems rather obvious”50 and has become a 
“ground norm” in the assessment of regulation.51 
The second critique of PUCs is related to the first: Commissions 
frequently do not live up to the ideal of expert bodies. Because commis-
sioners lack the inherent qualifications, or the expert staffs and other 
resources to substitute for them, some argue, PUCs cannot act as successful 
counterweights to utilities, which have significant informational advantages.52 
Commissions’ frequently broad responsibilities regulating electric, gas, 
water, and transportation utilities (among others) make it difficult if not 
impossible to procure commissioners with subject-matter expertise in each 
of the areas they regulate. Moreover, in eleven states, commissioners are 
elected by popular vote.53 While public selection of commissioners can 
avoid cronyism, it may also yield commissioners whose experience is 
political rather than technical. Indeed, across all commissions, the most 
common previous work experience is that of a state legislator.54 Moreover, 
the Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) who decide some commission cases 
in the first instance are lawyers by training and may lack substantive 
expertise.55 In fact, as one former commissioner observed, “It is generally 
lawyers who make the arguments, conduct the examination and cross-
examination of witnesses, write and apply the procedural rules, and 
ultimately write decisions.”56 
Expert staff can compensate for expertise gaps at the commissioner 
and ALJ levels, but many commissions have limited resources in this 
                                                                                                                           
 49. Id. at 293–94. 
 50. Id. at 292. On the critiques of capture theory, see Stefan H. Krieger, An Advocacy 
Model for Representation of Low-Income Intervenors in State Public Utility Proceedings, 
22 Ariz. St. L.J. 639, 654–55 (1990) [hereinafter Krieger, An Advocacy Model] (noting that 
the life cycle theory “falls short as an historical predictor of actual agency behavior” but 
remains a “useful conceptual and pedagogical metaphor”). 
 51. William J. Novak, A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture, in Preventing 
Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It 25, 25–48 (Daniel 
Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2013). Novak argues that while capture theory itself may 
be a creature of the early twentieth century, a broader awareness of “private coercion in a 
democratic republic” remains helpful in analyzing regulatory arrangements. Id. at 25–26. 
 52. This might be the case in states where commissioners are elected rather than 
appointed, for example (although even appointed commissioners may lack expertise in the 
subject matter they oversee). 
 53. These states are Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, 
North Dakota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. See John Dunbar, 
Nice Work if You Can Get It: Political Patronage Rules in State Utility Commissions, Ctr. for 
Pub. Integrity (Nov. 17, 2005), https://publicintegrity.org/inequality-poverty-opportunity/ 
nice-work-if-you-can-get-it [https://perma.cc/7A4Y-7R23] (last updated May 19, 2014). 
 54. See id. 
 55. See Ashley C. Brown, The Overjudicialization of Regulatory Decisionmaking, Nat. 
Res. & Env’t, Fall 1990, at 20, 21. 
 56. Id. at 22. 
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regard. A 2017 report by the National Regulatory Research Institute, an 
arm of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners 
(NARUC), observed that PUCs around the country face both increasing 
legislative demands and shrinking resources.57 Low salaries contribute to 
a dearth of technical expertise on commission staff.58 The authors also 
flagged an absence of professional staff development and continuing 
education as particularly harmful in an era of rapid energy system evolution.59 
Third, some accuse PUCs of excessive judicialization.60 While PUC 
proceedings do not involve the same degree of “motions practice” as 
judicial trials, most rely to some extent on exhibits, witness testimony, and 
cross-examination to surface the facts and arguments in a given case.61 
There are typically also various motions filed by parties to seek interven-
tion, to adjust deadlines, and to review both interim and final commission 
decisions.62 Many commissions assign adjudicatory matters to an ALJ in the 
first instance, creating a tiered system of internal review that further 
extends the time and complexity of proceedings.63 In the succinct words 
of an early critic, “Regulatory commissions take too long in disposing of 
contested rate filings or license applications.”64 
The fourth critique follows from the third, asserting that commission 
rules and procedures create barriers to access for stakeholders with limited 
resources. Environmental groups, consumer groups, local governments, 
community groups, labor organizations, and many others with a stake in 
the outcome of PUC proceedings may struggle to gain access to them or 
                                                                                                                           
 57. Ken Costello & Rajnish Barua, Nat’l Regul. Rsch. Inst., Report No. 17-02, 




 58. Id. at v (identifying an empty electrical engineer position at New Mexico’s Public 
Resource Commission that had proved difficult to fill due in part to low compensation). 
 59. Id. at iv–v. 
 60. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 55, at 20 (noting that, although commission dockets 
are dominated by legislative-type matters, their judicial-style process limits information flow 
through evidentiary strictures and prohibitions on ex parte communications); Fesler, supra 
note 44, at 42 (“Utility commissions have, in fact, grown more and more judicial in 
attitude . . . .”). 
 61. See NAACP Env’t & Climate Just. Program, Action Toolkit Module 3: Engaging 
Your Utility Company & Regulators 12–15, https://www.naacp.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2014/03/Module-3_Engaging-Your-Utility-Company-and-Regulators_JEP-Action-Toolkit_ 
NAACP.pdf [https://perma.cc/2H5Z-SN4T] (last visited Oct. 25, 2020) (outlining the 
stages of the regulatory process). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-6-109 (2020) (explaining the assignment of public 
utility cases to administrative law judges); Administrative Law Judges Division, Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of W. Va., http://www.psc.state.wv.us/scripts/Directory/alj.cfm [https://perma. 
cc/K3NX-9ZX2] (last visited Oct. 25, 2020) (listing Commission ALJs and describing their 
responsibilities). 
 64. Roger C. Cramton, Some Modest Suggestions for Improving Public Utility Rate 
Proceedings, 51 Iowa L. Rev. 267, 268 (1966). 
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to present their arguments at a point in the process and in a format that 
would ensure meaningful consideration. As Stefan Krieger notes, there 
was minimal interest in participation in PUC proceedings prior to the 
1970s because economies of scale in power production kept prices low.65 
As prices rose, however, individual ratepayers and consumer groups in-
creasingly sought to make their voices heard in commission proceedings.66 
Environmental organizations and concerned members of the public also 
began to intervene regularly as the environmental impacts of power 
production became better understood.67 But the virtual (or sometimes 
actual) requirement that parties be represented by legal counsel, arcane 
procedural rules, and the holding of hearings in a centralized location 
within the state all pose barriers to such participation.68 
While state offices of consumer counsel (OCCs) address some con-
cerns about stakeholder participation in public utility proceedings by 
raising ratepayer interests, a plethora of issues remain. OCCs typically 
focus on a narrow band of consumer interests.69 Most commonly, their 
focus is on keeping prices low.70 Many more complex stakeholder interests 
are simply not within OCC mandates. These include consumer interests in 
increased autonomy through distributed energy generation, interests in 
environmental protection and energy justice, and nonutility producer 
interests such as those of solar service companies and energy efficiency 
providers.71 
The four primary critiques of state PUCs still resonate, despite the 
partial restructuring of the electric and natural gas industries. In the early 
1990s, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) sought to 
increase competition in the wholesale supply of natural gas and then elec-
tricity by requiring pipelines and transmission lines to carry competitors’ 
                                                                                                                           
 65. Krieger, An Advocacy Model, supra note 50, at 639. It is also worth noting that 
before the 1970s and the rise of environmental organizations, concern about the 
environmental consequences of power production had not yet produced the coalitions that 
would come to target electricity regulatory proceedings. See Cary Coglianese, Social 
Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization of the Environmental Movement, 
150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 85, 91–94 (2001). 
 66. Krieger, An Advocacy Model, supra note 50, at 643–44. 
 67. See, e.g., David B. Spence, Regulation and the New Politics of (Energy) Market 
Entry, 95 Notre Dame L. Rev. 327, 330–31 (2019) (compiling and reporting data on 
nongovernmental organizations’ participation in siting proceedings). 
 68. See Brown, supra note 55, at 21 (“[T]he costs involved in litigating are high 
enough that only parties with very large stakes in the outcome will ever undertake serious 
intervention.”). 
 69. Colorado’s Office of Consumer Counsel is typical in this regard. Its website 
identifies its purpose as “advocating for consumers when utilities seek to raise their rates.” 
About the OCC, Colo. Dep’t of Regul. Agencies Off. Consumer Couns., https://occ.colo 
rado.gov/about-occ [https://perma.cc/83XX-5NTE] (last visited Oct. 25, 2020). 
 70. See Sharon B. Jacobs, The Energy Prosumer, 43 Ecology L.Q. 519, 554–55 (2016) 
[hereinafter Jacobs, The Energy Prosumer] (explaining the limitations in consumer counsel 
office mandates). 
 71. Id. 
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products on fair terms.72 This led to more entrants into the wholesale 
supply business, leading FERC to relax regulation in areas where there was 
sufficient competition to discipline prices.73 It also led to the creation of 
regional wholesale energy markets where retail utilities can purchase 
power. 
Several states opted for comparable restructuring at the retail level. 
These states required monopoly utilities to distribute competitors’ retail 
gas and electricity on their systems, again on fair terms. This gave end-use 
customers a choice of electricity and gas providers.74 Even though state 
commissions in restructured states no longer set the retail rates for the gas 
and electricity products themselves, they now oversee competitive markets 
and enforce compliance by competitive providers with laws and regula-
tions.75 The commissions also perform their traditional regulatory func-
tions for the transportation and distribution of those products. This in-
cludes overseeing the operations of the monopoly distribution utilities in 
their states.76 In addition, commissions with siting and planning oversight 
responsibilities continue to exercise them.77 In restructured states, utility 
planning obligations are sometimes referred to as procurement planning, 
as opposed to resource planning, to indicate that the utilities may be 
purchasing their gas or electricity rather than sourcing it from their own 
affiliates.78 
                                                                                                                           
 72. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 75 FERC ¶ 61,080 (Apr. 24, 1996), 
https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/rm95-8-00v.txt (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (increasing competition in power generation by requiring transmission 
providers to offer the same prices and terms to all customers); Pipeline Service Obligations 
and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implementing Transportation Under Part 284 
of the Commission’s Regulations, 59 FERC ¶ 61,030 (Apr. 8, 1992), https://www.ferc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/2020-05/rm91-11-000.txt (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(increasing competition in natural gas extraction and sale by requiring transportation 
providers to to offer the same prices and terms to all customers). 
 73. Eisen et al., supra note 41, 683–85. 
 74. On electricity restructuring at the retail level, see id. at 769. On retail gas 
restructuring, see Natural Gas Explained: Natural Gas Customer Choice Programs, U.S. 
Energy Info. Admin., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/customer-choice-
programs.php [https://perma.cc/Y6HP-645U] (last updated Oct. 2, 2020). 
 75. See, e.g., Lisa M. Quilici, Danielle S. Powers, Gregg H. Therrien, Benjamin O. Davis 
& Olivia A. Prieto, Concentric Energy Advisors, Retail Competition in Electricity: What Have 
We Learned in 20 Years? 16 (2019), https://ceadvisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/ 
07/AEPG-FINAL-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/69TC-3LVM] (describing state regulators’ 
role in restructured electricity markets). 
 76. See id. 
 77. See, e.g., Elise N. Zoli, Power Plant Siting in a Restructured World: Is There Light 
at the End of the Tunnel?, 16 Nat. Res. & Env’t 252, 252 (2002) (noting that the California 
Energy Commission was responsible for siting power plants both before and after 
restructuring). 
 78. See Rachel Wilson & Bruce Biewald, Synapse Energy Econ., Best Practices in 
Electric Utility Integrated Resource Planning: Examples of State Regulations and Recent 
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2. State Energy Offices. — For a long time, PUCs were the only electricity 
regulators in the states. The next generative period for state energy 
agencies did not occur until the 1970s, when oil price shocks led to acute 
fears about adequate energy supply.79 At the federal level, there were calls 
for consolidated executive control over the energy system and energy plan-
ning that culminated in the creation of the DOE in 1977.80 As explained 
elsewhere, this was an incomplete victory for President Jimmy Carter in 
that Congress divided authorities between the new Department and an 
independent FERC.81 Thus, key energy regulatory powers remained in an 
agency with at least some independence from the chief executive. 
Many states also created stand-alone energy offices between 1973 and 
1977 by legislation or executive order.82 Like state PUCs, these offices vary 
in form and in responsibilities. But each administers federal grant pro-
grams for energy efficiency and conservation, and indeed this was a 
primary justification for their creation.83 One condition of these federal 
grants was that states engage in annual energy planning, and energy offices 
oversee this process as well.84 
Creation of state energy offices was also related to the growing interest 
in gubernatorial reorganization of state government during this period. 
James Conant documents twenty-two state executive reorganizations from 
                                                                                                                           
Utility Plans 8 (2013), https://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rapsyn 
apse-wilsonbiewald-bestpracticesinirp-2013-jun-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/5E6B-F5BK]. 
 79. See Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power 607–08 
(1991). 
 80. Jacobs, Statutory Separation of Powers, supra note 19, at 383. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See infra Appendix. Other states also created energy offices of some form, even if 
these were not stand-alone. See Alfred R. Light, Federalism and the Energy Crisis: A View 
from the States, 6 Publius 81, 87 (1976) (“In response to a question posed by the National 
Governors’ Conference Energy Project in October 1974, 41 of 49 responding state and 
territorial governments reported that their jurisdictions had ‘comprehensive’ energy 
offices.”). 
 83. See Jonas J. Monast & Sarah K. Adair, A Triple Bottom Line for Electric Utility 
Regulation: Aligning State-Level Energy, Environmental, and Consumer Protection Goals, 
38 Colum. J. Env’t L. 1, 18 (2013) (noting that state energy offices may administer programs 
to incentivize consumer investment in energy efficiency or renewable energy programs); see 
also In re Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., No. 06I-448E, 2007 WL 2297358, at *9 (Colo. P.U.C. July 
24, 2007) (observing that the Governor’s Energy Office “stated that energy conservation 
and [demand-side management] are part of its core values and that its mission, in part, is to 
advance those issues . . . and to ensure that they stay front and center”). 
 84. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, State Energy Program: Operations Manual 6 (2017), 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/06/f34/SEP-ops-manual_0720.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D7GU-THXR]; see also 2 C.F.R. §§ 200.100–200.521 (2020) 
(establishing the administrative requirements, cost principles, and audit requirements for 
Federal Awards). 
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the period 1965 to 1987.85 Of the above-referenced states,86 only New 
Mexico’s Energy, Minerals, and Natural Resources Department emerged 
directly from a reorganization.87 But one of the core principles driving 
these reorganizations—the idea that increased executive control of admin-
istrative activity would improve government—motivated the creation of 
energy offices as well.88 Certainly, the creation of new energy agencies sub-
ject to gubernatorial control shifted some of the power over state energy 
policy from state legislatures and the PUCs to the governor’s mansion. 
Today, state energy offices oversee a broad portfolio of functions, with 
responsibilities varying by state. Energy offices frequently work to coordi-
nate and advance state energy plans as well as legislative and gubernatorial 
priorities.89 They might also propose legislation and executive actions.90 
Energy offices in some states gather energy data and information on 
energy consumption and in other specialized areas.91 They may also 
engage in public education and outreach.92 In states that have restructured 
their energy systems at the distribution level by allowing providers to 
compete for customers, energy offices can oversee consumer education 
and outreach about these programs. Rhode Island’s legislature, for 
                                                                                                                           
 85. James K. Conant, In the Shadow of Wilson and Brownlow: Executive Branch 
Reorganization in the States, 1965 to 1987, 48 Pub. Admin. Rev. 892, 894 (1988) 
[hereinafter Conant, In the Shadow of Wilson and Brownlow]. 
 86. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 87. See N.M. Legis. Council Serv., Government Restructuring Task Force: Final Report 
2010, at 47 (2010), https://www.innovations.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/opex/ 
documents/New%20Mexico%20Government%20Restructuring%20Task%20Force%20Rep
ort.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y95E-DCFK]. 
 88. See Conant, In the Shadow of Wilson and Brownlow, supra note 85, at 892–93. The 
1937 Brownlow Committee’s report concluded, for example, that a thriving democracy 
required “a responsible and effective chief executive as the center of energy, direction and 
administrative management.” The President’s Comm. on Admin. Mgmt., Report of the 
Committee with Studies of Administrative Management in the Federal Government 3 
(1937). 
 89. Rhode Island’s Office of Energy Resources, for example, must “[d]evelop and put 
into effect plans and programs to promote, encourage, and assist the provision of energy 
resources for Rhode Island in a manner that enhances economic well-being, social equity, 
and environmental quality.” 42 R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-140-3(1) (2020). 
 90. One example is Delaware’s State Energy Office, which may “[r]ecommend 
legislative or other initiatives” to support energy conservation initiatives. Del. Code tit. 29, 
§ 8053(c)(3) (2020). 
 91. For example, California’s Energy Commission undertakes “a continuing 
assessment of trends in the consumption of electrical energy” and collects “forecasts of 
future supplies and consumption of all forms of energy.” Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 25216(a)–
(b) (2020). South Carolina’s Energy Office “collect[s] currently published and publicly 
available energy data and provide[s] energy information clearinghouse functions” in the 
state. S.C. Code Ann. § 48-52-420(10) (2020). 
 92. The purpose of Utah’s Office of Energy Development is to “advance energy 
education, outreach, and research, including the creation of elementary, higher education, 
and technical college energy education programs.” Utah Code § 63M-4-401(3)(c) (2020). 
Alaska’s Energy Authority promotes “conservation, energy efficiency, and alternative energy 
through training and public education.” Alaska Stat. § 44.83.080(17) (2020). 
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example, tasked the state Office of Energy Resources with developing 
consumer-disclosure forms for installation of distributed solar.93 Some 
state energy offices also intervene in PUC proceedings, either as of right 
or at the discretion of the Commission.94 They may also participate in 
federal energy regulatory proceedings or otherwise engage with federal 
regulators.95 
Gubernatorial priorities shape the actions of energy offices. Even 
where statutes set office mandates, the offices may skew de facto toward 
executive preferences in implementation of their duties day-to-day. For 
example, due to a reauthorization fight at the state legislature that resulted 
in a compromise between senate Republicans and Democrats, the 
Colorado Energy Office’s statutory mandate is broad. In addition to 
promoting energy efficiency and clean energy, including by promoting the 
state renewable energy standard, the office must promote “[t]raditional 
energy sources such as oil and other petroleum products, coal, propane, 
and natural gas.”96 Nevertheless, on its website, the Office defines its 
mission as “[r]educ[ing] greenhouse gas emissions and consumer energy 
costs by advancing clean energy, energy efficiency and zero emission 
vehicles to benefit all Coloradans.”97 The exercise of this kind of discretion 
in implementation is not unusual. Broad statutory charges offer significant 
flexibility to prioritize particular elements of those charges.98 It is 
                                                                                                                           
 93. Ryan M. Belmore, Rep. Ruggiero Pleased with New Consumer Protection Effort 
for Solar Customers, What’s Up Newp (Oct. 1, 2019), https://whatsupnewp.com/ 
2019/10/rep-ruggiero-pleased-with-new-consumer-protection-effort-for-solar-customers 
[https://perma.cc/6FDN-VTWM]. The Rhode Island House passed a resolution “respect-
fully requesting” that the Energy Office create these forms. H.R. 5991, 2019 Gen. Assemb., 
Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2019). 
 94. See, e.g., Delta-Montrose Elec. Ass’n v. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, 
No. 18F-0866E, 2019 WL 467998, at *1 (Colo. P.U.C. Jan. 30, 2019) (noting that the 
Colorado Energy Office has the statutory authority to intervene as of right in PUC 
proceedings). 
 95. See, e.g., ISO New England Inc., Order Denying Waiver Request, Instituting 
Section 206 Proceeding, and Extending Deadlines, 164 FERC ¶ 61,003, app. A (July 2, 
2018), https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2018/07/er18-1509-000_7-2-18_ 
order_deny_waiver_request.pdf [https://perma.cc/R94P-S9B2] (identifying the Maine 
Governor’s Energy Office as an entity that filed “interventions, protests and/or 
comments”); see also Taylor Curtis, Aaron Levine & Kurt Johnson, Nat’l Renewable Energy 
Lab’y & Telluride Energy, State Models to Incentivize and Streamline Small Hydropower 
Development 12–14 (2017), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy18osti/70098.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/5MRX-Y3KP] (identifying the Colorado Energy Office as the point of contact for the 
implementation of a pilot program on small hydropower siting under a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the State of Colorado and FERC). 
 96. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-38.5-102(1)(a)(IV) (2020). 
 97. About Us, Colo. Energy Off., https://energyoffice.colorado.gov/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/A5KX-BXAC] [hereinafter Colorado About Us] (last visited Oct. 25, 
2020). 
 98. Thus, Western Resource Advocates, a nonprofit organization in Colorado, argued 
in a PUC proceeding that the Colorado Energy Office had not specified “how it will balance 
its broad statutory charges with its singular statutory charge of protecting the environment 
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predictable that a state governor, who appoints the head of state energy 
offices in most cases, would thereby exert greater control over how 
mandates are executed.99 
3. Energy Infrastructure Siting Boards. — During this same era, many 
states also created separate siting boards.100 Depending on the state, the 
siting of energy infrastructure can be either a local or state responsibility, 
or the responsibility can be shared.101 Where statewide permission is 
required, either in the form of a Certificate of Public Convenience and 
Necessity (an authorization to proceed) or in the form of approval of a 
particular site for the infrastructure, states vest this authority either in the 
PUC or in a separate body.102 
A primary driver for creating separate siting boards was environmental. 
During this period, states were increasingly focused on environmental 
protection, and many created state environmental agencies and passed or 
amended environmental protection statutes following the establishment 
of the federal EPA.103 As states increasingly recognized the environmental 
impacts of new, large power plants and other energy infrastructure, they 
required review of those impacts by government regulators.104 Nuclear 
plants were of particular concern. For example, one of the impetuses for 
the 1974 creation of the California Energy Commission, which also has 
                                                                                                                           
in the context of this proceeding.” Black Hills Colo. Elec., LLC, No. 19A-0660E, 2020 WL 
837749, at *8 (Colo. P.U.C. Feb. 12, 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
WRA Petition for Leave to Intervene at 14, Black Hills Colo. Elec., No. 19A-0660E). 
 99. Sometimes these broad mandates can create tensions that energy offices must 
balance. See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., No. 17A-0462EG, 2018 WL 2933532, at *25 (Colo. 
P.U.C. June 6, 2018) (Moser, Comm’r, dissenting) (implying irony in the Colorado Energy 
Office’s opposition to portions of a settlement that would have kept amounts spent on 
demand-side management relatively low “despite the fact that reducing energy costs for 
consumers is one of its key components to its mission and vision” [sic]). 
 100. While several boards were created during this period, states continued to create 
separate siting bodies over the ensuing decades. For example, the New Hampshire Energy 
Facility Site Evaluation Committee was created in 1990. Overview, N.H. Site Evaluation 
Comm., https://www.nhsec.nh.gov/overview/index.htm [https://perma.cc/GQ4X-5UB8] 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2020). 
 101. For a survey of state approaches as they relate to wind energy infrastructure, see 
Jaclyn Kahn & Laura Shields, State Approaches to Wind Energy Facility Siting, Nat’l Conf. 
of State Legislatures (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/state-wind-
energy-siting.aspx [https://perma.cc/KL6T-7T2T]. 
 102. For a listing of states that have created separate siting bodies, see infra Appendix. 
 103. See JoyAnna Hopper, Environmental Agencies in the United States: The Enduring 
Power of Organization Design and State Politics 8–9 (2020) (describing the calculations of 
various states during this period in deciding whether to create a new, separate 
environmental agency or to continue to house environmental functions in existing 
departments). 
 104. See Daniel P. Selmi, Themes in the Evolution of the State Environmental Policy 
Acts, 38 Urb. Law. 949, 954 (2006) (observing that, by 1975, many states had adopted their 
own versions of the federal National Environmental Policy Act to require review of the 
environmental impacts of major state actions). 
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responsibility for siting energy facilities, was concern about proposed 
nuclear plants in the state.105 
Twelve states have some type of separate siting office or agency.106 
Arizona created its siting committee in 1971 to mitigate siting delays, in 
part by creating a centralized review process,107 as well as to minimize 
effects on the environment and citizens’ quality of life.108 An additional 
goal was to enable participation by “interested and affected individuals, 
groups, county and municipal governments and other public bodies” in 
siting decisions.109 To this end, there is public representation on the siting 
board, and the board holds meetings open to the general public as part of 
its decisionmaking.110 
Similarly, Connecticut created its Siting Council in 1972 following 
passage of the Public Utility Environmental Standards Act.111 The state’s 
goal in creating the Council was to balance the “environment and ecology 
of the state” with more traditional energy infrastructure goals, such as low-
cost energy.112 The Connecticut Council too includes members of the 
public alongside members from government.113 
New York boasts the nation’s newest siting office, the Office of Renewable 
Energy Siting, established in 2020 to streamline the siting of renewable 
energy facilities in order to meet state decarbonization goals.114 This office, 
                                                                                                                           
 105. K.K. DuVivier, The Superagency Solution, 46 McGeorge L. Rev. 189, 197–98 
(2014). 
 106. See infra Appendix. Some of these are formally nested within the state PUC, but 
are independent in their operations. For example, the Arizona Power Plant and 
Transmission Line Siting Committee is located within the state Corporation Commission 
but operates independently from it. See Arizona Power Plant, Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 
https://www.azcc.gov/arizona-power-plant/line-siting-committee [https://perma.cc/T72 
V-Y32R] (last visited Oct. 25, 2020). For similar examples, see Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 278.702 
(West 2020) (stating that the Kentucky State Board on Electric Generation and 
Transmission Siting is “attached to the Public Service Commission for administrative 
purposes”); Mass Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 164, § 69H (West 2019) (describing the Massachusetts 
Siting Board as “an energy facilities siting board within the department, but not under the 
supervision or control of the department”). 
 107. See Arizona Power Plant, supra note 106. Similarly, the New Hampshire Site 
Evaluation Committee was created “to provide one stop shopping for regulatory review and 
permitting of newly proposed large energy facilities.” NH Site Evaluation Committee, Soc’y 
for the Prot. of N.H. Forests, https://forestsociety.org/advocacy-issue/nh-site-evaluation-
committee [https://perma.cc/6UZX-J7AW] (last visited Oct. 25, 2020). 
 108. Act of Apr. 16, 1971, ch. 67, sec. 1, 1971 Ariz. Sess. Laws 179, 180 (codified as 
amended at Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 40-360 to 40-360.13 (2020)). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 40-360.01, 40-360.04. 
 111. Conn. Siting Council, About Us, Ct.gov, https://portal.ct.gov/CSC/Common-
Elements/Common-Elements/Connecticut-Siting-Council---Description 
[https://perma.cc/S3QJ-93E3] (last visited Oct. 25, 2020). 
 112. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-50g (2020). 
 113. Id. § 16-50j. 
 114. Robert Walton, New York Becomes First State to Establish Renewables Siting Office 
in an Effort to Speed Up Deployment, Util. Dive (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.utility 
2021] AGENCY GENESIS 855 
the first of its kind, explicitly prioritizes the siting of renewable energy 
infrastructure at speed so that the state can meets its goal of seventy-
percent renewable electricity by 2030.115 The office could become a model 
for other states, especially those that have also set ambitious clean energy 
or renewable energy goals. 
4. Energy Transition Agencies. — The latest wave of state-energy-agency 
creation began in the early 2000s and is ongoing. Concerns about climate 
change and the resulting desire to decarbonize state energy economies 
characterize the current movement. The wave is not as uniform as those 
described above. Many of these new institutions are coordinating bodies 
that pull their membership from the leadership of existing state agencies. 
Some of the new administrative bodies are task forces or other less formal 
institutions. Others are offices within the executive branch. With respect 
to substance, some states combine climate and energy transition mandates 
within a single body while others emphasize one or the other. And in a 
nod to the fraught and sometimes partisan character of the energy transi-
tion debate, a few states have even created administrative bodies that dou-
ble down on fossil energy production. These design choices, too, are a 
product of the climate and energy transition movement, albeit reactionary 
ones. 
First, some states have created climate councils or other bodies whose 
broader mandates include energy. The Maine Climate Council, for 
example, has an Energy Working Group tasked with evaluating and 
recommending actions to mitigate climate emissions for the state’s energy 
sector and to increase energy system resilience in the face of anticipated 
climate impacts.116 New Mexico’s interagency Climate Change Task Force, 
established by executive order in 2019, has a mandate to consider 
renewable energy generation.117 Wisconsin’s Task Force on Climate 
                                                                                                                           
dive.com/news/new-york-becomes-1st-state-to-establish-renewables-siting-office-in-an-effo/ 
575591 [https://perma.cc/98GJ-RXED]. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See State of Me., Governor’s Off. of Pol’y Innovation & the Future, Energy Working 
Group, Maine.gov, https://www.maine.gov/future/initiatives/climate/climate-council/ 
energy [https://perma.cc/2CNN-4YBS] (last visited Oct. 25, 2020). The Group is currently 
working on the issues of grid planning and load flexibility, clean energy supply, renewable 
fuels, and energy financing. Id. The council includes representatives from the Governor’s 
Energy Office, the Public Utilities Commission, the Office of the Public Advocate, the Maine 
Department of Labor, local governments, the state legislature, stakeholders (including local 
utilities, consumer groups, and environmental groups), as well as subject-matter experts 
from state universities and elsewhere. State of Me., Governor’s Off. of Pol’y Innovation & 
the Future, Maine Climate Council Energy Working Group Membership List 1, 
https://www.maine.gov/future/sites/maine.gov.future/files/inline-files/EnergyWG_Mem 
berList_191223.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TFD-QF2D] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020). 
 117. N.M. Exec. Order No. 2019-003 (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.governor.state.nm.us 
/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/EO_2019-003.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3XV-PB7C] [here-
inafter New Mexico Executive Order]. 
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Change, created by executive order in 2019, must make recommendations 
to create a clean energy economy in the state.118 
Other states have created or reinvented energy offices to respond to 
climate risks. Then-Governor Bill Ritter transformed Colorado’s Energy 
Office in 2007 when he tasked it with promoting renewable energy and 
energy efficiency.119 Rhode Island transformed its state energy office into 
a freestanding Office of Energy Resources in 2006.120 Other states have 
embraced reorganization as a strategy to refocus existing administrative 
resources on new challenges, with or without expanded substantive agency 
mandates.121 In January 2020, Kansas Governor Laura Kelly announced a 
plan to move the Kansas Energy Office out of the Kansas Corporation 
Commission (the state’s PUC equivalent) and transform it into a separate, 
independent agency.122 At the same time, Governor Kelly intends to 
expand the office’s responsibilities to include energy planning, policy 
development, and stakeholder outreach.123 
Another state response to climate change has been to merge energy 
and environmental agencies, putting them under a single directorate. 
Arkansas, Connecticut, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Oklahoma 
                                                                                                                           
 118. Wis. Exec. Order No. 52 (Oct. 17, 2019), https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/ 
code/register/2019/766B/register/executive_orders/eo_52/eo_52 [https://perma.cc/5 
KMW-N9DW] [hereinafter Wisconsin Executive Order 52]. The task force, established by 
executive order in 2019, is chaired by the Lieutenant Governor and composed of state 
agency leaders as well as representatives from business, agriculture, utility companies, 
organized labor, tourism, Native Nations, and higher education. Id. 
 119. The office originated in 1977, when it was called the Office of Energy Conservation. 
Two Hills Acct. & Consulting for Colo. Energy Off., State Energy Program Performance 
Audit—November 2014, at 1 (2014), https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/audits/1346p_state_energy_program_performance_audit_november_2014.pd
f [https://perma.cc/HF6G-VYNK]. 
 120. Rhode Island Energy Resources Act, 42 R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-140-2 (2020). Similarly, 
Governor Gretchen Whitmer established Michigan’s Office of Climate and Energy within 
the Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy in 2019. See About EGLE and 
Energy, Mich. Dep’t of Env’t, Great Lakes & Energy, Off. of Climate & Energy, 
https://www.michigan.gov/climateandenergy/0,4580,7-364-85452---,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/4KGZ-XVCH] (last visited Nov. 20, 2020). 
 121. Missouri transferred the State Energy Division from the Department of Economic 
Development to the Department of Natural Resources in 2019. Bryce Gray, Missouri DNR 
Will Soon Have New Oversight of State Energy Policy—A Development Some Are Treating 
with Caution, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.stltoday.com/ 
business/local/missouri-dnr-will-soon-have-new-oversight-of-state-energy-policy-a-develop 
ment-some-are/article_f56ad878-4194-5eb2-abd3-5202e1c0aeb3.html (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). The move was accomplished by executive order (in Missouri, the 
legislature has sixty days to respond to such moves, but it did not object within that time). 
Id. 
 122. Press Release, Kan. Off. of the Governor, Governor Kelly Announces 
Reorganization of Energy Office (Jan. 28, 2020), https://governor.kansas.gov/governor-
kelly-announces-reorganization-of-energy-office [https://perma.cc/SU8S-6XX7]. 
 123. Id. The press release from the Governor’s office is careful to emphasize renewable 
energy and energy efficiency goals, noting its commitment to a “sustainable and balanced 
energy future.” Id. 
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have all effected such mergers, as has the District of Columbia.124 In some 
cases, these moves appear intended to bring environmental and climate 
considerations to the fore in energy planning and decisionmaking. In 
others, the motivation may have been the reverse: to elevate energy 
concerns above environmental ones.125 
Not all states have embraced the energy transition wholeheartedly. 
North Carolina’s governor established the North Carolina Energy Policy 
Council in 2014 to support an “all-of-the-above” energy strategy.126 And 
Colorado’s legislature recently expanded its Energy Office’s mandate to 
include promotion of fossil-fuel generation alongside renewable energy 
and energy efficiency.127 In 2011, Utah’s governor created the Governor’s 
Office of Energy Development, whose purpose is to deliver “high value 
results” to the “state’s economy.”128 Similarly, Indiana’s 21st Century Energy 
Policy Development Task Force, which is composed of members of the 
legislature plus gubernatorial appointees, is tasked with preserving “reliable, 
resilient, and affordable electric service” for state residents.129 
Finally, a few states are creating energy transition–specific bodies whose 
primary task is to ensure that the transition is just and equitable. The 
Colorado Legislature created the Office of Just Transition within the 
Department of Labor and Employment in 2019.130 The office’s mission is 
to ensure a smooth transition for “coal-dependent” communities as Colorado 
moves away from fossil-fuel generation and towards its goal of one-hun-
dred-percent renewable energy by 2040.131 An advisory committee will 
                                                                                                                           
 124. See infra Appendix. 
 125. In a statement on her move to combine Oklahoma’s Energy and Environment 
Offices by executive order in 2013, Governor Mary Fallin commented that “[s]trong energy 
policy is strong environmental policy.” Joe Wertz, Q&A: Oklahoma’s New Secretary of 
Energy and Environment, NPR: StateImpact Okla. (Sept. 12, 2013), https://state 
impact.npr.org/oklahoma/2013/09/12/qa-oklahomas-new-secretary-of-energy-and-
environment [https://perma.cc/2FZ8-HQ37] (internal quotation marks omitted). When 
the new director of the merged office, Michael Teague, was asked whether his early meeting 
with energy-industry officials rather than environmental representatives reflected the 
office’s priorities, he agreed that “it does reflect the governor’s priorities.” Id. 




 127. As discussed above, however, because Colorado and its dominant electric utilities 
have committed to carbon-neutral generation by midcentury, the lion’s share of the Office’s 
work remains focused on renewable generation and energy efficiency. See supra notes 96–
97 and accompanying text. 
 128. Utah Governor’s Off. of Econ. Dev., 2019 Annual Report 48 (2019), 
https://business.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/utah-goed-2019-annual-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JWH-22J3]. 
 129. Ind. Code § 2-5-45-7 (2020). 
 130. See Act of May 28, 2019, ch. 323, 2019 Colo. Sess. Laws 2987 (codified at Colo. Rev. 
Stat. §§ 2-3-1203, 8-83-501 to -506 (2020)) (appropriating about $155,000 for implementation 
of the Act). 
 131. Id. 
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develop a “just transition” plan for submission to the governor and legis-
lature regarding benefits to coal-transition workers and grants to coal-
transition communities.132 
In a related approach, New Mexico has established new advisory com-
mittees to help distribute energy transition funds to affected communities. 
An existing agency—the Economic Development Department—will 
distribute the actual funds,133 however, new committees in each affected 
community will advise the department on fund expenditures.134 New 
Mexico’s Energy Transition Act specifies that, of the three conveners of 
these committees, each must be from the affected community, one should 
come from each major political party, and one should represent the 
Navajo Nation.135 Participants must include members from each affected 
local government, at least one member representing displaced workers, 
and at least four members representing diverse economic and cultural 
perspectives of the community.136 
B. The Logic of State Administrative Design 
This section explains the evolution of state energy architecture by 
drawing on the public administration literature on state government 
organization and the political science literature on policy diffusion. The 
public administration literature’s explication of broader waves of state 
government organization and reorganization provides the backdrop for 
this Part’s observed changes in state energy structures over time. The 
political science literature suggests an additional explanation for the 
synchronicity observed in state-agency genesis: that states are more 
inclined to adopt reforms piloted by peer states. 
The generative periods for state-level energy agencies follow a logic 
similar to the observation in the public administration literature that state 
agency creation occurs in “waves.”137 Stephen Jenks and Deil Wright 
studied the “presence and proliferation of state administrative agencies” 
across four decades from 1959 to 1989.138 They found a significant degree 
                                                                                                                           
 132. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-83-503. The statute also required utilities retiring coal-
generation plants to submit a workforce-transition plan at least six months prior to the 
retirement. Id. § 8-83-505. 
 133. Energy Transition Act, ch. 65, § 16(E)–(F), 2019 N.M. Laws 437, 477–79. The 
department must establish a public planning process in affected communities to include no 
fewer than three public meetings in that community. Id. § 16(F). 
 134. Id. § 16(C). 
 135. Id. § 16(K). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Conant, In the Shadow of Wilson and Brownlow, supra note 85, at 892, 898 n.1 
(identifying four waves of state agency creation). 
 138. Stephen S. Jenks & Deil S. Wright, An Agency-Level Approach to Change in the 
Administrative Functions of American State Governments, 25 State & Loc. Gov’t Rev. 78, 80 
tbl.1 (1993) (cleaned up). 
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of overlap in agencies from state to state.139 Additionally, they determined 
that similar agencies were created at similar times. For example, in the 
1960s at least three quarters of the states created air quality agencies.140 
Many states created small and minority business agencies in the 1980s, with 
a comparable number creating hazardous waste agencies that same 
decade.141 Mining reclamation agencies and public broadcasting systems 
popped up in the 1990s.142 
What accounts for these waves? Jenks and Wright offer several hypoth-
eses. First, they speculate that state agencies may be created in response to 
national policy initiatives and the establishment of cooperative federalism 
schemes.143 Second, they suggest that new agencies can be the result of 
“state executive-based coordination and control efforts.”144 Finally, they 
postulate that new social concerns in response to changing social and 
economic conditions can provide the impetus for new administrative 
bodies.145 
The pattern of energy-agency creation in the states is consistent with 
these hypotheses. As the previous section shows, most states created energy 
offices in the 1970s and 1980s in order to implement federal grant pro-
grams, supporting Jenks and Wright’s theory that state offices arise in 
response to federal schemes. The expansion of these energy offices, 
however, supports their second hypothesis, namely that new agencies can 
be tools of gubernatorial consolidation and control. And, echoing Jenks 
and Wright’s theory about the importance of social concerns, states have 
more recently been creating new types of energy agencies, including state 
siting boards and climate and energy transition offices, in response to 
public concern about climate change and our energy future. 
The similarities in agency creation across states might also be the 
product of diffusion, a phenomenon discussed primarily in the political 
science literature.146 Jack Walker is generally credited with originating the 
conversation about state policy diffusion with the publication of his 
seminal article on the topic in 1969.147 Drawing on the work of Herbert 
                                                                                                                           
 139. Id. at 79–83. 
 140. Id. at 80 tbl.1. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 81, 83. 
 144. Id. at 81. Miriam Seifter highlights this “modern move to centralization” in her 
work on state administration. Seifter, Understanding State Agency Independence, supra 
note 38, at 1559 (cleaned up). 
 145. Jenks & Wright, supra note 138, at 82–83. 
 146. A 2012 summary of the literature noted that “[o]ver the past 50 years, scholars have 
published nearly 1,000 research articles in political science and public administration 
journals about ‘policy diffusion.’” Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, Policy Diffusion: Seven 
Lessons for Scholars and Practitioners, 72 Pub. Admin. Rev. 788, 788 (2012). 
 147. Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 Am. 
Pol. Sci. Rev. 880 (1969). In addition to his theory of diffusion, Walker also posited that 
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Simon, Walker noted that state decisionmakers frequently “satisfice[],” 
choosing courses of action that seem satisfactory under the circumstances 
based on a set of heuristics, or rules of thumb.148 One of these rules of 
thumb, Walker suggests, is to look to other states (especially regional 
“leaders”) for ideas about policy innovation.149 
While the prevalence of diffusion is still subject to some debate, scholars 
broadly agree on its most likely mechanisms: learning (adoption of 
policies that have been successful elsewhere), emulation (conforming to 
norms established by other states), and competition (adoption of policies 
for a competitive advantage).150 Diffusion may also be the work of “policy 
entrepreneurs” who build broad coalitions to support change.151 Collabo-
rative associations like the National Conference of State Legislatures, the 
National Association of Governors, and the National Association of 
Attorneys General can speed and regularize diffusion.152 These organiza-
tions are sources of information and facilitate the exchange of information 
and knowledge among their members.153 
The case of state energy agencies supports several of the above ideas 
about the mechanisms of policy diffusion. Most notably, the history of 
state-energy-agency creation supports a prominent role for policy entre-
preneurs. In the energy context, the two most important national organi-
zations that can serve as conduits of learning are the National Association 
of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) (founded in 1889)154 and 
the National Association of State Energy Offices (NASEO) (founded in 
1986).155 These organizations comprise state energy officials and conduct 
policy research for their members.156 They provide fora in which state 
                                                                                                                           
states were more likely to be first adopters of innovative policies if they were larger, 
wealthier, more industrialized, and more urban. Id. at 887. 
 148. Id. at 889. 
 149. Id. at 893. 
 150. See Fabrizio Gilardi, Four Ways We Can Improve Policy Diffusion Research, 16 
State Pol. & Pol’y Q. 8, 9 (2016) (summarizing the literature). 
 151. Barry Rabe stresses the importance of “mezzo-level entrepreneurs” in innovation 
in climate change policy. Rabe, supra note 44, at 25. Rabe also notes that policymaking is 
“far more informal” in the states than at the federal level, and that individuals may have 
easier access to the governor’s office, which makes it more likely that policy entrepreneurs 
may “emerge as the trusted resident expert on a particular topic.” Id. at 27. 
 152. See Walker, supra note 147, at 891, 894 (suggesting that development of state 
norms is facilitated by “professional organizations and other forms of communication 
among state administrators”). 
 153. See id. at 894–95. 
 154. About NARUC, Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Util. Comm’rs, https://www.naruc.org/ 
about-naruc/about-naruc [https://perma.cc/NS72-6Y5W] (last visited Oct. 25, 2020). 
 155. About NASEO, Nat’l Ass’n of State Energy Offs., https://www.naseo.org/about-
naseo [https://perma.cc/UE9M-GW9Z] (last visited Oct. 25, 2020). 
 156. See NARUC Center for Partnerships & Innovation, Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Util. 
Comm’rs, https://www.naruc.org/cpi-1 [https://perma.cc/LK36-QPMR] (last visited Oct. 
25, 2020); Publications, Nat’l Ass’n of State Energy Offs., https://www.naseo.org/ 
publications [https://perma.cc/Z6C5-N5QB] (last visited Oct. 25, 2020). 
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energy officials can learn about experimentation with administrative form 
in their sister states.157 And their reports collect models from around the 
country that other states can emulate.158 
*    *    * 
The story of energy-agency genesis in the states raises the larger 
question of how new agencies come into being. The next Part considers 
this question. It also presents a framework for analyzing the central query 
of this Article: When is agency genesis a viable solution to policy concerns, 
and when might its downsides outweigh any benefits? 
II. THE LAW AND POLITICS OF AGENCY GENESIS 
This Part explains, first, how new state agencies are created. New 
agencies can be creatures of state constitutions, statutes, or executive 
orders. If the first, they owe their creation to the people of the state. If the 
second, to the legislature. If the last, to the governor. Next, this Part offers 
a framework for evaluating the costs and benefits of new agency creation. 
A. The Law of State Agency Genesis 
State constitutional and statutory law govern the mechanics of agency 
creation. Some state constitutions themselves create agencies that may 
then be modified or disbanded only by constitutional amendment.159 For 
example, the Colorado Public Utilities Commission is a creature of the 
state constitution.160 
While some state agencies have constitutional pedigree, however, 
more are created by statute or even by executive order. In some states, 
legislatures have the sole authority to create agencies.161 In others, gover-
nors have either inherent or delegated authority to reorganize the state 
                                                                                                                           
 157. See NARUC Center for Partnerships & Innovation, supra note 156; Publications, 
supra note 156. 
 158. For example, a 2020 NASEO report documents models of promoting “cleantech” 
innovation in the states. Sandy Fazeli, Nat’l Ass’n of State Energy Offs., States and Cleantech 
Innovation 12–23 (2020), https://www.naseo.org/data/sites/1/documents/publications/ 
Tech%20Innovation%20Report%20Final%20Draft%204.pdf [https://perma.cc/454D-6KRK]. 
 159. See Seifter, Understanding State Agency Independence, supra note 38, at 1555–57 
(noting, for example, that twenty-eight state constitutions create state boards of education 
or boards of regents for public universities and that six create wildlife commissions or 
boards). Most state constitutions also create executive offices other than the governor. Id. 
at 1552–55. 
 160. Colo. Const. art. XXV (delegating the regulation of utilities to a Public Utilities 
Commission but permitting the General Assembly to vest this authority in a different body 
by statute). 
 161. See Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration: Appendices, at app. B (Univ. of 
Wis. L. Sch. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Paper No. 1407, 2017), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2934671 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Seifter, Appendices]. 
Even in states where governors lack authority to create new agencies, they may sometimes 
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bureaucracy, including by creating new administrative bodies.162 Gover-
nors might also take steps short of official agency creation by reorganizing 
personnel within their own offices to create new administrative bodies or 
to refocus the mandates of existing actors. 
Legislatures create agencies by passing statutes to that effect and by 
delegating authority to the new bodies. These statutes, in nearly every 
state, are subject to some form of executive veto.163 In the vast majority of 
states, governors have line-item veto authority, meaning that they can veto 
specific provisions of a statute rather than the statute as a whole.164 Legis-
lators must then overcome these vetoes by either a two-thirds or three-
fifths vote, depending on the state.165 Some states are skeptical enough of 
new agencies that they have passed legislation requiring that all agencies 
“sunset” after five years unless the legislature reauthorizes them.166 
Governors, too, can create agencies in some states. In twenty-seven 
states, governors possess some form of reorganization authority.167 In some 
states, that authority is limited such that it would be difficult for a governor 
to create a new agency through its exercise. In Arkansas, for example, the 
governor may only exercise reorganization authority when necessary to 
comply with federal law or regulations.168 California’s governor may not 
                                                                                                                           
be able to convene less formal bodies that cannot act with the force of law. Id. app. B n.53 
(citing the example of Colorado). 
 162. See Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 483, 505–07 
(2017) [hereinafter Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration] (noting that twenty-seven 
governors possess some degree of reorganization authority). At the federal level, the 
President may only engage in administrative reorganization when Congress has authorized 
it by statute. Congress has done so several times, most recently in the Reorganization Act of 
1977 (which was briefly extended but expired in December 1984). Ronald C. Moe, Cong. 
Rsch. Serv., RL30876, The President’s Reorganization Authority: Review and Analysis 4–7 
(2001). 
 163. See Seifter, Appendices, supra note 161, at app. C. 
 164. Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 162, at 508–09; Seifter, 
Appendices, supra note 161, at app. C. 
 165. See John Haughey, State-By-State Guide to Gubernatorial Veto Types, CQ (Nov. 
14, 2016), https://info.cq.com/resources/state-by-state-guide-to-gubernatorial-veto-types 
[https://perma.cc/QLP6-AY52]. 
 166. See Brian Baugus & Feler Bose, Mercatus Ctr., Sunset Legislation in the States: 
Balancing the Legislature and the Executive 3–4 (2015), https://www.mercatus.org/ 
system/files/Baugus-Sunset-Legislation.pdf [https://perma.cc/74HU-NBHV]. At the fed-
eral level, recognizing that the creation of new boards and commissions can be a potent tool 
of executive power, Jack Beermann suggests that Congress could limit this behavior by 
statute for some period of time at the end of a presidential term to prevent “midnight” 
agency genesis. Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. Rev. 947, 
1004–05 (2003) (acknowledging the drawbacks of this and other limitations on presidential 
power during the lame-duck period but concluding that “on balance some restrictions 
would be desirable”). 
 167. Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 162, at 506; Seifter, Appendices, 
supra note 161, at app. B. 
 168. Seifter, Appendices, supra note 161, at app. B. 
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create new administrative powers.169 And in New Jersey, the governor may 
not create a “principal department.”170 In other states, gubernatorial reor-
ganizations require legislative ratification (or legislatures may veto their 
efforts).171 Notwithstanding these restrictions, executive reorganization 
authority as a tool of agency creation remains more potent in the states 
than at the federal level.172 
That state agencies and offices derive from so many different sources 
explains in part why multiplicity might occur. The next section offers a 
framework for evaluating the choice to create new agencies as opposed to 
reforming existing ones. 
B. Evaluating Agency Genesis and Agency Multiplicity 
And so we return to the question posed at the opening of this Article: 
When should policymakers create new institutions to address new prob-
lems, or problems that have been inadequately dealt with by existing 
systems? This section provides a framework for evaluating the effects of 
new agency creation. The framework surfaces key considerations that 
policymakers should take into account in deciding whether to create a new 
agency. The framework can also assist citizens in evaluating policymaker 
choices. 
Of course, agency creation comes in different forms. New agencies 
can assume new responsibilities not previously assigned to administrative 
                                                                                                                           
 169. Id. (citing Cal. Const. art. V, § 6; Cal. Gov’t Code § 12080.2 (2016)). 
 170. Id. (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:14C-4 (West 2016)). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Presidential reorganization authority lapsed with the expiration of the most recent 
Reorganization Act in 1984. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & John-Michael Seibler, Heritage Found., 
The President’s Reorganization Authority 3 (2017), https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ 
files/2017-07/LM-210_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQJ6-C29A]. 
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bodies or take on existing obligations.173 They can consolidate responsibil-
ities174 or decentralize them by breaking off mandates from previously cen-
tralized bodies.175 New agencies might have more focused mandates than 
existing agencies or be a hodge-podge of authorities.176 Their authorities 
may be distinct from or overlap with those of other agencies.177 They can 
be subject to direct control by the state executive or more insulated from 
gubernatorial control. They can be more or less responsive to voters and 
stakeholder groups. 
Variation in agency form complicates the effort to draw broad conclu-
sions about the phenomenon of genesis itself. Moreover, the potential 
advantages and disadvantages of agency genesis will vary depending on 
position, perspective, and values.178 Offering this framework is not intended 
to minimize the difficulty of estimating the actual advantages or disad-
vantages associated with each criterion. Some effects—the monetary costs 
of infrastructure and personnel in particular—will be easier to estimate 
                                                                                                                           
 173. Compare Act of May 28, 2019, ch. 323, 2019 Colo. Sess. Laws 2987 (codified at 
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 2-3-1203, 8-83-501 to -506 (2020)) (creating the Colorado Office of Just 
Transition and providing that it shall assume new responsibilities associated with workforce 
transition in Colorado coal communities), with New York State Announces Passage of 
Accelerated Renewable Energy Growth and Community Benefit Act as Part of 2020–2021 




nouncing the consolidation of existing environmental review functions within the New York 
Office of Renewable Energy Siting). 
 174. For example, the new CFPB consolidated existing consumer-protection authorities 
into a single agency. Cheryl R. Cooper & David H. Carpenter, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF10031, 
Introduction to Financial Services: The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB) 
1 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF10031.pdf [https://perma.cc/78KJ-V8PE]. On 
the potential need for greater consolidation of intelligence services, see Jeremiah Goulka & 
Michael A. Wermuth, The Law and the Creation of a New Domestic Intelligence Agency in 
the United States, in The Challenge of Domestic Intelligence in a Free Society 105, 106 
(Brian A. Jackson ed., 2009). 
 175. For example, in 1974, Congress split the Atomic Energy Commission’s functions 
between two new agencies: the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Energy Research 
and Development Administration. See John Gorham Palfrey, Energy and the Environment: 
The Special Case of Nuclear Power, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1375, 1403 (1974). 
 176. See Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Beyond Agency Core Mission, 68 Admin. L. Rev. 551, 558 
(2016) (calling the idea of an agency core mission an “outdated model” in part because 
Congressional delegations are so numerous and varied). 
 177. See Camacho & Glicksman, Reorganizing Government, supra note 21, at 40–43 
(summarizing the literature on the advantages and disadvantages of distinct and 
overlapping authority). 
 178. To take just one example, when radio broadcasts were first introduced, legislators 
“[a]ll agreed that national legislation was required, but they divided on whether to leave the 
allocation of the airwaves with the Commerce Department or entrust it to a new agency.” 
Daniel R. Ernst, The Shallow State: The Federal Communications Commission and the New 
Deal, 4 U. Pa. J.L. & Pub. Affs. 403, 410 (2019) (noting that the House of Representatives 
wanted to give responsibility to an executive department while the Senate majority preferred 
a bipartisan, independent commission). 
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than others. By contrast, benefits such as bringing increased visibility to an 
issue or the “vitality” of new agency staff are much more difficult to weigh. 
For this reason, policymakers should be wary of status quo bias. 
Yet as problematic as it is to measure the effects of agency genesis with 
any precision, it is more problematic still to ignore them. As Gregory 
Treverton observes in his evaluation of the benefits and costs of creating a 
new domestic intelligence agency, even a rough comparison of risks to 
benefits can help identify areas of disagreement and thus provide a 
“framework for debate” that may be more productive than “simply a fight 
over different final conclusions.”179 
The framework proceeds as follows. First, policymakers should con-
sider the need for a new agency. They should begin by questioning 
whether—and in what ways—existing agencies fall short. They should con-
sider whether a new agency would ameliorate any identified shortcomings, 
by either replacing or supplementing existing regulatory bodies. As part 
of this calculus, policymakers might consider whether a new agency would 
raise a policy domain’s profile or whether a new agency’s vitality could 
produce more rapid progress toward statutory goals. For example, a 
governor who seeks to highlight the importance of social justice and 
community support during the energy transition may conclude that a new 
agency or office focused on these aspects of the transition is desirable as a 
way to draw attention to the issue, to attract regulatory talent, and to make 
more rapid progress on regulatory programs. 
Second, policymakers must face the costs of creating new bureau-
cratic structures. These include the dollar costs of new personnel and 
infrastructure as well as transition inefficiencies. Third, policymakers, but 
also and perhaps especially observers and critics, should consider that new 
agencies can shift the balance of power among political actors and be-
tween members of the public and elected officials. As discussed below, 
politicians may favor agency creation as a means of increasing their own 
power over regulation in a given policy domain.180 Observers should 
scrutinize agency genesis for such effects. New agencies may also facilitate 
or complicate public participation in administrative decisionmaking and 
can make it more or less difficult to hold elected officials accountable. 
Fourth, it is crucial to consider new agencies’ relations to existing 
agencies in a given policy area. The framework therefore incorporates 
insights from the literature on the administrative separation of powers.181 
It asks both what inefficiencies and what benefits can come from conflict, 
or at least friction, between multiple agencies within the same broad 
domain. 
                                                                                                                           
 179. Gregory F. Treverton, Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence: Assessing the 
Options 99 (2008). 
 180. See infra section II.B.3. 
 181. See supra note 19. 
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Finally, policymakers should recognize that it is easier to create insti-
tutions than to destroy them. Careful weighing of the advantages and 
drawbacks of agency genesis is therefore desirable before entrenching 
administrative bodies. Reform of existing institutions to address any defi-
ciencies is also warranted, either as a complement to or in tandem with 
agency genesis. 
The following sections discuss each of these considerations in more 
detail. 
1. Shortcomings of Existing Arrangements. — Agencies are created either 
to further the political interests of their designers or to achieve public-
focused ends.182 If the latter, the typical justification is that the law and 
policy generated in the crucible of democratic institutions cannot be 
implemented effectively by existing agencies. Thus, new bodies may be 
called for. 
A new agency might be favored if no agency with a mandate to 
consider a particular problem currently exists or if policymakers or the 
public view an existing agency as weak, dysfunctional,183 biased,184 or 
conflicted.185 Politicians are more likely to replace agencies when they 
learn of “visible agency defections and failures” that damage agency 
reputations.186 The United Kingdom created a new Food Standards Agency 
because of dissatisfaction with existing food-safety regulation in the wake 
                                                                                                                           
 182. Cf. James K. Conant, Executive Branch Reorganization: Can It Be an Antidote for 
Fiscal Stress in the States?, 24 State & Loc. Gov’t Rev. 3, 5 (1992) [hereinafter Conant, 
Executive Branch Reorganization] (explaining that executive branch reorganization has 
been viewed in intellectual traditions both as an “administrative tool” and as a “political” 
one). Even the public administration literature, however, acknowledges the central role of 
politics in reorganization decisions. See, e.g., Peri E. Arnold, Reorganization and Politics: A 
Reflection on the Adequacy of Administrative Theory, 34 Pub. Admin. Rev. 205, 205 (1974) 
(declaring that “[w]hen we speak of administration, politics stares us in the face”). 
 183. See, e.g., Fred B. Samson & Fritz L. Knopf, Archaic Agencies, Muddled Missions, 
and Conservation in the 21st Century, 51 BioScience 869, 869, 872 (2001) (proposing the 
consolidation of existing natural resource agencies in a new Department of Natural 
Resources whose horizontal, geographic boundaries better conform to ecological 
provinces). 
 184. If an agency’s culture is seen as both problematic and so ingrained that change 
would be impossible, a new body may be called for. Goulka and Wermuth propose, for 
example, that “if one holds the opinion that the FBI or other government agencies 
have . . . exceeded constitutional or legal constraints that protect civil rights or liberties, a 
new agency may seem appropriate.” Goulka & Wermuth, supra note 174, at 106. 
 185. See, e.g., Luther J. Carter, Reshuffling the Bureaucracy: Nixon Proposes Pollution 
Ocean Agencies, 168 Science 1433, 1433–34 (1970) (explaining that most authorities 
subsequently consolidated in the new EPA and National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration were previously exercised by agencies also responsible for promoting 
development activities that caused pollution); Nigel Williams, U.K. Cooks Up Food 
Standards Agency, 279 Science 472, 472 (1998) (observing that food safety was previously 
handled by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fishers, and Food, which suffered from a conflict of 
interest because it served the needs of both food producers and consumers). 
 186. Johannes Kleibl, The Politics of Financial Regulatory Agency Replacement, 75 J. 
Pol. 552, 554 (2013). 
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of outbreaks of “mad cow disease,” salmonella, and E. coli.187 Canada cre-
ated a new blood-donation agency in the wake of a scandal in which thou-
sands of patients were sickened by tainted transfusions, thereby calling 
into question the existing administrative arrangements.188 Similarly, when 
financial regulators fail to ensure the stability of domestic banking, for 
example, they are more likely to be replaced.189 Where statutory mandates 
still stand, agency termination on its own will not solve the problem, 
however. In that case, a new agency, unblemished by the failures of its 
predecessor, may be preferable. 
Another reason to create a new agency might be to consolidate 
dispersed regulatory functions. For example, when President Lyndon B. 
Johnson created the Environmental Science Services Administration by 
merging the Weather Bureau and the Coast and Geodetic Survey (and 
other programs), he wrote to Congress that this would “provide a single 
national focus for our efforts to describe, understand, and predict the state 
of the oceans, the state of the lower and upper atmosphere, and the size 
and shape of the earth.”190 
The following two sections deal in more detail with two specific 
advantages of new agency creation, each of which responds to the 
deficiencies or perceived deficiencies of existing regulatory bodies. 
a. Status and Salience. — New agencies can achieve higher status than 
existing bodies because of their newness alone or because of their focus.191 
For example, the CFPB, created in 2010 by the Dodd–Frank Act, “suc-
ceeded in intensifying the focus on consumer protection in the market for 
                                                                                                                           
 187. Williams, supra note 185, at 472. One criticism of the existing food-safety agency 
in the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food was that it was captured by the very food 
producers it regulated. Id. 
 188. See Janis Hass, Cost No Object as New Agency Tries to Restore Blood System’s 
Credibility, 160 Canadian Med. Ass’n J. 699, 699 (1999); André Picard, Opinion, Have We 
Forgotten the Lessons of the Tainted Blood Scandal?, Globe & Mail (Nov. 28, 2017), 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/have-we-forgotten-the-lessons-of-the-tainted-
blood-scandal/article37097051 [https://perma.cc/EX7X-CVVC] (“The tainted-blood 
tragedy left roughly 2,000 recipients of blood and blood products infected with HIV-AIDS 
and another 30,000 infected with the hepatitis C virus (HCV) . . . . The good news is Canada 
has a much safer blood system today. Canadian Blood Services is better administered, more 
transparent and regulated properly.”). 
 189. Kleibl, supra note 186, at 555. 
 190. Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 2 of 1965: 
Environmental Science Services Administration, 1 Pub. Papers 526, 526–27 (May 13, 1965) 
[hereinafter 1965 Special Message to the Congress] (emphasizing also that the new agency 
would be better equipped to see connections across sea, earth, and the upper and lower 
atmospheres). 
 191. For example, Senator Edmund Muskie supported the establishment of an 
Environmental Protection Agency because he felt that uniting all of the programs for 
pollution control in a single agency would raise the status of environmental protection 
efforts (which could also lead to greater resources for these efforts). Carter, supra note 185, 
at 1434. 
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financial products and services.”192 Similarly, Treasury Secretary John W. 
Snow argued in favor of a new agency to oversee federal housing-finance 
programs in part because supervisory offices within existing agencies 
lacked the “stature” to perform the task effectively.193 Consolidating existing 
regulatory functions in a new agency may be seen as “ending [the] orphan 
status” of a program or set of programs.194 A nutritionist at King’s College 
London in the United Kingdom welcomed the creation of a new food-
safety agency in the 1990s because “it puts food standards on the political 
agenda.”195 
Agency genesis is a visible act with symbolic impact.196 As one com-
mentator put it, creation of a new administrative body “serves to dramatize 
the inauguration of new activity.”197 Certainly, this signaling function was 
at least a partial motivation for President Nixon’s creation of the EPA.198 
Although he considered placing the functions ultimately vested in the EPA 
in an existing department, President Nixon concluded that it was “politi-
cally necessary to create an agency focused solely on environmental mat-
ters because ‘anything else would not be seen as a fulsome response to the 
growing public perception that environmental problems were getting out 
of hand.’”199 Similarly, it cannot be coincidence that President George W. 
Bush announced the creation of a new Office of Homeland Security in the 
                                                                                                                           
 192. Eric J. Mogilnicki & Melissa S. Malpass, The First Year of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau: An Overview, 68 Bus. Law. 557, 557, 559 (2013). 
 193. Stephen LaBaton, New Agency Proposed to Oversee Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, 
N.Y. Times (Sept. 11, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/11/business/new-agency-
proposed-to-oversee-freddie-mac-and-fannie-mae.html (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
 194. See Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Agency 3, 7–8 (Pew Econ. 
Pol’y Dep’t, Fin. Reform Project Briefing Paper No. 3, 2009), https://www.pewtrusts.org/ 
~/media/assets/2009/08/6/pewlevitancfpa.pdf [https://perma.cc/43V5-62U2] (advocating 
for the consolidation of consumer-protection authorities spread across eleven federal 
government agencies in a single regulator). 
 195. Williams, supra note 185, at 472. 
 196. As Stephen Wilks and Ian Bartle put it, “[P]olitical acts can be purposive and goal 
orientated, or they can be ritualistic and reassuring.” Stephen Wilks & Ian Bartle, The 
Unanticipated Consequences of Creating Independent Competition Agencies, 25 W. Eur. 
Pol. 148, 155 (2002). 
 197. Milton Musicus, Reappraising Reorganization, 24 Pub. Admin. Rev. 107, 108 
(1964). 
 198. Special Message to the Congress About Reorganization Plans to Establish the 
Environmental Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, 1 Pub. Papers 578, 579, 585 (July 9, 1970) [hereinafter 1970 Special Message 
to the Congress] (emphasizing the coordination advantages of consolidating environmental 
functions in a new agency). 
 199. Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 181, 196 (2011) 
[hereinafter Marisam, Duplicative Delegations] (quoting Douglas M. Costle: Oral History 
Interview, EPA (Jan. 2001), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/douglas-m-costle-oral-
history-interview.html [https://perma.cc/YQG4-EACV]). Combining agency functions 
previously spread between multiple bodies may be especially appealing to an executive 
seeking to consolidate control. 
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White House a mere nine days after the September 11 attacks.200 And 
Stephen Wilks and Ian Bartle argue that the creation of independent 
competition agencies in Europe was “motivated by a need to reassure and 
to appear to act.”201 
The signal might be genuine, of course, even if it also carries political 
benefit. Jenks and Wright suggest that the existence of a state administrative 
agency tasked with particular responsibilities is an indicator of the 
significance of those responsibilities for the state.202 But politicians who 
create new agencies can still take credit for responding to a crisis, fulfilling 
campaign promises, or empowering various constituencies, even if the new 
agency has weak powers or inadequate resources and is therefore unlikely 
to be effective.203 
A new agency can also create, expand, or enhance the status of 
particular constituencies. The creation of new, independent competition 
agencies in Europe, for example, “populate[d] the policy area with actors 
(agents) who have their own priorities, interpretations, and influence.”204 
This can be especially important when the new agency amplifies voices 
previously excluded from the debate. Creation of an energy transition 
office, for example, will empower communities that will be most impacted 
by a transition away from fossil fuels. Colorado’s Office of Just Transition 
is focused on helping workers transition from coal-related jobs and ensuring 
that communities whose welfare was or is currently tied to the fossil-fuel 
economy have “more diversified, equitable, and vibrant” economic fu-
tures.205 Its creation, along with the establishment of a dedicated advisory 
committee composed of diverse stakeholders, can enhance the political 
visibility and influence of affected communities.206 Energy justice offices, 
                                                                                                                           
 200. I.M. Destler & Ivo H. Daalder, Advisors, Czars and Councils: Organizing for 
Homeland Security, Brookings Inst. (June 1, 2002), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
articles/advisors-czars-and-councils-organizing-for-homeland-security [https://perma.cc/ 
J4DG-JDRU]. See generally Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart 
Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 
1655 (2006) (questioning the effectiveness and effect on democratic values of the ultimate 
decision to consolidate intelligence functions in the new DHS and Director of National 
Intelligence). 
 201. Wilks & Bartle, supra note 196, at 148. 
 202. Jenks & Wright, supra note 138, at 79. 
 203. Creation of a new agency might give the public greater confidence in regulators 
even if the new agency is no more capable than its predecessor. See Kleibl, supra note 186, 
at 555 (“By terminating the incumbent regulatory agency and replacing it with a new one, 
governments can send a highly visible signal to the public that they are taking forceful action 
to resolve the crisis and that the failed supervision regime is being replaced with a new and 
sound regulatory structure.”). 
 204. Wilks & Bartle, supra note 196, at 148. 
 205. HB19-1314: Just Transition from Coal-Based Electrical Energy Economy, Colo. 
Gen. Assembly, https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/hb19-1314 [https://perma.cc/MXX6-
EXWZ] (last visited Oct. 26, 2020) (bill summary). 
 206. The legislation grew out of facilitated discussions between unions and 
environmental groups. Rachel M. Cohen, The Just Transition for Coal Workers Can Start 
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none of which have been created to date, could do the same for a broader 
group of marginalized communities. 
b. Vitality. — Marver Bernstein argues that new agencies have a “vigor” 
stemming from the support of politicians and interest groups that is lost 
over time.207 Simply adding a new program to an existing agency, this 
suggests, is unlikely to produce the same kind of vigor as the creation of 
an entirely new entity. President Johnson seemed to subscribe to this 
theory when he defended his creation of the new Environmental Science 
Services Administration by noting that it would “promote a fresh sense of 
scientific dedication, discovery, and challenge, which are essential if we are 
to attract scientists and engineers of creativity and talent to Federal 
employment in this field.”208 Administrative youthfulness can also yield 
efficiency. In the early years of the Forest Service, “[i]mbued with a strong 
sense of mission and can-do attitude, the new agency was . . . regarded as 
the quintessential example of an efficient bureaucracy.”209 
Creation of a new administrative body can boost enthusiasm for its 
mission more generally. The media, and consequently the public, may pay 
more attention to an agency at the beginning of its life. Politicians 
interested in the new institution may provide funding and other resources. 
For these reasons and others, a new agency can attract high-quality 
leadership and staff that enhance its expertise advantage. 
Another way in which the vitality of a new entity might achieve pro-
grammatic advantage is where the new agency can bypass calcified or 
captured channels.210 Old institutions may become “fossilized, rigid, 
bureaucratic, and dominated by distant, visionless, outdated professionals.”211 
In describing the politics of change in financial regulation after the crisis 
of 2007, Daniel Carpenter argues that “[s]tatus quo government agencies 
with turf to protect—mainly the Federal Reserve”—sought to preclude the 
creation of a new, independent financial regulator.212 Carpenter suggests 
                                                                                                                           
Now. Colorado Is Showing How., In These Times (July 24, 2019), https://inthesetimes. 
com/article/colorado-just-transition-labor-coal-mine-workers-peoples-climate-movement 
[https://perma.cc/PPG3-A8MP]. Stakeholders pushed for a new office as opposed to a task 
force or advisory board specifically because they believed it would be stronger. Id. 
 207. Bernstein, supra note 42, at 80 (finding that “an agency ordinarily begins its 
administrative career in an aggressive, crusading spirit”); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, 
Administrative Law 164 (1951) (observing that “[y]oung agencies are dominated by the 
qualities of youth—energy, ambition, imagination”). 
 208. 1965 Special Message to the Congress, supra note 190, at 527. 
 209. Robert B. Keiter, Public Lands and Law Reform: Putting Theory, Policy, and 
Practice in Perspective, 2005 Utah L. Rev. 1127, 1135. 
 210. Bernstein argues that “young” regulatory agencies are more likely to seek to avoid 
capture by the industries they regulate. Bernstein, supra note 42, at 84. 
 211. Daniel Thursz, Creating New Institutions: Planning with a Payoff, 22 Soc. Work 
259, 260 (1977) (identifying the critique before rejecting it as oversimplified). 
 212. Daniel Carpenter, Institutional Strangulation: Bureaucratic Politics and Financial 
Reform in the Obama Administration, 8 Persps. on Pol. 825, 831–32 (2010) [hereinafter 
2021] AGENCY GENESIS 871 
that the Federal Reserve did little to protect consumers as an historical 
matter and began to emphasize consumer protection in its rhetoric only 
to forestall the creation of an independent consumer-protection body.213 
Congress may thus seek to create new agencies, as James Landis observed 
during the New Deal, “to avoid the inertia and capture of existing cabinet 
departments.”214 
A new agency’s vitality advantages may, of course, be short-lived.215 
New agencies age, and as they do, they may become susceptible to capture 
and calcification just like their legacy counterparts. In addition, new 
agencies are not always vital, effective entities. They can take time to reach 
their full strength.216 Further complicating the situation, the dichotomy 
between new and established agencies may not be as stark as Bernstein 
argues.217 Even mature agencies have incentives to remain effective in 
order to preserve their reputations.218 As William Kovacic argues in his 
essay about the FTC and other economic regulators, agencies signal 
quality to outsiders—including courts and legislators—by ensuring that 
their procedures are sound, that their capabilities are strong, and that 
their culture is healthy.219 Thus the magnitude of any vitality advantage will 
vary in practice. 
                                                                                                                           
Carpenter, Institutional Strangulation]. The “status quo” agencies, which Carpenter identi-
fies as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the FTC in addition to the Federal 
Reserve, may have been particularly concerned that they would lose budget and personnel 
to a new consumer agency. Id. at 831–33. 
 213. Id. at 832–36. These actions, Carpenter suggests, nearly led to the establishment of 
a consumer-protection bureau within the Federal Reserve rather than the creation of the 
CFPB as an independent agency. Id. at 837. 
 214. Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and 
Executive Agencies), 98 Cornell L. Rev. 769, 777 (2013) (citing Landis, supra note 17, at 
26–28). 
 215. Thursz, supra note 211, at 260 (noting that new institutions quickly assume the 
pathologies of the hoary institutions they replace). 
 216. William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions 
in Transition Economies, 23 Brook. J. Int’l L. 403, 414–16 (1997) (citing the FTC’s 
“turbulent beginning” during which it was hamstrung by “insipid leadership”). 
 217. For critiques of the agency life-cycle thesis, see David Martimort, The Life Cycle of 
Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs, 66 Rev. Econ. Stud. 929, 944 
(1999) (supporting the basic premise of the life-cycle thesis but identifying variables that 
could change an agency’s trajectory in specific cases); Kenneth J. Meier & John P. Plumlee, 
Regulatory Administration and Organizational Rigidity, 31 W. Pol. Q. 80, 83 (1978) 
(observing that the relationship between agencies and political support as well as interest 
groups is more complicated than Bernstein suggested). 
 218. See Carpenter, Institutional Strangulation, supra note 212, at 832 (observing that 
all agencies have an incentive to preserve their reputations as a means of enhancing 
discretion and autonomy). 
 219. William E. Kovacic, Creating a Respected Brand: How Regulatory Agencies Signal 
Quality, 22 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 237, 238–39 (2015) (explaining that investing in reputation 
pays dividends in deference from judges as well as boosts in budget and powers from 
Congress). 
872 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:835 
2. Costs. — Second, policymakers should consider the costs of any new 
institution. There are high administrative costs associated with any new 
bureaucratic institution.220 Expenses include the cost of new personnel, 
new infrastructure and supplies, and training. For the major federal 
departments, program costs, rather than administrative support costs, 
make up the majority of agency expenses.221 Even at these agencies, however, 
personnel costs make up approximately twelve percent of the budget of 
federal departments, while acquisition of assets accounts for approxi-
mately six percent.222 In the states, the breakdown can be quite different. 
The Hawaii Energy Office, for example, spends ninety percent of its 
budget on personnel costs.223 
Agency start-up costs are particularly high,224 and an agency may be 
less well-equipped to tackle problems at the start of its tenure, notwith-
standing the “vitality advantage” discussed above, because it lacks experi-
ence and has not yet created problem-solving routines.225 Jonas Monast 
and Sarah Adair note that agency reorganization can be disruptive in part 
because it requires agency actors to “develop new relationships and 
communication patterns to perform their normal tasks.”226 
Even merging existing agencies can have costly effects, including the 
costs of enacting new legislation, the potential loss of experienced staff, 
and disruptions in regulatory operations during the transition.227 But 
                                                                                                                           
 220. See, e.g., Cathy Marie Johnson, New Wine in New Bottles: The Case of the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, 50 Pub. Admin. Rev. 74, 75 (1990) (describing the 
myriad tasks facing the newly created Consumer Product Safety Commission, including the 
establishment of standard operating procedures for writing regulations); Arthur L. Levine, 
NASA’s Organizational Structure: The Price of Decentralization, 52 Pub. Admin. Rev. 198, 
199 (1992) (noting that it often “takes years for a new agency to develop a solid 
organizational base and to launch major new initiatives”). Cathy Marie Johnson observes 
that it was not until four years after its creation that the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission began to implement more sophisticated, proactive processes that led to the 
prioritization of standards for more hazardous products. Johnson, supra, at 79. 
 221. The Budgetary Implications of Eliminating a Cabinet Department, CBO, 
https://www.cbo.gov/content/budgetary-implications-eliminating-cabinet-department 
[https://perma.cc/4B4W-8FBJ] (last visited Oct. 26, 2020). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Off. of the Auditor, State of Haw., Audit of the Hawai’i State Energy Office: A 
Report to the Governor and the Legislature of the State of Hawai’i 14–15 (2018), 
https://files.hawaii.gov/auditor/Reports/2018/18-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZDX7-J7AS]. 
 224. For example, the new DHS spent considerable time and effort integrating and 
coordinating the missions of the twenty-two separate agencies placed under its control. 
Charles Perrow, The Disaster After 9/11: The Department of Homeland Security and the 
Intelligence Reorganization, 2 Homeland Sec. Affs. 1, 12 (2006). Some employees went 
without telephones for weeks because there was simply no budget for them. Id. at 11. 
 225. Johnson, supra note 220, at 74 (emphasizing the importance of “routines, stability, 
past experience, and incremental changes in organizational decision making”). 
 226. Monast & Adair, supra note 83, at 59. 
 227. José de Luna Martínez & Thomas A. Rose, International Survey of Integrated 
Financial Sector Supervision 27–29 (World Bank Pol’y Rsch. Working Paper No. 3096, 
2003), https://ssrn.com/abstract=636458 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (basing 
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merging existing administrative bodies might also create economies, and 
in fact cost savings are frequently cited as a justification for agency 
consolidation.228 
For some, increasing the size of administrative government is unpal-
atable in any form.229 For others, bureaucracy is inevitable—even desira-
ble—but expensive or redundant bureaucracy is unwelcome.230 For those 
in either camp, the costs of establishing a new agency are enough reason 
for pause.231 Costs may be particularly unwelcome when existing institu-
tions could instead be reformed to address concerns. Daniel Thursz 
advocates caution around “creating new institutions when goals remain 
unrealized through existing structural arrangements.”232 He offers as an 
example the Office of Economic Opportunity, the agency created to 
administer President Johnson’s “Great Society” social welfare programs. 
That agency, in turn, spawned additional new institutions across the 
country.233 Thursz suggests that existing welfare agencies, including the 
Travelers Aid Association, could have been modified to fulfill the same 
functions. This would have avoided “a virtual reinvention of the wheel by 
persons who really had no background in this field,” wasting “huge sums 
of money.”234 
3. Political Considerations. — It is also important to consider whether 
creating a new agency will shift the balance of power over regulatory 
                                                                                                                           
conclusions on an examination of fourteen countries that merged financial oversight 
agencies). 
 228. Two of the primary recommendations in President Woodrow Wilson’s 1887 article, 
The Study of Administration, were to increase efficiency and economy in government. Conant, 
In the Shadow of Wilson and Brownlow, supra note 85, at 892; see also, e.g., 1965 Special 
Message to the Congress, supra note 190, at 400 (asserting that creation of the 
Environmental Science Services Administration in the Department of Commerce by 
merging existing bodies would produce economies by eliminating overlapping systems and 
permitting more efficient use of administrative staff); The President Presents Plan No. I to 
Carry Out the Provisions of the Reorganization Act, 1 Pub. Papers 245, 246 (Apr. 25, 1939) 
(“It is our responsibility to make sure that the peoples’ Government is in condition to carry 
out the peoples’ will, promptly, effectively, without waste or lost motion.”). 
 229. See Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 482 F.2d 672, 686 n.15 
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that Wilson opposed creation of what would become the Federal 
Trade Commission “simply on the ground that additional bureaucracy was undesirable per 
se”). 
 230. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, The Trump 
Administration’s Pandemic Response Is Structured to Fail, Regul. Rev. (May 19, 2020), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2020/05/19/camacho-glicksman-trump-administration-
pandemic-response-structured-fail [https://perma.cc/GGQ2-AQ2T] (observing that over-
lapping authority has resulted in waste). 
 231. See Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities Investor 
Protection Act, Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
1071, 1143 (1999) (rejecting the idea of creating a new agency to regulate holding 
companies as “cumbersome, costly, and politically distasteful”). 
 232. Thursz, supra note 211, at 259. 
 233. Id. at 260. 
 234. Id. 
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decisionmaking. New agencies can affect the nature and extent of top-
down control by political actors as well as the effectiveness of bottom-up 
influence by stakeholders and other citizens. 
Agencies are not mere pawns of the political branches.235 And yet, by 
design, agencies are subject to political control. Legislatures exert control 
over agencies through their initial delegations and subsequently via 
funding, oversight, and less formal measures.236 Presidents and governors 
can control agencies to a greater or lesser extent depending on struc-
ture,237 and executives, like legislatures, use agency creation and design as 
a tool of political control.238 
Politicians might favor genesis over reinvention of existing agencies 
for several reasons. First, they can use agency genesis to signal a high level 
of support for particular initiatives.239 Second, they may feel that existing 
administrative bodies are controlled by competitors. Joel Seligman has 
suggested, for example, that Senator Carter Glass pushed for creation of 
the SEC because he was concerned that the FTC “was controlled by . . . 
New Deal reformers.”240 Third, political will to remake the existing agency 
may be lacking, especially when employees, regulated entities, and 
stakeholders have grown familiar with its practices. Or the existing 
                                                                                                                           
 235. See Brigham Daniels, Agency as Principal, 48 Ga. L. Rev. 335, 401–11 (2014) 
(cataloging ways in which agencies can control the elected branches); Gillian E. Metzger, 
Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1739, 1742–43 (2015) (observing 
that “agencies are not simply pawns in a battle between the two parties or institutional 
struggle among the political branches of national government”). 
 236. For a summary of the literature on congressional control of the bureaucracy, see 
Feinstein, supra note 18, at 266–71. 
 237. For a review of the criteria that make agencies more or less independent from the 
presidency at the federal level, see generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, The Future of Agency 
Independence, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 599 (2010) (discussing mechanisms that make so-called 
“independent” agencies more subject to presidential control); Datla & Revesz, supra note 
214 (identifying seven structural indicia of independence); Jennifer L. Selin, What Makes 
an Agency Independent?, 59 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 971 (2015) (emphasizing statutory provisions 
that insulate agency decisions from review by political principles). 
 238. See William G. Howell & David E. Lewis, Agencies by Presidential Design, 64 J. Pol. 
1095, 1096–99 (2002) (discussing presidential tools of agency control). Rational choice 
theorists advise that “[p]olitical institutions are established because organized groups of 
people seek to achieve certain purposes that can be realized only by creating new institutions 
or modifying old ones.” Alexander Ovodenko & Robert O. Keohane, Institutional Diffusion 
in International Environmental Affairs, 88 Int’l Affs. 523, 523 (2012). 
 239. See Carter, supra note 185, at 1433 (suggesting that reshuffles occur due to “new 
perception of certain national problems or opportunities, shifts in political priorities, and 
the rise and fall of certain agencies and bureaucrats”); see also Conant, Executive Branch 
Reorganization, supra note 182, at 5 (citing the political science position that executives 
seek reorganizations to signal policy priorities and to reassure constituents that their 
interests are being protected). Indeed, newly elected governors may feel “an obligation to 
create machinery to implement campaign pledges.” Musicus, supra note 197, at 107. 
 240. Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street: A History of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance 97 (1982) (suggesting also that 
Senator Glass and his allies hoped the SEC would prove a less effective regulator). 
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agency’s current configuration may continue to serve some important 
function or functions notwithstanding its flaws. 
William Howell and David Lewis have drawn attention to presidential 
creation of agencies as a tool of political influence.241 They note that, 
between World War II and 2002, Presidents created over half of new 
federal agencies unilaterally.242 In creating these new agencies, they argue, 
presidents maximized their own control over the new administrative 
bodies.243 While emphasizing that “a strong, independent agency is 
needed”244 when he established the EPA, for example, President Nixon 
created an agency most would agree is subject to a significant degree of 
presidential influence.245 By contrast, under conditions of divided 
government when Congress can muster strong majorities, any new 
agencies are likely to be independent as opposed to executive.246 
At the state level, too, politicians will typically create new agencies 
whose structures make them more responsive to those actors’ prefer-
ences.247 Miriam Seifter notes the degree of “raw partisanship” on display 
                                                                                                                           
 241. Howell & Lewis, supra note 238, at 1096–99. 
 242. Id. at 1096. 
 243. Id. Independent commissions are not wholly beyond the reach of presidential 
influence. But that influence is proportionately less and takes longer to establish. Neal 
Devins and David Lewis have found that Presidents are less effective than one might think 
at rapidly appointing partisans to staff independent commissions. Neal Devins & David E. 
Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional 
Design, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 459, 460–61 (2008) (“[S]tatutory limits on the President’s 
appointment and removal powers are effective: opposition-party members do not share the 
President’s priorities and Presidents are unable to quickly appoint a majority of 
commissioners.”). 
 244. 1970 Special Message to the Congress, supra note 198, at 874. 
 245. For perspectives on EPA politicization, see Richard N.L. Andrews, The EPA at 40: 
An Historical Perspective, 21 Duke Env’t L. & Pol’y Forum 223, 239 (2011) (describing 
increased politicization of the agency’s scientific and rulemaking processes); Madeline June 
Kass, Presidentially Appointed Environmental Agency Saboteurs, 87 UMKC L. Rev. 697, 
700–01 (2019) (arguing that political appointees at the agency exercise undue influence). 
 246. See David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political 
Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946–1997, at 127 (2003); Patrick 
Corrigan & Richard L. Revesz, The Genesis of Independent Agencies, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 637, 
680 (2017); Roberta Romano, Does Agency Structure Affect Agency Decisionmaking? 
Implications of the CFPB’s Design for Administrative Governance, 36 Yale J. on Regul. 273, 
286 (2019) (citing Lewis, supra, and Corrigan & Revesz, supra, at 680); see also Gyung-Ho 
Jeong, Gary J. Miller & Andrew C. Sobel, Political Compromise and Bureaucratic Structure: 
The Political Origins of the Federal Reserve System, 25 J.L. Econ. & Org. 472, 486–88 (2009) 
(explaining the creation of an independent Federal Reserve as the product of compromise 
between legislators with different preferences). 
 247. See Seifter, Understanding State Agency Independence, supra note 38, at 1545 
(citing the example of Maryland’s Democrat-controlled legislature authorizing its Attorney 
General to sue the federal government without their Republican governor’s permission). 
An even more cynical perspective holds that executive branch reorganizations are 
undertaken to “reward friends and punish enemies.” Conant, Executive Branch 
Reorganization, supra note 182, at 5. Governors may also manipulate bureaucratic 
structures to build a record for a presidential run. See Rabe, supra note 44, at 39 (noting 
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in the design of state agencies and in gubernatorial efforts to control 
them.248 Governors will tend to prefer agencies with a single head that they 
can remove at will.249 By contrast, legislatures may prefer multimember 
commissions whose members may only be removed by the governor for 
cause.250 The case of PUCs is instructive. Some states elect their utility 
commissioners directly.251 In such “plural executive” states, since governors 
cannot appoint commissioners, they may see creation of companion energy 
agencies as an especially appealing way to exert control over state energy 
policy. Even in states where governors appoint commissioners, the 
appointment power may be less appealing as a tool of influence than 
agency genesis. Where removal protections exist, governors must wait to 
appoint sympathetic commissioners until existing commissioners’ terms 
expire.252 And there is always the risk that a commissioner will act in ways 
that diverge from the governor’s preferences once appointed. Thus, the 
creation of new agencies whose heads serve at the governor’s pleasure 
offers more certain influence. 
The public, too, can see its policy influence wax or wane when a new 
agency is created. How a new agency shifts the dynamics of political 
responsiveness and accountability is very much in the details. It depends 
not only on agency structure, but on whether the new agency replaces or 
joins an existing agency in the same policy space. Where there are multiple 
agencies with authority in the same domain, it can be harder to know 
whom to hold accountable for a particular policy choice. Multiplicity can 
therefore complicate monitoring (for the legislature as well as for the pub-
lic).253 Multiple agencies might also increase the expense to stakeholders 
of influencing policy by forcing them to lobby several different govern-
ment entities. But multiple agencies might also increase transparency if 
                                                                                                                           
that Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush all 
emphasized their economic records as state governors in their successful White House 
runs). 
 248. Seifter, Understanding State Agency Independence, supra note 38, at 1589. 
 249. An early commentator notes that new governors may find themselves faced with 
“an inordinate number of agencies often directed by persons not subject to his 
appointment.” Musicus, supra note 197, at 107. 
 250. Ganesh Sitaraman and Ariel Dobkin argue in favor of single-director agencies over 
multimember commissions on efficacy and accountability grounds. See Sitaraman & 
Dobkin, supra note 18, at 724. Meanwhile, it has been argued elsewhere that multimember 
commissions offer deliberative benefits that can produce better-considered policy. Sharon 
B. Jacobs, Administrative Dissents, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 541, 586–90 (2017). 
 251. Byrnett & Shea, supra note 39, at 2. 
 252. In Florida, for example, governors may only remove public utility commissioners 
before expiration of their terms for “malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect of duty, 
drunkenness, incompetence, permanent inability to perform official duties, or commission 
of a felony.” Fla. Const. art. IV, § 7 (applied to public utility commissioners by Fla. Stat. 
§ 350.03 (2020)). 
 253. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 194, at 3 (noting that Congress lacked a dedicated 
monitoring capacity for the consumer-protection functions split between eleven different 
government agencies prior to the CFPB’s creation). 
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the agencies’ interactions with one another make internal discussions 
more visible.254 
4. Interagency Dynamics. — Multiplicity creates coordination problems 
and increases the likelihood of interagency conflict. Yet while each of these 
presents challenges, they can also yield benefits. Agencies that coordinate 
with peer agencies might be able to accomplish policy aims more effec-
tively than single agencies acting in the same field. 255 And conflict between 
agencies can be productive if it promotes transparency and stimulates 
creative thinking.256 
a. Coordination. — Agencies might coordinate their activities in a num-
ber of ways. In a 2012 article, Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi offer a typology 
of agency coordination tools that includes consultation, agreements, joint 
policymaking, and presidential management of coordination.257 Jason 
Marisam observes that agencies can contribute their expertise to one 
another in a kind of “interagency marketplace.”258 Statutes or executive 
orders may require coordination, or agencies may engage in it voluntarily.259 
At the federal level, the President sometimes convenes interagency bodies 
to facilitate this coordination.260 Such convening may be seen as a weak 
form of agency genesis because while the new bodies are given important 
responsibilities, they may have limited resources, narrow mandates, 
consensus requirements, and little muscle. 
If agencies within a given policy domain do not coordinate their 
activities, they could produce redundant work, at best, and undermine 
policy, at worst. Dan Walters argues that “the energy transition is like a 
bridge or a jigsaw puzzle: unless and until all the necessary pieces come 
together, the project as a whole and the individual pieces themselves are 
                                                                                                                           
 254. See Musicus, supra note 197, at 109 (observing that “[t]he presence of numerous 
smaller agencies permits maximum public oversight of administrative operations” as 
compared with concentrated administrative power). 
 255. Camacho and Glicksman characterize coordination as concerning “the extent and 
type of interactions between agencies.” Camacho & Glicksman, Reorganizing Government, 
supra note 21, at 43. 
 256. On the potential benefits of agency conflict, see Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph 
O’Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 1375, 1416–32 (2017). 
 257. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 
Harv. L. Rev. 1131, 1155–81 (2012). 
 258. Jason Marisam, The Interagency Marketplace, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 886, 886–88 (2012) 
(describing interagency agreements for the exchange of services under the Economy Act of 
1932); see also Jason Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 Ariz. St. L.J. 183, 189–91 
(2013) (describing contributions of expertise by one agency to another). 
 259. Jason Marisam suggests that Congress, the President, and the Judiciary each have 
tools available to coordinate agency action and that agencies themselves might coordinate 
voluntarily. Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, supra note 199, at 198–218. 
 260. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117, 52,124 (Oct. 8, 2009) 
(requiring agencies to actively participate in the Interagency Climate Change Adaptation 
Task Force). 
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of substantially less value.”261 A successful energy transition will require the 
achievement of complementary goals, oversight of which may be assigned 
to different regulators. Experts from the National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory, for example, use policy stacking theory to conclude that 
adoption of electric-vehicle policies should be staged in order to achieve 
maximum deployment at the lowest cost.262 Authority to implement 
policies such as electric-vehicle incentives, mandates, and interconnection 
may be delegated to different agencies within a state. Coordinating such 
policy strategies is complex enough when one agency is tasked with 
implementation. Where multiple agencies might be working at cross-
purposes, they are more difficult still. 
b. Checking and Balancing. — As scholars have observed, agencies can 
serve as effective counterweights to one another in a system of administrative 
checks and balances.263 In part for this reason, the DOJ resisted consolidation 
of existing financial agencies into a single entity on the ground that 
“jurisdictional competition among agencies is an assurance of effective 
regulation” since “a single agency with responsibility for everything . . . will 
frequently become highly protective of the firms that it is responsible 
for.”264 Similarly, when the U.S. intelligence agencies were consolidated 
and domestic surveillance capabilities were enhanced after September 11, 
2001, a set of privacy-protection offices were also established “to counter-
balance the new surveillance authority.”265 
Agencies might operate as checks on one another in a variety of ways. 
One agency might participate in another’s rulemaking or adjudicatory 
proceedings. In Colorado, for example, several state agencies participate 
regularly as parties in PUC proceedings, including the Colorado Energy 
Office and the Office of Consumer Counsel, each of which represents a 
                                                                                                                           
 261. Daniel E. Walters, Lumpy Social Goods in Energy Decarbonization 9 (June 30, 
2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 262. V.A. Krasko & E. Doris, Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab’y, Strategic Sequencing for 
State Distributed PV Policies: A Quantitative Analysis of Policy Impacts and Interactions 20–
21 (2012), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/56428.pdf [https://perma.cc/LYE3-UMM6]. 
 263. Jacobs, Statutory Separation of Powers, supra note 19, at 390, 394. On the benefits 
of administrative checks and balances more broadly, see generally Katyal, supra note 19 
(exploring the effects on presidential power of divisions within the executive branch); 
Metzger, Interdependent Relationship, supra note 19 (concluding that internal executive 
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 264. Paul R. Verkuil, Perspectives on Reform of Financial Institutions, 83 Yale L.J. 1349, 
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standards” and that “there is no reason to believe that the present multiagency 
arrangement” was free from undue industry influence). 
 265. Marc Rotenberg, The Sui Generis Privacy Agency: How the United States 
Institutionalized Privacy Oversight After 9-11, at 2 (Sept. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=933690 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). At the same time, 
Congress refused calls to establish a free-standing, independent privacy agency. Id. 
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different aspect of the public interest.266 Agencies might also serve as 
watchdogs for one another, reporting bias, waste, or other improper 
actions to political actors or to the public. Agencies within the same space 
can also step in to move policy forward when another agency falters. These 
redundancies can ensure forward policy motion even when individual 
agency programs stall. Friction can also be counterproductive, however, as 
when agencies spend time and resources on conflict with peer agencies.267 
Thus, finding a happy medium of productive friction is an important 
component of multiple-agency governance. 
5. Stickiness. — A final point is that agency genesis can result in a 
patchwork of legacy agencies, not all of which are necessary to accomplish 
regulatory goals.268 While agency termination does occur,269 inertia favors 
the status quo. New agencies may develop powerful constituencies that 
would oppose their demise.270 Where this happens, agency destruction can 
lead to accusations that state policymakers no longer care about particular 
constituents served by that agency.271 
Policymakers should therefore consider carefully the benefits and 
costs of agency creation before authorizing new entities. They might also 
consider approaches to retiring existing agencies that have outlived their 
usefulness. One solution to the problem of institutional perpetuity, albeit 
a draconian one, is the one devised by Colorado and several other states: 
Every agency in the state automatically sunsets after a designated period if 
not affirmatively reauthorized by the legislature.272 
*    *    * 
Ultimately, conclusions about the relative desirability of creating a 
new agency versus reforming existing institutions will reflect the way the 
                                                                                                                           
 266. The Colorado Energy Office’s stated mission is to “[r]educe greenhouse gas 
emissions and consumer energy costs by advancing clean energy, energy efficiency and zero 
emission vehicles to benefit all Coloradans.” Colorado About Us, supra note 97. 
 267. See generally Bijal Shah, Executive (Agency) Administration, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 641 
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evaluator weights the above criteria as well as degrees of confidence about 
what the future holds. The framework above, however, can assist in evalu-
ating specific agency arrangements. The next Part examines how the 
framework operates in practice by exploring the example of state energy 
agencies and the impact of administrative form on state energy transitions. 
III. ADMINISTERING THE ENERGY TRANSITION 
This Part considers the effects of state agency architecture in the 
context of the current energy moment. States are on the front lines of the 
most significant transformation of our energy system since the advent of 
electric power at the beginning of the last century. Arguably, that transfor-
mation began in the 1970s after the 1973 oil crisis underscored the 
possibility of energy shortage. Programs put in place during that decade 
encouraged efficiency and conservation, as well as diversification of supply 
to include renewable technologies.273 As Part I notes, this shift also 
produced the federal DOE and enabled the rise of energy departments or 
offices in the states. 
Until recently, however, progress toward a more diverse, more sustain-
able energy system was slow. The pressing need for transformation 
suggested by the energy crisis faded as oil from the Middle East began to 
flow westward once again.274 The next several decades saw incremental 
improvements in efficiency and conservation, as well as steady but slow 
growth in renewable generation portfolios.275 While a minority of states 
experimented with more fundamental reforms to energy regulation, 
including by introducing competition to supply electricity to consumers, 
most continued to rely on traditional generation, transmission, and distri-
bution systems.276 
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But the pace of energy transformation has accelerated in the last 
decade. Today, the push for transformation comes not from concern 
about supply but from the certain knowledge that emissions from fossil-
fuel power sources are contributing to the rapid warming of the global 
climate. Electricity production accounts for more than a quarter of U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions.277 The burning of fossil fuels across sectors 
(including transportation) is responsible for over ninety percent of U.S. 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions.278 Levels of carbon dioxide in the atmos-
phere are now higher than 400 ppm—the highest they have been in 
millennia—and are steadily and rapidly increasing.279 
The effects of these extraordinarily high levels of atmospheric green-
house gases are visible everywhere.280 Wildfires are more frequent and 
more intense: Such fires have mercilessly devoured large swaths of the 
Amazon, Australia, Indonesia, western North America, southern Europe, 
Siberia, and other parts of the world.281 Elsewhere, flooding, extreme heat, 
and more powerful storms are climate change’s most visible impacts.282 
Moreover, we are only beginning to understand the scale of the effects on 
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scientists’ tendency to underestimate the severity and imminence of politically salient 
threats to the perceived need for consensus). 
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our oceans, where warmer temperatures and acidification may lead to a 
large-scale die-off of sea life.283 
These changes are already affecting the U.S. economy and culture.284 
Global impacts are even greater. The Economist Intelligence Unit predicts 
that climate change will shrink the global economy by three percent by 
2050 compared with baseline projections.285 Climate change’s effects will 
also exacerbate social inequality both within countries286 and across 
nations.287 
Eliminating carbon from the U.S. electricity sector will not halt this 
progression on its own.288 But while moving to carbon-free electricity is not 
a sufficient step to avert the worst effects of climate change, it is a necessary 
one. Such a shift will not only eliminate carbon from power generation, 
but will also allow us to electrify the transportation sector without 
increasing emissions. 289 It will support changes to buildings and other 
infrastructure that reduce emissions from the commercial and residential 
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(U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affs., Working Paper No. 152, 2017), https://www.un.org/ 
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RealClearPolitics (July 9, 2019), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2019/07/09/ 
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3-CLGH]. 
 288. The U.S. transportation sector accounts for nearly a third of the country’s 
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percent, the commercial and residential sectors a combined twelve percent, and the 
agricultural sector ten percent. Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, EPA, 
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sectors.290 And it will reduce the industrial-sector emissions that come from 
oil and gas processing and on-site power production.291 
Federal efforts to eliminate carbon from our electricity system have 
been muted. Other than the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 
which created incentives for small renewable generation projects,292 
Congress has offered almost no positive programs addressing the shift to 
renewable generation and remarkably little direction about what the 
national fuel mix should look like.293 In the absence of federal action, the 
states will continue to drive America’s energy transition. 
The states have always been of vital importance when it comes to 
energy policy.294 In 1935, the Federal Power Act split authority over energy 
regulation between the state and federal governments, leaving states with 
the authority to regulate electric and gas utility planning, rates, and 
energy-facility siting.295 Within these broad parameters, states have adopted 
a variety of approaches to energy regulation. Those pursuing greener 
generation portfolios have experimented with feed-in tariffs,296 carbon 
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pricing,297 and direct subsidies.298 Some of the most popular tools, how-
ever, are renewable portfolio standards or clean energy standards. These 
standards are mandates for public utilities operating within a given state 
to source a certain percentage or amount of their electricity from renewa-
ble or “clean” sources (defined state-by-state) by a target date. Iowa was 
the first state to establish a renewable energy standard in 1983.299 Currently, 
twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have such standards.300 
Eight additional states have voluntary goals.301 
In the past few years, fourteen states, the District of Columbia, and 
Puerto Rico have announced one-hundred-percent renewable energy or 
carbon-free energy standards or goals.302 These states expect to eliminate 
carbon from their electricity sectors by mid-century.303 They, along with 
states with less ambitious carbon-reduction goals, have important choices 
to make about how to reduce or eliminate carbon from their electricity 
systems. They must decide whether to encourage particular low-carbon 
technologies and what form that encouragement should take. They must 
choose whether to emphasize large, utility-scale generation, to embrace 
distributed generation like rooftop solar, or to find a place for each in the 
energy transition. They must decide how much emphasis to place on 
reducing or shifting demand for electricity as opposed to constructing 
supply. And they must facilitate upgrades to the transmission and 
distribution grids to support all of these efforts. 
Regardless of the path states choose, they must navigate certain 
inevitable tradeoffs of the energy transition. Legislatures and governors 
will ideally provide broad policy direction through statutes and executive 
orders, however, agencies will manage the key day-to-day challenges of 
decarbonization. The three most important types of agency proceedings 
in this context are planning, siting, and ratemaking proceedings. 
First, as Part I notes, in most states, regulators oversee some version of 
long-term planning by electric utilities. Utilities are required to submit 
plans detailing how they will meet projected demand over a term of years. 
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These plans typically include some mix of utility-owned generation,304 gen-
eration purchased from other entities, and demand-side management.305 
This kind of long-term planning allows regulators to weigh in on a utility’s 
path to decarbonization.306 Utility commissions define the requirements 
of these plans consistent with statutory authorizations.307 
Second, state regulators oversee siting decisions for most types of 
energy infrastructure.308 Achieving rapid decarbonization of the electricity 
sector will require a rapid build-out of renewable generation facilities 
along with the siting of new transmission lines and associated infrastruc-
ture.309 These proceedings are not without controversy: Opposition from 
nearby landowners concerned about property values, visual impacts, and 
other disruptions, as well as from environmental organizations concerned 
about land use and other environmental impacts are common. 
Finally, state regulators oversee the rates that utilities may charge cus-
tomers for their products and services. The target and degree of regulatory 
oversight varies depending on the regulatory structure of the state. In tra-
ditionally regulated states, utilities submit bundled or unbundled charges 
for generation (the electricity itself) and distribution to state regulators 
for approval.310 In “restructured” or “competitive” states, by contrast, com-
petition in the generation marketplace means that state regulators oversee 
distribution system charges but allow the market to set rates for the 
electricity itself.311 With respect to the energy transition, in traditionally 
regulated states, utility commissions must decide whether and how to 
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compensate utilities for fossil-fuel plants that retire before the end of their 
useful lives.312 They must also decide whether and how utilities should 
recover the costs of new utility-scale renewable plants, new transmission 
and distribution lines, advanced grid infrastructure, and demand-side 
programs.313 
Each of the three types of proceedings described above (planning, 
siting, and ratemaking) has historically been the province of the state 
PUCs. However, some of the critiques of PUCs from Part I are more 
trenchant still in an era of energy transition. To meet state decarbonization 
goals, the electric utility industry must not only transform; it must do so 
quickly. That transformation will transfer wealth from communities and 
companies invested in the fossil-fuel economy to communities and 
companies that invest in renewable generation, energy storage, and 
demand-side management. The transition also raises important questions 
about energy justice and equity. Because the question of whether new 
agencies are advantageous turns first on whether existing institutions are 
adequate, the following subsections will explain why traditional concerns 
about PUCs may be more trenchant still in the context of the energy 
transition. The next Part then explores how newer energy agencies can 
mitigate some of those failures. 
A. Capture 
First, capture in the era of decarbonization takes on a different cast. 
The potential for massive transformation elevates the stakes for traditional 
utilities, as well as new merchant generators, and they may redouble their 
efforts to influence public officials.314 Capture may be particularly effective 
in states with elected commissions.315 In these states, industry actors can 
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pour funds into commissioner election efforts, making it more likely that 
a candidate supporting industry interests will be elected.316 In Arizona, for 
example, the incumbent utility, Arizona Public Service, allegedly spent 
millions of dollars through third-party groups in 2014 to support two 
commission candidates who won in a close election.317 Those candidates 
subsequently voted as part of a 3-2 majority to consider raising the fees 
imposed on rooftop solar customers (who many utilities view as a threat to 
their business model).318 
Of course, utilities no longer represent fossil-fuel interests in all cases. 
A growing number of utilities have pledged to divest their portfolios of 
high-carbon generation.319 At the same time, the nature of industry has 
changed.320 Today, renewable generation companies and trade groups are 
better organized and have also been active in attempting to influence 
regulators.321 
The structural and procedural concerns about capture may linger, 
however, even as the results produced by captured commissions or com-
missioners shift. In particular, the dynamics of capture will always favor 
wealthy, well-organized interests over their more diffuse, under-resourced 
counterparts.322 
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B. Expertise 
The expertise critique of PUCs also has special resonance in a climate-
changed world. This is because the types of expertise historically repre-
sented within PUCs may not be sufficient to support the energy transition. 
PUCs rely on both the internal expertise of commissioners and staff as well 
as the external expertise of parties appearing before them.323 Internally, 
PUCs remain most focused on the economic and legal questions that have 
historically defined their missions.324 Externally, the concerns about influ-
ence by better-organized groups discussed above also resonate when it 
comes to information availability. 
Furthermore, as scholars have noted, confronting climate change is 
no mere technocratic exercise.325 It requires choices between the competing 
values of low prices, environmental protection, reliability, local economic 
prosperity, and equity to an extent rarely seen over the last century. 
Traditional kinds of expertise still matter a great deal—we must be able to 
evaluate a utility’s projections for demand on its system and the cost of 
various resources, for example—but such technical expertise seldom 
yields an answer about what to do with the information gleaned. PUCs must 
make difficult decisions about whether and how quickly to pursue decar-
bonization policies, and at what cost. Technical expertise enables them to 
make such decisions in an informed manner but does not help them 
navigate hard tradeoffs. 
C. Speed 
Third, the slow pace and formality of PUC decisionmaking is ill-suited 
to the rapid transitions to low-carbon economies that experts say are 
necessary to keep global warming below catastrophic levels.326 The Edison 
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Electric Institute estimates that the average time between rate case filing 
and a commission decision is approximately ten months.327 The timeline 
to approve siting of new renewable energy facilities may be even longer, 
though this is due largely to the need for local approvals in some states 
rather than cumbersome processes at state commissions.328 Similarly, PUC 
grid-modernization proceedings can take years.329 
There is, of course, some tension between efforts to speed up deci-
sionmaking and efforts to enhance participation. Governors and other 
stakeholders may be dissatisfied with the slow pace of PUC action. But 
“one man’s delay is another man’s due process.”330 One might defend the 
judicialization of PUCs as necessary, for example, to ensure that the 
utility’s positions are tested, that stakeholder voices are heard, and that the 
evidence supporting commission action is sufficient. Even so, while 
“elements of due process are essential for fairness . . . they do not require 
a full blown judicialized decisionmaking model to be accrued.”331 As the 
next Part describes, states are experimenting with streamlined processes 
in order to speed up decisionmaking associated with the energy transition. 
D. Participation 
Barriers to stakeholder participation in PUC proceedings, while 
troubling at all times, may be even more problematic in the energy 
transition. This is in part due to the nature of discussions around the 
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https://abell.org/sites/default/files/files/Solar%20Siting%20Report%209_10_19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P5QS-EUB7] (noting that Maryland local governments caused delays in 
large-scale solar project siting after they were overwhelmed by applications). 
 329. For example, see the Oregon PUC’s distribution grid modernization process, 
which expects to produce final utility plans by 2024. Or. Pub. Util. Comm’n, UM 2005 
Distribution System Planning (2020), https://edocs.puc.state.or.us/efdocs/HAH/um2005 
hah13311.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJM9-AHLJ]. 
 330. This phrase has been attributed to a witness for the National Association of 
Manufacturers in a hearing on the potential reorganization of the National Labor Relations 
Board, as reported by James Landis. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of 
American Law 1870–1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 244 (1992). 
 331. Brown, supra note 55, at 48. 
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transition itself and in part because of the nature of its effects. With respect 
to discussions about the energy transition, as noted above, these are 
conversations rife with tradeoffs that cannot be resolved merely by 
applying rational principles to sound data. As Shelley Welton has argued, 
the process of decarbonizing our energy sector raises complex ethical 
questions.332 Participation by stakeholders who can raise and argue some 
of those questions in regulatory proceedings is one way to enhance 
democratic input into energy decisionmaking.333 
Another special challenge to participation is that the energy 
transition affects both stakeholder groups that have become regular 
participants in PUC proceedings around the country as well as 
nontraditional stakeholder groups that are less well represented in this 
forum. These nontraditional stakeholder groups include communities 
facing job losses due to the transition, existing energy justice communities 
that fear being left behind once again by a new energy economy, and other 
individuals affected by climate impacts in their personal or professional 
lives. While renewable energy industry representatives may easily come up 
with the funding and other resources required to participate effectively in 
PUC dockets, individuals and community groups face greater barriers.334 
Many states already fund a separate office of consumer counsel to 
represent ratepayer interests in commission proceedings.335 But these 
offices frequently represent the traditional, relatively narrow interests of 
many consumers in keeping rates low.336 Thus, even where states choose 
to fund these offices robustly (and many do not),337 they do not necessarily 
support the complex interests of the energy justice community, or other 
communities likely to be most impacted by failures to limit carbon from 
electricity production and use. Because we live in a world in which the 
interests at stake in public utility proceedings are no longer confined to 
those of utilities in keeping returns high and ratepayers in keeping prices 
low, states need to think more creatively when it comes to providing 
support for stakeholders in energy decisionmaking. 
                                                                                                                           
 332. Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy, supra note 20, at 583. 
 333. See id. at 623–24 (outlining a vision of energy democracy as access to process). 
 334. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 322, at 48, 53 (noting that larger groups are less likely 
to take collective action than smaller groups). 
 335. See Murphy & Sevel, supra note 40, at 26 tbl.1. 
 336. See Jacobs, The Energy Prosumer, supra note 70, at 554–55 (explaining the 
limitations in consumer counsel office mandates); see also Elin Swanson Katz & Tim 
Schneider, The Increasingly Complex Role of the Utility Consumer Advocate, 41 Energy 
L.J. 1, 4 (2020) (describing conflicts between support for policies that benefit consumers 
with behind-the-meter resources and those who cannot afford such technologies). 
 337. See, e.g., Chris Hubbuch, Assembly Bill to Boost Ratepayer Advocacy, Streamline 
Utility Regulation, Wis. St. J. (Jan. 15, 2020), https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-
and-politics/assembly-bill-to-boost-ratepayer-advocacy-streamline-utility-regulation/article_ 
fe45fa01-5586-5db2-ba6e-66190d5e7ed7.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(describing a Wisconsin assembly bill that would direct $900,000 to the Citizens Utility 
Board, an independent nonprofit organization that represents utility customers). 
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*    *    * 
The critiques of PUCs, as magnified during the energy transition, 
suggest that additional administrative bodies to manage and execute that 
transition alongside the commissions can be beneficial. As Part I describes, 
some states have placed responsibility for siting energy infrastructure in 
separate siting boards. In addition, states have tasked energy offices with 
specifying a direction for overall state energy policy. A few have even cre-
ated specialized offices to represent the needs of particular communities 
and individuals who might otherwise be disadvantaged by the transition. 
The final Part addresses the advantages and disadvantages of assigning 
some of these tasks to administrative actors outside of the PUC. It empha-
sizes the value—and challenges—of maintaining an ecosystem of multiple 
state energy agencies at this particular moment in history. 
IV. NAVIGATING THE TRANSITION: RECONFIGURATION AND REFORM 
As the historical narrative in Part I suggests, the broad trend in state-
energy-agency design has been in the direction of creating new agencies 
alongside state PUCs to administer energy laws. This Part evaluates that 
choice in the context of the energy transition that many states are 
undertaking. 
Choices about agency architecture, like all political choices, are messy 
and contingent. As states experiment with the creation of new energy 
agencies, they should recognize that new and reorganized agencies “may 
fail in ways that differ from those that prompted reorganization.”338 The 
process is one of striving toward an agency ecosystem that better promotes 
achievement of society’s goals than the previous one. 
We should not expect that the process of experimentation will itself 
be comprehensively rational. In a perfect world—or at least an administra-
tively rational one—legislators and governors would sit down and negoti-
ate energy-agency genesis or reorganization based on mutually agreed-
upon goals. When they chose to create more than one agency with 
responsibility for energy administration, they would give serious thought 
to how best to allocate specific tasks among those agencies based on their 
forms and incentives. 
In the real world, administrative ecosystems result from more 
haphazard, overlapping decisionmaking by a variety of actors, each with 
                                                                                                                           
 338. Camacho & Glicksman, Reorganizing Government, supra note 21, at 11; see also 
Joan B. Aron, The Reorganization Syndrome: The Nuclear Regulatory Case, 5 S. Rev. Pub. 
Admin. 459, 470 (1982) (observing that creation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 
1974 as part of the reorganization of nuclear agency functions in the United States produced 
“results different from those expected” and that “the unanticipated consequences are easier 
to identify in retrospect than the expected ones”). 
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their own motivations.339 Recognizing the impossibility of taking politics 
out of agency design, this Part focuses less on what a comprehensively 
rational ecosystem of state energy agencies would look like and more on 
possibilities for strengthening various existing arrangements in service of 
the energy transition. 
Whether or not particular architectural decisions will prove a boon in 
the decarbonization era depends on how well they serve functions and 
goals that PUCs are less well equipped to provide. It will also depend on 
how effectively multiple agencies can coordinate their actions to ensure 
that policy is synchronized. But one of the key advantages of multiple agen-
cies in a single domain is the productive friction that such arrangements 
can offer. Thus, states with several energy agencies should ideally maintain 
a balance between cooperation and conflict between these bodies. 
This Part applies the framework set out in Part II to weigh the 
advantages and drawbacks of creating new state energy agencies. The first 
section below suggests ways in which additional energy agencies can 
harness their newness and more focused mandates to mitigate some of the 
critiques of PUCs, especially as those weaknesses manifest in proceedings 
related to decarbonization. Next, it examines the costs and political 
ramifications of energy-agency genesis. The final section explores ways to 
temper the downsides of having multiple agencies operating in a single 
domain. As Part II discusses, these include coordination challenges and 
the maintenance of productive friction between agencies. 
A. Shortcomings of Existing Arrangements 
The creation of new state energy agencies, including energy offices, 
siting boards, and climate change or energy transition bodies, can address 
some of the critiques of PUCs the previous Part discusses. This section 
considers each in turn. It is also important, however, to consider tensions 
between these goals. Increasing participation in state-agency proceedings, 
for example, can slow down decisionmaking. A focus on technocratic 
expertise might deemphasize the lay expertise that participation by 
community groups can provide. Such tradeoffs are inevitable in the energy 
transition in particular and in governance generally.340 By surfacing them, 
                                                                                                                           
 339. While agencies can be sticky once created, their form and number can also shift as 
politics change. In Kansas in 2009, for example, Governor Kathleen Sebelius abolished the 
Kansas Energy Council established by her predecessor, citing Council bias and the 
proliferation of new energy policy bodies in the legislative and executive branches of state 
government. Tim Carpenter, Energy Council Abolished: Sebelius Acts After Panel Was 
Given a Year to Right Its Course, Climate & Energy Project (Jan. 2, 2009), http://climate 
andenergy.org/blog.965.dissolution-of-the-kansas-energy-council-kec?act=view [https://pe 
rma.cc/KU9W-V7N9]. 
 340. For a collection of academic work discussing tradeoffs in the context of the energy 
transition, see Conversations, EnergyTradeoffs.com, https://www.energytradeoffs.com/84-
2 [https://perma.cc/NY37-KBA7] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021) (publishing conversations with 
scholars and experts). 
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the framework can make institutional decisions that privilege one goal 
over another more transparent. 
1. Capture. — New agencies are not themselves immune to capture. As 
Part II suggests, however, in their early years, new agencies might resist 
capture by dominant industries to a greater extent than their legacy 
counterparts. Moreover, depending on their structures and missions, new 
agencies might be more insulated from capture than PUCs or be 
susceptible to capture by different groups. While the criticism of public 
utility capture has focused largely on capture of commissions by the 
utilities they regulate,341 energy offices tasked with promoting renewable 
generation and conservation may be more influenced by renewable energy 
and energy efficiency companies. Other energy institutions, such as the 
consumer advocate or offices of energy transition, may advance a single 
viewpoint by design. While not “capture” per se, these natural affinities 
with and duty to advocate for particular stakeholders can counter 
perspectives at a PUC more beholden to traditional utility interests. 
Other energy agencies might also serve as checks on or watchdogs for 
the PUCs. Agency genesis can bolster the administrative separation of 
powers, a series of internal checks and balances within the bureaucracy 
that can guard against private influence and perspective dominance. 
Agency genesis can thus be seen as, in the words of William Novak, part of 
“the simultaneously mundane and heroic task of attempting to blunt the 
force of perennial public corruptions and private coercions by simply 
piling on ‘all the checks and balances that human ingenuity can devise.’”342 
Where other agencies intervene in PUC proceedings, they might also 
blunt capture’s effects. William Berry has found that the presence of 
intervenors in such proceedings can change the incentive structures and 
information resources of a commission in ways that might mitigate 
capture.343 
For an example of how checking by participation might operate in 
practice, consider the Nevada PUC’s investigation into the impacts of re-
newable energy on Nevada’s “electricity rates, environment and economic 
development” in 2010.344 This was an investigation to determine how 
much distributed generation from renewable energy existing distribution 
systems in the state could support.345 While ostensibly neutral, the fact of 
the study suggested skepticism about continued expansion of distributed 
solar resources. 
                                                                                                                           
 341. See Bernstein, supra note 42, at 156 (“The limits of regulatory policy tend to be set 
by the acceptability of regulatory policies to the dominant parties in interest.”). 
 342. Novak, supra note 51, at 48. 
 343. See William D. Berry, An Alternative to the Capture Theory of Regulation: The 
Case of State Public Utility Commissions, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 524, 530–31 (1984). 
 344. Investigation Regarding the Impacts of Renewable Energy on Nevada’s Electricity 
Rates, Environment and Economic Development, No. 10-04008, 2011 WL 1820067, at *1 
(Nev. P.U.C. May 3, 2011). 
 345. Id. 
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Four individuals from the State Energy Office filed comments, along 
with its Director.346 One comment stressed that “[d]istributed generation 
can potentially expand energy options for Nevada citizens, reduce air 
pollution emissions, and diversify Nevada’s energy portfolio.”347 This 
comment also noted that “[a]n emphasis on ramping up distributed 
generation . . . will go a long way to getting Nevada out of our current 
economic funk.”348 The investigation ultimately showed that increased 
penetration of distributed generation did not threaten reliability on NV 
Energy’s distribution systems.349 While it is difficult to link any particular 
comments to outcomes in regulatory proceedings, it was significant that 
the Energy Office was able to make its voice heard in the PUC proceeding. 
2. Expertise. — As Part III discusses, PUC expertise may not be a perfect 
match for the expertise required to navigate the energy transition.350 
Energy offices and other energy agencies can help to redress any informa-
tional deficit by supplementing the PUC’s expertise. One way they can do 
this is by conducting research into specific topics crucial to the energy 
transition. For example, Hawaii’s legislature tasked the Energy Office with 
studying business models and innovative regulatory approaches for utilities.351 
                                                                                                                           
 346. See, e.g., Comment Letter from James C. Groth, Dir., Nev. State Off. of Energy, to 
Rebecca Wagner, Comm’r, Nev. Pub. Utils. Comm’n (June 28, 2010), http://pucweb1. 
state.nv.us/pdf/aximages/dockets_2010_thru_present/2010-4/2541.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/L7FB-H4QH] (stating that “I believe I hold the responsibility to conduct and fund this 
study on behalf of the enormous economic driving opportunity for all Nevadans” [sic]); 
Comment Letter from Robert C. Nellis, Energy Program Manager, Nev. State Off. of Energy, 
to Rebecca Wagner, Comm’r, Nev. Pub. Utils. Comm’n (June 25, 2010), http://puc 
web1.state.nv.us/pdf/aximages/dockets_2010_thru_present/2010-4/2529.pdf [https://pe 
rma.cc/6LC7-RGJP] (commenting that “it is vital to the State of Nevada and its economy 
that this study be led by the executive branch of the State and not the primary utility”); 
Comment Letter from Thomas A. Wilczek, Energy Program Manager, Nev. State Off. of 
Energy, to Rebecca Wagner, Comm’r, Nev. Pub. Utils. Comm’n (June 28, 2010), 
http://pucweb1.state.nv.us/pdf/aximages/dockets_2010_thru_present/2010-4/2530.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ESL9-HUUS] (commenting that “[i]t is of the utmost importance that 
the Nevada State Office of Energy . . . be allowed to proceed as the lead entity for this 
Independent Study”). 
 347. Comment Letter from Sean Sever, Energy Outreach Coordinator, Nev. State Off. 
of Energy, to Rebecca Wagner, Comm’r, Nev. Pub. Utils. Comm’n (June 28, 2010), 
http://pucweb1.state.nv.us/pdf/aximages/dockets_2010_thru_present/2010-4/2531.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HC7L-CDWX]. 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. 
 350. A report from the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory on resource planning 
suggests that “[a]s resource planning problems become more complex, from renewable 
energy integration to the role and treatment of distributed energy resources[,] state 
regulatory commissions and energy offices will need to expand and deepen their expertise 
to inform their decision making.” Fredrich Kahrl, Andrew Mills, Luke Lavin, Nancy Ryan & 
Arne Olsen, The Future of Electricity Resource Planning 5 (2016), https://emp.lbl.gov/ 
sites/all/files/lbnl-1006269.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JRH-QZDW]. 
 351. Haw. State Energy Off., Evaluation of Utility Ownership and Regulatory Models for 
Hawaii 8 (2019), https://energy.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/HI_DBEDT_ 
UtilityModelStudy.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FM8-XG4D]. 
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The Office enlisted private consultants to assist with preparing the final 
report, published in 2019.352 The report recommended adopting perfor-
mance-based rates as the best way to ensure that the state’s investor-owned 
utilities could achieve core policy objectives, including customer cost 
savings and achieving state clean energy goals.353 While PUCs might gather 
information of this sort through rulemakings, these proceedings are 
subject to the other critiques of PUC action: They are cumbersome, 
adversarial, and time-consuming; they also present high barriers to 
participation. 
Due to their specialized mandates, energy offices are particularly 
likely to develop expertise around renewable energy generation and 
energy efficiency.354 In states that have articulated renewable energy and 
energy conservation goals, energy offices can be advocates for those goals, 
including by reminding the PUC and other government agencies to act in 
harmony with them.355 
Part II suggests that new agencies might attract talent due to 
enthusiasm around their creation. Such surges of new talent might also 
enhance creative problem-solving. Rhode Island Governor Gina Raimondo 
suggested this had been the case at state energy agencies when she noted 
that “new thinking and new people” at these agencies contributed to the 
state’s adoption of renewable energy legislation.356 
Non-PUC energy agencies can also sharpen and deepen the kinds of 
localized, distributed expertise available to PUCs by educating the general 
                                                                                                                           
 352. See id. 
 353. Id. at 17. The legislature had originally asked the Energy Office to investigate 
alternative utility business models, including transitioning the state to cooperative and 
municipal utility models as well as creating independent distribution systems. Supplemental 
Appropriations Act of 2016, Act No. 124, sec. 4(7), § 7.1, 2016 Haw. Sess. Laws 254, 283. 
 354. See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 196-71 (2020) (establishing the Hawaii State Energy 
Office and tasking it with supporting efforts to achieve renewable energy, energy efficiency, 
and clean transportation goals); 42 R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-140-3 (2020) (tasking the Rhode 
Island Office of Energy Resources with coordinating energy efficiency and renewable energy 
plans, among other duties). 
 355. In Hawaii, for example, the Energy Office has a statutory mandate to work with the 
public utilities commission and other state agencies to develop and inform policies “to 
achieve energy efficiency, renewable energy, energy resiliency, and clean transportation 
goals.” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 196-71(b)(1). The legislation also notes that the energy office “shall 
be the State’s primary government entity for supporting the clean energy initiative.” Id. 
§ 196-71(c). Government agencies other than utility commissions are also taking note of 
recommendations from energy offices. See Citizens Coal. v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 
619 A.2d 940, 949 (D.C. 1993) (“The BZA also recognized that the District of Columbia 
Energy Office ‘was of the opinion that the proposed [C]ogeneration [F]acility contributes 
to the conservation of energy and promotes the energy goals and policies of the District of 
Columbia.’” (quoting BZA Finding No. 46)). 
 356. Tim Faulkner, Rhode Island’s New Renewable-Energy Laws Address Economy and 
Climate Change, EcoRI News (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.ecori.org/government/ 
2017/8/14/new-renewable-energy-laws-address-economy-and-climate 
[https://perma.cc/84QY-4NWP]. 
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public. Many energy offices are responsible for educating the public about 
energy conservation and efficiency.357 Others have broader educational 
mandates. Florida’s Office of Energy, for example, partners with the state’s 
academic institutions to provide educational outreach related to energy 
and climate change.358 Georgia’s State Energy Program has a similarly 
broad educational mission that emphasizes the social, environmental, and 
economic impacts of energy consumption.359 
Finally, when expertise runs out, representation and accountability 
can provide alternative forms of legitimacy, and non-PUC energy agencies 
might offer greater democratic accountability than their commission 
counterparts. This is because, as executive agencies with a single head, they 
are subject to direct gubernatorial oversight.360 If citizens are unhappy with 
the actions of state energy offices, they can lobby the governor for different 
policies or vote for a different governor in the next election. Perhaps be-
cause of the concerns raised about the efficacy of indirect accountability,361 
however, some state legislatures have gone further by placing members of 
the public in agency leadership positions.362 
3. Speed. — Additional agencies might speed up tasks associated with 
the energy transition in several ways. First, as the previous section 
discusses, state energy offices can provide research to support legislation 
or executive action on coal plant retirements, new infrastructure, or 
                                                                                                                           
 357. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 9-2003(1) (West 2020) (tasking the 
Maryland Energy Administration with providing educational services); Utah Code § 63M-4-
401(3)(c) (2020) (tasking the Utah Office of Energy Development with advancing energy 
education, including by creating elementary, higher education, and technical college 
energy-education programs). 
 358. Fla. Stat. § 377.6015(2)(f) (2020). 
 359. Ga. Code Ann. § 50-23-32(b)(6) (2020). 
 360. See Shah, supra note 267, at 666 (explaining the argument that independent 
agency interpretations of statutes should be entitled to less judicial deference because those 
agencies are less politically accountable as compared with executive agencies); Neal D. 
Woods & Michael Baranowski, Governors and the Bureaucracy: Executive Resources as 
Sources of Administrative Influence, 30 Int’l J. Pub. Admin. 1219, 1221 (2007) 
(“[G]ubernatorial appointment has been the power that has most consistently been found 
to be related to administrative influence.”); see also Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 
supra note 162, at 536 (noting that agencies in the states are associated with the governor’s 
administration). On the distinctions between executive oversight of executive versus 
independent agencies, arguing that presidents possess more control over independent 
agency actions than is commonly acknowledged, see Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. 
Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 599, 600–01 (2010). Lisa 
Bressman and Robert Thompson admit, however, that presidents can exert greater control 
over executive agencies. See id. 
 361. See Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 162, at 537–38 (noting the 
limitations of electoral accountability). 
 362. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 164, § 69H (West 2020) (requiring that there 
be three members of the public on the board, of whom one shall be experienced in 
environmental issues, one in labor issues, and one in energy issues). 
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transition justice.363 These overarching mandates can produce more direct 
results than waiting for the PUC to develop expertise case-by-case. 
Second, separate energy agencies with focused mandates can streamline 
the siting of new energy infrastructure. Michael Gerrard suggests that 
“one-stop (or at least few-stop) procedures for major new energy facili-
ties . . . can reduce the hurdles that project developers need to surmount, 
and at a minimum could help ensure that reviews are conducted simulta-
neously rather than sequentially.”364 
In New York, the state legislature recently created a new office to 
expedite approval of new renewable energy projects specifically. The new 
Office of Renewable Energy Siting, located within the Department of 
State, consolidates all siting functions for renewable energy projects, 
including environmental review.365 One goal of the office is to ensure that 
siting decisions are “delivered in a timely manner.”366 To that end, the 
office must “ensure that complete applications are acted upon within one 
year.”367 Commentators hope that the new office will ease a backlog of 
applications for renewable energy siting created under the previous siting 
                                                                                                                           
 363. Energy offices in many states advise their state governors or legislatures on general 
energy matters, including by recommending legislation or other legal changes. See, e.g., 
S.C. Code Ann. § 48-52-420(11) (2020) (tasking the State Energy Office with assisting the 
Governor’s Office and the General Assembly “in assessing the public economic and 
environmental interest on issues related to energy production, transportation, and use”); 
Wash. Rev. Code § 43.21F.045(2)(d) (2020) (tasking the State Energy Office with 
“[d]evelop[ing] energy policy recommendations for consideration by the governor and the 
legislature”). Offices in several states collect data that can support general energy 
policymaking. See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 25216.5(d) (2020) (designating the California 
Energy Commission as the “central repository . . . for the collection, storage, retrieval, and 
dissemination of data and information on all forms of energy supply, demand, conservation, 
public safety, research, and related subjects”); N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 1854(5) (McKinney 
2020) (describing one of the purposes of the New York State Energy Research and 
Development Authority as the accumulation and dissemination of “information relating to 
the development and use of new energy technologies and energy conservation 
technologies”). 
 364. Michael B. Gerrard, Legal Pathways for a Massive Increase in Utility-Scale 
Renewable Generation Capacity, 47 Env’t L. Rep. 10,591, 10,607 (2017). 
 365. Press Release, N.Y. State Energy Rsch. & Dev. Auth., New York State Announces 
Passage of Accelerated Renewable Energy Growth and Community Benefit Act as Part of 
2020–2021 Enacted State Budget (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/about/ 
newsroom/2020-announcements/2020-04-03-new-york-state-announces-passage-of-
accelerated-renewable-energy-growth-and-community-benefit-act-as-part-of-2020-2021-
enacted-state-budget [https://perma.cc/AW22-6Z36] [hereinafter NYSERDA, Press Release]. 
 366. Id.; see also Michael Bates, NY Legislation Creates New Siting Process for 
Renewables, N. Am. Windpower (Apr. 6, 2020), https://nawindpower.com/cuomo-passes-
renewable-energy-legislation [https://perma.cc/EW4H-EN69] (“This new law will support 
a rapid transition to clean renewable energy sources . . . .” (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Alicia Barton, President and CEO, N.Y. State Energy Rsch. & Dev. 
Auth.)). 
 367. NYSERDA, Press Release, supra note 365. The timeline is even shorter for former 
commercial and industrial sites. Id. (noting that the timeline for these sites is only six 
months). 
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regime, in which most projects took significantly longer to site than the 
twenty-four-month statutory goal.368 
Finally, energy offices can collaborate directly with the private sector, 
think tanks, and national laboratories to move the energy transition 
forward. For example, Colorado’s Energy Office is working with private 
industry, including auto manufacturers and dealers, to create an electric-
vehicle plan for the state.369 Hawaii’s State Energy Office has an explicit 
statutory mandate to “[e]ngage the private sector to help lead efforts to 
achieve renewable energy and clean transportation goals through the 
Hawaii clean energy initiative.”370 It is also partnering with the Rocky 
Mountain Institute, a nonprofit dedicated to sustainability, on a transpor-
tation-electrification project, and is working with the National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory on energy resource planning software that can model 
and visualize complex future scenarios.371 Such partnerships supplement 
the PUC’s work by producing nonutility solutions that speed the energy 
transition and by creating tools that utilities can implement in support of 
their own decarbonization efforts. 
4. Participation. — Finally, additional energy agencies can lower barriers 
to participation in state energy decisionmaking. Innovative agencies like 
Colorado’s Office of Just Transition make particular stakeholder perspec-
tives the government’s business.372 Like the push to establish offices of 
consumer counsel, this latest effort to focus government efforts on com-
munities that will be affected by the transition away from fossil fuels will 
give these communities a greater voice in the policymaking conversation 
as a whole and potentially in PUC proceedings as well. 
Even for groups without a specific government office dedicated to 
their interests, the establishment of energy offices, as well as climate and 
energy task forces and councils, can give them more points of access to 
government officials.373 In addition to providing direct access to energy 
                                                                                                                           
 368. See Keith McShea, Environmental Groups Demand Clean Energy Action from 
NYS: ‘We Can’t Afford to Wait’, Buff. News (Apr. 22, 2019), https://buffalonews.com/ 
news/local/environmental-groups-demand-clean-energy-action-from-nys-we-cant-afford-to-
wait/article_fb6a8ecb-a9cf-5347-a0c8-55e21e9ca21b.html (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). Bottlenecks and delays resulted in the abandonment of several of these projects. 
Id. 
 369. Colorado Energy Office to Present Colorado Electric Vehicle Plan 2020, Colo. 
Energy Off. (Apr. 23, 2020), https://energyoffice.colorado.gov/press-releases/colorado-
energy-office-to-present-colorado-electric-vehicle-plan-2020 [https://perma.cc/Z7SB-94NR]. 
 370. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 196-71(b)(4) (2020). 
 371. Haw. Clean Energy Initiative, Celebrating 10 Years of Success: Hawaii Clean Energy 
Initiative 2008–2018, at 5 (2018), https://energy.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/ 
01/HCEI-10Years.pdf [https://perma.cc/6W6F-LGNU]. 
 372. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-83-503 (2020) (creating the Office of Just Transition and 
tasking it with supporting coal communities in Colorado). 
 373. For examples of agencies and task forces with public members of their leadership 
structures, see, e.g., Ind. Code § 2-5-45-3 (2020) (requiring that at least one member of the 
21st Century Energy Policy Development Task Force represent ratepayer interests and that 
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decisionmaking, these agencies can facilitate public participation in PUC 
proceedings. In California, the Office of the Public Advisor serves as a 
point of contact for members of the public wishing to participate in 
meetings, hearings, workshops, and rulemakings at the California Energy 
Commission.374 Access to energy offices, task forces, and councils can also 
enable public influence on PUC proceedings indirectly through the 
participation of other energy agencies in those proceedings. In fact, one 
study of twelve PUCs found that proxy advocacy—advocacy by designated 
governmental actors—was more effective than grassroots advocacy by 
citizen groups due to proxies’ better financial resources and greater 
technical expertise.375 
B. Costs 
The costs of creating a new agency are likely to be easier to calculate 
than its benefits and are therefore less likely to be ignored by policymakers. 
Thus this section merely provides a high-end and low-end example of the 
costs of various state energy agencies. Perhaps unsurprisingly, energy-
agency administrative costs vary significantly. The New York State Energy 
                                                                                                                           
several members have specific expertise in advanced energy research, renewable energy 
technology and deployment, and related areas); Conn. Exec. Order No. 3 (Sept. 3, 2019), 
https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/Office-of-the-Governor/Executive-Orders/Lamont-
Executive-Orders/Executive-Order-No-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/9C8G-ZJWF] [hereinafter 
Connecticut Executive Order]; Energy Transition Act Committee, N.M. Dep’t of Workforce 
Sols., https://www.dws.state.nm.us/Portals/0/DM/ETA_Meeting%20Agenda_10292019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CG9G-TPU5] (last visited Oct. 27, 2020) (overviewing the first meeting 
of New Mexico’s Energy Transition Act Advisory Committee); Elizabeth Harball, Walker 
Names Members of Alaska Climate Leadership Team, Alaska Pub. Media (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://www.alaskapublic.org/2017/12/12/walker-names-members-of-alaska-climate-
leadership-team [https://perma.cc/DRA2-PHSH]; Members of the Governor’s Task Force 
on Climate Change, Wis. Governor’s Task Force on Climate Change, https://climate 
change.wi.gov/Pages/Members.aspx [https://perma.cc/BJL5-PMTU] (last visited Oct. 27, 
2020); U.P. Energy Task Force Members, Mich. Dep’t of Env’t, Great Lakes & Energy, 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/egle/egle-exec-upetf-members_662090_7.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8UFJ-T7P8] (last visited Oct. 27, 2020) (including upper peninsula 
residents as well as energy experts in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula Energy Task Force); see 
also Camacho & Glicksman, Reorganizing Government, supra note 21, at 9 (“Decentralized 
decision making, for example, may provide greater opportunities for public 
participation . . . .”). 
 374. Office of the Public Advisor, Cal. Energy Comm’n, https://www.energy.ca.gov/ 
about/divisions-and-offices/office-public-advisor [https://perma.cc/3AWE-6DDG] (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2020). 
 375. William T. Gormley, Public Advocacy in Public Utility Commission Proceedings, 17 
J. Applied Behav. Sci. 446, 455 (1981). But William Gormley suggests government funding 
of grassroots advocacy as a way to ameliorate these disparities and cautions that there can 
be gaps between proxy and citizen goals. Id. at 456. While consumer advocates press largely 
for lower rates, citizen groups advocate for environmental protection, against nuclear 
power, and in favor of community equity, among other positions. Because Gormley was 
writing in 1981, moreover, he likely failed to capture the increased resources and 
professionalization of citizen groups in PUC proceedings over the past several decades. 
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Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) has total annual ex-
penditures of close to $1.5 billion, of which personnel and administrative 
costs make up about $71 million.376 Smaller agencies can be much less 
costly. When the Colorado General Assembly created the Office of Just 
Transition, it appropriated $155,758 from the general fund to the Colorado 
Department of Labor and Employment to hire a director and one other 
employee to staff the new office.377 
Not all agency costs are created equal, especially from the perspective 
of politicians who must persuade stakeholders of the need for new institu-
tions. Some costs may be recovered by assessing surcharges on utility 
customers, by leveraging federal grant programs, or through other mech-
anisms, thereby decreasing effects on a state’s budget.378 The lower the 
amount that must be appropriated from a state’s budget, the less of a 
disincentive cost is likely to present to the establishment of new agencies. 
C. Political Considerations: Mitigating Gubernatorial Control 
Notwithstanding the purposes for which many state energy offices 
were originally established, today many of these offices engage in planning 
and policy advancement consistent with gubernatorial priorities. This 
emphasis, and the consequent increase in state executive authority it pro-
duces, parallels the shifts in the separation of energy powers at the federal 
level. Presidents can use the federal DOE to advance their specific energy 
visions and priorities.379 In this way, the DOE can act as a counterweight to 
the more independent FERC when it comes to shaping federal energy 
policy.380 Similarly, state energy offices can press gubernatorial energy 
priorities in state administrative proceedings, with the private sector, and 
in civil society.381 
This trend is consistent with what Seifter describes as the rise of “gu-
bernatorial administration” during the mid- to late twentieth century.382 
                                                                                                                           
 376. N.Y. State Energy Rsch. & Dev. Auth., Fiscal Year 2020–21 Budget and Financial 
Plan 13, https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/-/media/Files/Publications/Annual-Reports-and-
Financial-Statements/2020-21-Budget-and-Financial-Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG52-
HS46] [hereinafter NYSERDA, 2020–21 Budget] (last visited Feb. 12, 2021). 
 377. Act of May 28, 2019, ch. 323, sec. 3(1), 2019 Colo. Sess. Laws 2987, 2995 (codified 
at Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 2-3-1203, 8-83-501–506 (2020)). 
 378. For example, NYSERDA is funded in part by utility surcharges and in part by a 
Federal State Energy Plan grant. NYSERDA, 2020–21 Budget, supra note 376, at 3–5. 
 379. See Jacobs, Statutory Separation of Powers, supra note 19, at 408. 
 380. Id. 
 381. “Civil society” is an umbrella term frequently used to denote a range of 
nongovernmental actors, including community groups, labor unions, NGOs, charitable 
organizations, faith-based organizations, foundations, and professional associations. See 
Adam Jezard, Who and What Is ‘Civil Society?’, World Econ. F. (Apr. 23, 2018), 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/what-is-civil-society [https://perma.cc/U465-
NDJG]. The term is used in that sense here. 
 382. See Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 162, at 498–99. 
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Seifter argues that state executive reorganizations during this period pro-
duced more powerful governorships.383 As discussed above,384 the creation 
of state energy offices is consistent with this narrative. State governors who 
are frustrated with the decisions of independent PUCs or who simply 
desire greater control over energy regulation in their states have an 
incentive to create executive-branch energy offices. This is especially so if 
those energy offices can exert influence beyond their express statutory 
responsibilities by serving as coordinating bodies and by exerting 
influence at state PUCs. 
Of course, it is also possible for energy-agency genesis to weaken 
gubernatorial control. As Seifter also notes, during the era of Jacksonian 
populism in the 1800s, new state agencies and offices subject to direct 
election diluted gubernatorial power.385 Similarly, during the early years 
of the Progressive Era at the turn of the last century, the creation of new, 
independent commissions to regulate public utilities detracted from 
gubernatorial power.386 Likewise, the creation of new energy agencies, 
boards, and commissions that are either directly elected or otherwise not 
subject to direct gubernatorial control can weaken the power of the state 
executive.387 
In fact, however, state-agency genesis has tended to enlarge rather 
than restrict gubernatorial authority. While there are advantages to 
concentrated gubernatorial power, even the staunchest advocates of 
executive control are in favor of checking mechanisms to prevent the 
excessive accumulation of governmental authority in a single actor.388 As 
Seifter points out, these checks are frequently lacking in the state 
context.389 
                                                                                                                           
 383. Id. 
 384. See supra section II.B. 
 385. See Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 162, at 495–96. 
 386. Id. at 496. 
 387. Although PUCs in many states have indicia of independence, Seifter reminds us 
that we should think differently about independent agencies at the state level. She notes 
that, unlike their federal counterparts, state courts do not treat “independent agencies” as 
a distinct category. Seifter, Understanding State Agency Independence, supra note 38, at 
1543. State courts’ “noncategorical, nonbinary approach” to characterizations of agency 
independence, she continues, “impedes development of stable norms,” and “thus 
undermin[es] independence overall.” Id. at 1544. 
 388. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally Flawed Theory of the 
Unbundled Executive, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1696, 1697 (2009) (noting that the authors are not 
defending a claim of inherent presidential power to act contrary to statutes duly enacted by 
the legislative branch); Richard J. Pierce, Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those 
Who Would Distort and Abuse It: A Review of The Unitary Executive by Steven G. Calabresi 
and Christopher S. Yoo, 12 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 593, 594 (2010) (observing that neither the 
unitary executive theory of presidential power nor its most faithful adherents imply that the 
president possesses powers greater than those of the other two constitutional branches). 
 389. Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 162, at 536 (acknowledging that 
powerful governments can be efficient and productive but cautioning that this may come at 
the expense of diversity and expertise in state governance, potentially threatening rule-of-
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State legislatures uncomfortable with expansion of executive power 
via agency genesis can push back in a number of ways. First, they could 
exert greater control over the leadership and mandates of new energy 
agencies through more detailed statutes. In cases where governors create 
new energy bodies by using delegated reorganization authority, legisla-
tures can convert them to statutory agencies. A final possibility is for the 
legislature to create yet more new agencies to counter executive influence. 
However, because of the concerns Part II raises about the multiplication 
of agencies, legislatures should consider the first two options before 
resorting to agency genesis of their own. 
D. Coordination and Conflict 
This section suggests how to manage energy-agency multiplicity in a 
way that enhances its benefits and minimizes its costs. It focuses on ena-
bling coordination between energy agencies while maintaining productive 
friction. 
1. Enabling Coordination. — The transition to decarbonized electricity 
will require administrative coordination. As William Boyd argues, decar-
bonization requires hundreds of billions of dollars in investments to 
modernize the grid and construct new forms of power generation.390 This 
investment must be planned and sequenced if it is to yield results.391 
At the federal level, the OMB coordinates agency policy. Most 
prominently, OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
reviews major agency regulations under a cost–benefit framework.392 As 
part of this process, the Office solicits comments on agency proposals from 
other government agencies with an interest in the subject matter. One of 
OIRA’s lesser-known functions is to coordinate a unified regulatory agenda 
each year made up of the regulatory agendas that each agency is required 
to submit.393 In these ways, OIRA monitors regulatory actions across 
government. 
                                                                                                                           
law values). As Seifter and Bulman-Pozen point out, moreover, state constitutions evince 
strong commitments to popular sovereignty. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Miriam Seifter, The 
Democracy Principle in State Constitutions, 119 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) 
(manuscript at 21–26), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article 
=3658&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/U84Z-TZXT]. These would be in 
tension with a too-powerful executive due to the limitations of electoral accountability as a 
safeguard of citizens’ power. See Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 162, at 
537–38. 
 390. See Boyd, Public Utility, supra note 16, at 1618. 
 391. Id. 
 392. Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship 
Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 Pace Env’t L. Rev. 325, 330 
(2014). 
 393. Sally Katzen, OIRA at Thirty: Reflections and Recommendations, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 
103, 111 (2011) (observing, however, that “the process itself has become more of a paper 
exercise than an analytical tool”). 
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At the state level, too, coordination is most likely to come from the 
governor’s office, and many states have their own versions of OIRA.394 
Executive, as opposed to decentralized, coordination is perhaps even 
more advantageous in the states due to individual agencies’ limited 
resources. 
Sometimes legislation mandates coordination, even if that coordina-
tion is left to the executive branch to implement in practice.395 In Oregon, 
for example, the state legislature tasked the Oregon Department of Energy 
with establishing a system of tradeable renewable energy credits in consul-
tation with the Public Utility Commission.396 In other cases, governors 
initiate coordination themselves by creating formal or informal task forces 
made up of members from the various government agencies with interest 
in a given policy area. In Rhode Island, for example, Governor Raimondo 
has sought “to create a single team on the field across departments,” 
including the Office of Energy Resources, Division of Public Utilities and 
Carriers, Infrastructure Bank and Department of Environmental 
Management to address overlapping issues related to climate change.397 
Coordination could also be agency-initiated. Monast and Adair 
propose that state energy offices serve as coordinators between PUCs and 
state environmental agencies.398 They suggest several methods by which 
such coordination might take place, from information-sharing to staff 
interaction to testimony by one agency in another’s proceedings.399 State 
energy offices can offer additional scrutiny of utility resource plans, for 
example, to make sure that they are taking state renewable energy goals 
and programs into account.400 State energy offices might also coordinate 
                                                                                                                           
 394. See Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, supra note 162, at 503–05 (noting that 
thirty-four states have implemented some version of centralized regulatory review). See 
generally Jason A. Schwartz, Inst. for Policy Integrity, N.Y.U. Sch. of L., 52 Experiments with 
Regulatory Review: The Political and Economic Inputs into State Rulemakings 7 (2010), 
https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/52_Experiments_with_Regulatory_Review.p
df [https://perma.cc/C7QP-U9TA] (offering a comprehensive comparative snapshot of 
“state-level regulatory decisionmaking”). 
 395. Rulemaking to Amend, Adopt, and/or Repeal Regulations in Accordance with 
Senate Bill 300 (2019), No. 19-06008, 2020 WL 3051103, at *12 (Nev. P.U.C. June 3, 2020) 
(“Coordinate with sister agencies (Governor’s Office of Energy, Department of 
Transportation, Department of Conservation and Natural Resources) to address 
interdependent efforts . . . .”). 
 396. Or. Rev. Stat. § 469A.130(1) (2019). 
 397. Faulkner, supra note 356. Governor Raimondo observed that collaboration 
between these departments produced a large number of renewable energy bills that were 
then passed by the state legislature. Id. 
 398. See Monast & Adair, supra note 83, at 19. 
 399. See id. at 55–58. 
 400. See, e.g., In re Portland Gen. Elec. Co., No. 10-457, 2010 WL 4807694 (Or. P.U.C. 
Nov. 23, 2010); In re Pub. Util. Comm’n of Or., No. 10-132, 2010 WL 1445484 (Or. P.U.C. 
Apr. 7, 2010) (arguing in favor of leaving the costs of interconnection with the utility unless 
the connection only benefits the facility); In re Pacificorp, dba Pacific Power, No. 08-232, 
2008 WL 1904668 (Or. P.U.C. Apr. 24, 2008) (proposing that Pacific Power acquire more 
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with other energy bodies in the state, including siting boards and climate 
change or energy transition offices. Energy offices are perhaps best suited 
among existing energy agencies to coordinate activities across agencies, 
given their ties to the governor’s office and because their mandates tend 
to be more flexible than those of sister agencies. Some energy offices are 
even required by statute or executive order to serve this coordinating 
function.401 One effect of placing coordination responsibilities in an 
energy office, however, is that it increases the governor’s control over 
energy policy. 
Collaborations might involve not just agencies themselves but also 
stakeholders. In the 1980s and 1990s, there was great enthusiasm for 
integration of alternative dispute mechanisms into the regulatory process. 
Some agencies experimented with negotiated rulemaking, in which 
agencies invited key stakeholders to provide input at the earliest stages of 
the rulemaking process.402 For example, in 1987, the Connecticut 
Department of Public Utility Control implemented a Collaborative 
Planning Process that worked in much the same way as negotiated 
rulemaking.403 A group of stakeholders, including utility representatives, 
environmental advocates, and PUC staff, produced consensus-based rate 
proposals that were then submitted to the PUC for review.404 The utilities 
themselves funded technical support for this process.405 While the 
Collaborative Planning Process was designed to facilitate negotiation 
within a single PUC proceeding, it might be expanded to collaborations 
involving multiple agencies. 
Another example was the Washington Utilities and Transportation 
Commission’s creation of a collaborative process on incentives for utility 
least-cost planning and performance. The Commission formed a Policy 
Collaborative Group to develop a proposal.406 The Group included 
                                                                                                                           
renewable resources than called for in the plan submitted and expand its energy efficiency 
and peak reduction programs). 
 401. Consider, for example, the Michigan Office of Climate and Energy, which 
coordinates the activities of state agencies on responses to climate change. Mich. Exec. 
Order No. 2019-06, § 1(d)(3)(A) (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/ 
0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-490039–,00.html [https://perma.cc/43Z8-XA5P]. Similarly, the 
Nevada Governor’s Office of Energy must “[c]oordinate the activities and programs of the 
Office of Energy with the activities and programs of the Consumer’s Advocate and the Public 
Utilities Commission of Nevada, and with other federal, state and local officers and 
agencies.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 701-180(5) (2020). 
 402. See Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated 
Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. Env’t L.J. 32, 33–39 (2000) (explaining the process and history of 
negotiated rulemaking). 
 403. Evan van Hook, Note, Conservation Through Cooperation: The Collaborative 
Planning Process for Utility Conservation and Load Management, 102 Yale L.J. 1235, 1239–
40 (1993). 
 404. Id. 
 405. Id. at 1241. 
 406. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., No. UE-910689, 1992 WL 12790160 (Wash. U.T.C. 
Jan. 14, 1992). 
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representatives from the local utility, commission staff, the public counsel 
(which represents the interests of utility customers in the state), the state 
energy office, a major industrial customer, industrial and cogeneration 
trade groups, a conservation organization, and a public regional power-
planning and conservation council.407 The utility funded consultants to 
support all parties to the effort.408 Ultimately, the Commission adopted 
aspects of the Group’s proposal for decoupling rates from utility revenues 
and included many of the ideas generated by the collaborative.409 
There have been serious critiques of negotiated rulemaking, most 
notably that it is no less time-consuming or costly than the traditional rule-
making process.410 Even if this is true, however, it does not negate some of 
the participatory benefits of alternative procedures. State legislatures and 
PUCs would do well to consider experimentation with participatory mech-
anisms as a way to bring more voices into debates about the energy 
transition. Ari Peskoe suggests, for example, that PUCs might convene 
stakeholders for informal technical or working group sessions to surface 
views and provide opportunity for dialogue.411 
Such collaborative processes should be designed, Peskoe cautions, to 
ensure that particular voices—especially those with greater resources and 
experience—do not dominate the discussions.412 One way to mitigate this 
problem would be to have a relatively neutral party involved in the process 
who can report on power dynamics.413 Another would be to provide 
training and resources to less experienced and less affluent participants. 
While power dynamics are endemic to human interactions, some of the 
more pernicious effects of power imbalance might be addressed through 
these and other design elements. 
2. Maintaining Productive Friction. — Notwithstanding the benefits of 
coordination, agencies do not always agree on a course of action. This can 
be a good thing. Dividing authority within a single domain among multiple 
agencies can prevent any one government actor from accumulating too 
much power. The competition that can arise between agencies with 
                                                                                                                           
 407. Id. 
 408. Martin Schweitzer, Mary English, Evelin Yourstone & John Altman, Oak Ridge 
Nat’l Lab’y, Interactive Efforts to Address DSM and IRP Issues: Findings from the First Year 
of a Two-Year Study 33 (1993), https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/6323022 (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review). 
 409. Id. at 42. 
 410. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of 
Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 Duke L.J. 1255, 1283–86, 1290–309 (1997) (concluding that 
negotiated rulemaking neither prevents litigation nor saves time during the rulemaking 
process). 
 411. Ari Peskoe, Harvard Env’t Pol’y Initiative, Alternative Dispute Resolution at Public 
Utility Commissions 8 (2017), http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
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[https://perma.cc/BP36-4KK9]. 
 412. Id. at 9. 
 413. See id. 
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overlapping jurisdiction can also make agencies work harder.414 One way 
they can do this is by participating in each other’s formal proceedings. For 
example, the Washington State Energy Office and the Public Counsel each 
raised concerns in a gas-ratemaking proceeding before the Washington 
Utilities and Transportation Commission that the gas utility was too slow 
in pursuing methods to reduce the demand for gas.415 While the 
Commission ultimately approved the rate plan as proposed, they chastised 
the utility for their “slow pace” in pursuing demand-side solutions and 
exhorted them to “proceed deliberately” in incorporating such resources 
onto their system.416 
Furthermore, duplication of function can make it more difficult for 
interest groups to capture the policy field.417 Agencies can also serve as 
watchdogs for one another, calling attention to improper influence by reg-
ulated industry or others. As Seifter has noted, oversight by civil society at 
the state level is not as robust as commentators often assume.418 Therefore, 
alternative checking mechanisms may be called for. Interagency checks 
and balances can ameliorate this deficit. 
State offices of consumer counsel have served this function for 
decades by intervening in, and even initiating proceedings, with the goal 
of keeping customer rates—and the process by which they are set—fair. In 
Colorado Energy Advocacy Office v. Public Service Co. of Colorado, for example, 
the Advocacy Office alleged that the PUC had improper ex parte contacts 
with the gas company whose rates were being set in an open proceeding.419 
State attorneys general might also balance PUC perspectives, at least 
behind the scenes. But the Attorney General’s watchdog function is 
complicated by the fact that it frequently represents the PUC and by the 
fact that, in most states, its resources, and therefore its ability to monitor 
and review PUC actions, are limited. 
Managing multiplicity means keeping avenues open for agencies to 
check one another, to consider alternate viewpoints, and to make deci-
sions based on the best data and science available. It means facilitating 
agency participation in one another’s proceedings. And it means tailoring 
agency mandates so that they overlap where necessary and complement 
one another where appropriate. 
V. REFORM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO MULTIPLICITY 
As suggested above, state PUCs are, in many ways, imperfectly 
designed to navigate the energy transition. But do these imperfections 
                                                                                                                           
 414. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 256, at 1425–26. 
 415. Wash. Nat. Gas Co., No. UG-931143, 1994 WL 479240 (Wash. U.T.C. July 22, 1994). 
 416. Id. 
 417. Farber & O’Connell, supra note 256, at 1427. 
 418. See Miriam Seifter, Further from the People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 
93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 107, 109–10 (2018). 
 419. 704 P.2d 298, 300 (Colo. 1985). 
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require designing around commissions? Certainly, governors may prefer 
this approach, since it shifts the center of gravity of energy administration 
toward agencies that are more responsive to gubernatorial preferences. 
Policymakers, however, should consider energy-agency reform as an alter-
native to agency multiplication.420 Agency reform is not nearly as attention-
grabbing as agency genesis, and therefore it might be less appealing to 
politicians seeking to signal commitment to a given policy domain. Never-
theless, in the energy space in particular, reform of state PUCs could avoid 
many of the problems with agency multiplicity while addressing the 
concerns motivating agency creation. Where standalone energy offices 
with significant responsibilities already exist, states should also consider 
reforming or expanding their responsibilities in lieu of creating still more 
agencies. Even where new agencies still seem, on balance, the most 
appropriate alternative, reform of existing institutions could complement 
that approach. Especially in states that have already created additional 
bodies, this complementarity should be driving PUC reform. 
Agency reform is not a panacea. But in the energy context, the poten-
tial for PUCs to serve as effective agents of decarbonization deserves 
greater scrutiny. William Boyd and Ann Carlson note that some PUCs in 
traditionally regulated states are using their ratemaking authorities to 
support decarbonization by, for example, permitting utility recovery of 
investments in nuclear plants as well as carbon capture and storage.421 
Commissions are also incentivizing the early retirement of fossil-fuel plants 
by allowing utilities to recover the stranded costs associated with those 
plants.422 
PUCs also either possess or can be delegated the power to address 
many of the environmental and distributional concerns associated with 
decarbonization. Michael Dworkin and his coauthors suggest in a pair of 
articles that PUCs have more authority to consider the environmental 
impacts of utility proposals than is commonly acknowledged.423 They find 
                                                                                                                           
 420. Thursz suggests that, instead of creating new administrative bodies, policymakers 
should consider ways to use funding “to co-opt, transform, infiltrate, redirect, merge, or 
redefine existing institutions.” Thursz, supra note 211, at 260. 
 421. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 294, at 815. 
 422. See, e.g., Justin Gerdes, Colorado May Have a Winning Formula for Managing 
Early Coal Plant Retirements, Greentech Media (Mar. 25, 2019), 
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 423. See generally Michael Dworkin, David Farnsworth & Jason Rich, The 
Environmental Duties of Public Utility Commissions, 18 Pace Env’t L. Rev. 325 (2001) 
(listing commission authority to consider environmental factors by state); Michael Dworkin, 
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that in areas such as certification and siting, resource planning, 
restructuring, and even ratemaking, many states have provided 
commissions with the tools to consider environmental impacts alongside 
economic ones.424 
Even in restructured states, PUCs can use their authority over 
distribution-system cost recovery to support decarbonization, for example, 
by incentivizing utility investments in advanced metering infrastructure.425 
Commissions in some restructured states have also effectively established 
time-of-use pricing, which incentivizes customers to shift their electricity 
use away from times of peak consumption and thereby defers the need for 
construction of new power plants.426 
There is also room in existing delegations for PUCs to prioritize the 
distributional concerns associated with the energy transition. Some 
enterprising PUCs are using their leverage over utility cost recovery to 
attach conditions to rate orders that benefit particular communities. In a 
rate case for Southern California Edison that permitted the utility to retire 
the Mojave Generating Station (a coal plant) early, the California PUC 
required that it spend revenues from the sale of acid rain pollution 
allowances to help the local Hopi and Navajo communities transition to 
clean energy alternatives.427 
Where PUCs do not possess sufficient substantive authority to address 
decarbonization and distributional equity, or where their existing 
organization and procedures stand as an impediment to participation or 
make it too easy for incumbent utilities to influence decisionmaking, 
legislative reforms may address these inadequacies. The subsections below 
suggest several ways in which states might reform PUCs to mitigate the 
problems Part II identifies and enhance these agencies’ abilities to act as 
agents of decarbonization and social justice.428 
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 425. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 294, at 815 (“In states operating under a 
restructured or hybrid model, . . . we see utility commissions focusing more heavily on the 
distribution side of the grid, which is the portion of the grid that delivers electricity directly 
to customers.”). 
 426. See Wilson Gonzalez, Restructured States, Retail Competition, and Market-Based 
Generation Rates, at C-2, C-7 (2015), https://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/05/appendix-c-smart-rate-design-2015-aug-31.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WQL-S8LL]. 
 427. Alan Ramo & Deborah Behles, Transitioning a Community Away from Fossil-Fuel 
Generation to a Green Economy: An Approach Using State Utility Commission Authority, 
15 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 505, 518–19 (2014). 
 428. One relatively simple way to encourage greater attention to decarbonization and 
the energy transition on state PUCs is to elect or appoint commissioners for whom these 
goals are a priority. In practice, this may be one of the most effective ways to shift an agency’s 
emphasis and agenda. But because this strategy is political rather than structural, it is not 
discussed here. 
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A. Countering Capture 
Increasing participation in formal and informal PUC processes can 
mitigate capture, even without the creation of new energy agencies. Jim 
Rossi notes that “as the number of participants . . . in an administrative 
process is expanded . . . the amount of monopoly rents powerful interest 
groups may be able to extract will decrease.”429 More participants can also 
mitigate the informational advantages of regulated utilities by providing 
expert evidence of their own.430 
Reform of commissioner selection and recusal procedures can also 
counter capture. As discussed above, elected commissions can pose 
particular problems when it comes to capture due to the potentially 
corrupting effect of large campaign contributions.431 Troy Rule therefore 
recommends that states with elected commissioners implement stricter 
conflict of interest requirements, forcing commissioners who received 
considerable financial support from particular entities during their 
candidacies to recuse themselves from matters involving those entities.432 
Rule is not sanguine that this strategy will successfully eliminate bias, given 
that “dark money” campaign contributions (those made to third-party 
organizations) need not be disclosed.433 But it is a step in the right 
direction. 
B. Enhancing Expertise 
If PUCs currently lack the right kinds of expertise to navigate the 
energy transition, state legislatures could provide them with in-house 
research resources that mirror those created at state energy offices. Some 
state energy offices are actually just divisions of PUCs. This is true in New 
Jersey, for example, where the energy division of the PUC is charged with 
recommending changes to existing rules and mandates in response to 
market conditions, policy trends, and technology.434 
More generous intervention rules could also enhance the external 
expertise available to PUCs. Commission rules tend to require the party 
seeking intervention to explain the specific interests that justify their 
intervention and why they are well positioned to represent those 
                                                                                                                           
 429. Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for 
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 173, 213 (1997). 
 430. See id. (noting that the amount of data, number of issues raised, and set of possible 
solutions will increase with more interveners). 
 431. See supra notes 315–318 and accompanying text. 
 432. Rule, supra note 316, at 11 (citing to the Supreme Court’s decision in Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), to suggest that such recusal may be required 
where an entity’s support likely impacted the outcome of the election). 
 433. Id. at 13–15. Rule proposes a judicial remedy instead: clarification that Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), does not apply to spending by investor-owned utilities 
due to their quasi-public nature. Id. at 16. 
 434. See Energy, N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., https://www.state.nj.us/bpu/about/divisions/ 
energy [https://perma.cc/9K25-U3UV] (last visited Oct. 27, 2020). 
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interests.435 But some states define relevant interests more narrowly than 
others. In Colorado, the interests affected must be “pecuniary or tangible.”436 
By contrast, in New Hampshire the standards for intervention in PUC pro-
ceedings are identical to those in judicial proceedings: The commission 
must decide whether “rights, duties, privileges, immunities or other 
substantial interests” may be affected by the proceedings.437 More 
permissive intervention rules, while creating challenges for commissions 
in terms of managing proceedings, can also expand the expert and lay 
views available to commissioners. 
PUCs might also convene formal or informal stakeholder groups, as 
suggested below, to generate ideas and draw on the expertise of those 
outside government. In Connecticut, for example, stakeholder groups 
have proposed rules around net energy metering and competitive sup-
ply.438 In Missouri, an Energy Efficiency Advisory Collaborative convened 
under the auspices of the state Public Service Commission meets annually 
to generate technical resources for the commission and to share lessons 
learned from demand-side planning and implementation.439 
Stakeholder group discussions have advantages over the adversarial 
presentation of expert views in formal PUC proceedings for several 
reasons. If these proceedings are conducted earlier in the ratemaking or 
resource-planning process, nonutility stakeholders can influence the shape 
of utility proposals as opposed to merely critiquing them. Even where 
stakeholder processes take the form of settlement conferences, however, 
they can still lead to modified utility proposals that better take various 
group interests into account. It may be easier to come to agreement over 
compromise positions in these processes than in a final commission order 
that attempts to accommodate various criticisms of a utility rate or plan 
that is already on the table. 
                                                                                                                           
 435. For example, the Public Utility Commission of Texas requires potential intervenors 
to file a motion establishing that they represent “persons with a justiciable interest which 
may be adversely affected by the outcome of the proceeding.” 16 Tex. Admin. Code 
§ 22.103(b)(2) (2020). 
 436. Colo. Code Regs. § 723-1-1401(c) (2020). 
 437. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:32 (2020); N.H. Code Admin. R. Ann. PUC 203.17 
(2020). Petitioners must also show that allowing intervention would be “in the interests of 
justice and would not impair the orderly and prompt conduct of the proceedings.” N.H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541-A:32(II). 
 438. Peskoe, supra note 411, at 16. Commissions in Arkansas, Colorado, Nevada, and 
Rhode Island have taken similar approaches. See id. at 17–20. 
 439. Missouri Energy Efficiency Advisory Collaborative, Mo. Saves, https://mosaves. 
com/statewide-energy-efficiency-resources/missouri-energy-efficiency-advisory-collaborative 
[https://perma.cc/6RNM-Z6WH] (last visited Oct. 27, 2020). 
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C. Streamlining Processes 
Legislatures and PUCs themselves have sought to address judicialization 
concerns by creating streamlined processes. Many of these efforts have fo-
cused on the siting of renewable energy infrastructure. Broadly speaking, 
legislatures and PUCs can streamline siting processes by dedicating more 
resources to them. They can also “fast track” processes by reducing 
burdens for applicants or setting deadlines for agency action. Wisconsin 
streamlined the process for siting wind turbines in 2009.440 New York’s law 
establishing a new Office of Renewable Energy Permitting also contained 
several provisions designed to speed up the siting process for renewable 
energy infrastructure.441 Other states could adopt similar approaches, 
which include the development of uniform standards for environmental 
impacts as well as time limits for permit action,442 without creating separate 
agencies to implement them. 
Parties before state PUCs also rely on settlement procedures to 
shortcut lengthy adversarial processes. Increasingly, stakeholders are 
finding settlement to be an attractive alternative to formalized rulemakings 
and other adversarial proceedings. Settlement processes have their draw-
backs, especially where the agreements are not unanimous,443 but they 
have two potential advantages in terms of speed. First, they can bypass 
cumbersome PUC proceedings, leading to quicker resolution of cases.444 
Second, they can induce promises by utilities to take energy transition–
related actions that would have been difficult to secure as part of a more 
formal proceeding. In Colorado, for example, a 2016 settlement between 
local utility Xcel Energy, industry (including solar industry groups), and 
environmental and ratepayer advocates produced an agreement in which 
Xcel retreated from a request for a fixed monthly grid charge on rooftop 
solar customers in exchange for a pilot program on time-of-use rates and 
the expansion of community solar programs.445 
                                                                                                                           
 440. Act of Sept. 30, 2009, No. 40, sec. 3, 2009 Wis. Sess. Laws 889, 890 (codified in 
scattered sections of Wis. Stat. (2020)). Act 40 also created a Wind Siting Council to conduct 
research and advise the PUC on rule content. Edward S. Marion, The Municipal Regulation 
of Wind Energy in Wisconsin, Nat’l Wind Watch (Apr. 20, 2011), https://www.wind-
watch.org/news/2011/04/21/the-municipal-regulation-of-wind-energy-in-wisconsin 
[https://perma.cc/M2SY-NRZM]. 
 441. See supra text accompanying notes 114–115. 
 442. Accelerated Renewable Energy Growth and Community Benefit Act, S7508B, pt. 
JJJ, 2019–2020 Leg., 243d Sess. (N.Y. 2020) (codified at N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§ 1900–1905 
(McKinney 2020)). 
 443. See Stefan H. Krieger, Problems for Captive Ratepayers in Nonunanimous 
Settlements of Public Utility Rate Cases, 12 Yale J. on Reg. 257, 306–08 (1995) (flagging in 
particular the risk that captive ratepayers will be inadequately represented in such 
settlements and will face higher costs as a result). 
 444. Id. at 299–300. 
 445. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., No. C16-1075, 2016 WL 7048273 (Colo. P.U.C. Nov. 9, 
2016) (decision granting motion to approve settlement). 
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D. Expanding Participation 
As discussed above, a number of groups with strong interests in the 
energy transition have traditionally been poorly represented before utility 
commissions. These include communities whose economies are depend-
ent on fossil-fuel extraction or production as well as communities that will 
be disproportionately burdened by the effects of climate change.446 They 
also include communities that will not benefit from some of the financial 
advantages of the low-carbon transition, including the advantages associated 
with rooftop solar, home energy management, and electric vehicles.447 
Some PUCs are already introducing more opportunities for diverse 
stakeholder participation and collaboration. New York has been especially 
proactive in convening stakeholder groups as part of its broad “Reforming 
the Energy Vision” strategy.448 In 2015, for example, New York’s 
Department of Public Service issued an order on expanding opportunities 
for shared distributed renewable generation facilities. In the order, the 
Commission directed staff to convene a “low-income customer collabora-
tive” process to evaluate barriers to low-income customer participation in 
such community distributed generation.449 Five working groups provided 
a report to the Commission in 2016.450 
These mechanisms are not widespread, nor are they a silver bullet to 
address concerns about effective participation.451 Some collaborative 
mechanisms are available only to utility participants.452 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                           
 446. See NAACP Env’t & Climate Just. Program, supra note 61, at 7 (observing that “the 
people who are most impacted by these polluting industries have the least influence over 
who is making decisions” and offering suggestions for how community justice advocates can 
participate more effectively in PUC proceedings). 
 447. See Eric Daniel Fournier, Robert Cudd, Felicia Federico & Stephanie Pincetl, On 
Energy Sufficiency and the Need for New Policies to Combat Growing Inequities in the 
Residential Energy Sector, Elementa Sci. Anthropocene, 2020, at 1, 7–9 (forecasting the 
exacerbation of current inequities due to vehicle electrification and rooftop solar PV). 
 448. About the Initiative, N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv., http://www3.dps.ny.gov/ 
W/PSCWeb.nsf/All/CC4F2EFA3A23551585257DEA007DCFE2?OpenDocument [https:// 
perma.cc/5AL2-H45W] (last updated May 9, 2018). 
 449. Policies, Requirements and Conditions for Implementing a Community Net 
Metering Program, No. 15-E-0082, 2015 WL 4503638, at *17 (N.Y.P.S.C. July 17, 2015). 
 450. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 15-E-0082—Summary of the Collaborative Working 
Group Reports Regarding Community Distributed Generation for Low-Income Customers 
7–58 (2016), https://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/ca7cd46b41e6d01f052568580054 
5955/8a75b07f45e1672485257edd00602d7c/$FILE/15-E-0082%20Low%20Income%20 
Collaborative%20Report%208-15-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/738L-9C7Y]. 
 451. There is also the risk that too much participation can be problematic. Jim Rossi 
finds that the benefits of increased participation in regulatory proceedings diminish at the 
margin once certain levels of participation are reached. Rossi, supra note 429, at 213–14. 
He also argues that expanding participation may be in some tension with the 
“expertocratic” model of PUC decisionmaking. See id. at 214–15. 
 452. For instance, the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio’s Power Forward 
Collaborative, a working group of utility stakeholders led by Commission staff whose task is 
to propose strategies for grid modernization. PowerForward, Ohio Pub. Utils. Comm’n, A 
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effective participation in formal commission proceedings and even in less 
formal collaborative proceedings requires a high level of sophistication. 
Thus, access alone cannot ensure meaningful participation. Krieger notes, 
for example, that successful commission advocacy requires knowledge of 
commission composition, configuration of the regulatory environment, 
and an understanding of the political and social values implicated by the 
substantive issues at stake.453 Stakeholders who wish to purchase this 
expertise rather than develop it themselves must pay the frequently high 
fees of specialist attorneys. 
Another option to expand public input into PUC decisionmaking is 
the practice of “deliberative polling.” 454 The Public Utility Commission of 
Texas has used this practice to gauge public opinion on policies to expand 
renewable energy generation in the state.455 PUC staff arranged for ses-
sions in each major electric utility service territory in Texas during which 
diverse groups of citizens would read background materials, consider 
presentations from every sector with an interest in electricity-generation 
policy, interact with presenters and one another, and ultimately offer their 
opinions on the future of electricity in Texas.456 A report from the National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory credits this deliberative polling with the 
success of regulatory and legislative measures to promote renewable 
generation in the state.457 
CONCLUSION 
Agency genesis is a vital but underexplored aspect of administrative 
law and policy. By providing a general framework for analyzing the choice 
to create new agencies and by illustrating how it can be adapted to specific 
cases and policy domains, this Article facilitates more rigorous scrutiny of 
the phenomenon. 
In the case of state energy bureaucracies, the gradual addition of 
more agencies over time has been a partial response to the critiques of 
PUCs as captured, insufficiently expert, slow, and noninclusive. These 
                                                                                                                           




 453. Krieger, An Advocacy Model, supra note 50, at 648–49. 
 454. For caution about more direct democratic input in a different context, identifying 
community heterogeneity and apathy as two impediments to sound “democratized” 
governance, see John Rappaport, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 711, 739–42, 750–57 (2020). 
 455. See Rabe, supra note 44, at 56–57 (describing the introduction of “deliberative 
polling” by the Public Utility Commission of Texas). 
 456. Id. at 57–58. 
 457. R.L. Lehr, W. Guild, D.L. Thomas & B.G. Swezey, Listening to Customers: How 
Deliberative Polling Helped Build 1,000 MW of New Renewable Energy Projects in Texas 9 
(2003), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy03osti/33177.pdf [https://perma.cc/93BN-39J6]. 
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critiques should be taken especially seriously during the present energy 
transition when rapid, well-informed, and inclusive decisions must be 
made to mitigate the worst impacts of global climate change while enhancing 
equity. But agency genesis may not always be the answer. Reform of 
existing agencies—notably state PUCs—is equally important. 
Even where agency multiplicity is the most appealing option, there 
are still opportunities to formalize and improve the relationships between 
agencies and to consider, carefully, how a state’s constellation of agencies 
affects political power and policy output. Ideally, policymakers will avail 
themselves of opportunities to remake existing energy agencies rather 
than simply adding to their number. The political economy of institutional 
design may favor agency genesis, but difficult problems require sustained 
attention to bureaucratic structure, policy, and process. The need for this 
less glamorous work persists. 
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APPENDIX 
Alabama 
Utilities commission Public Service Commission458 
Freestanding energy office? No  
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Energy Division (in Department of 
Economic and Community Affairs)459 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
Alaska 
Utilities commission Regulatory Commission of Alaska460 
Freestanding energy office? Alaska Energy Authority461 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
Arizona 
Utilities commission Corporation Commission462 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
No463 
                                                                                                                           
 458. Created by statute in 1915. See Ala. Code § 37-1-1 (2020). 
 459. Energy, Ala. Dep’t of Econ. & Cmty. Affs., https://adeca.alabama.gov/ 
Divisions/Energy/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/2QHD-DUU8] (last visited Jan. 
30, 2021). 
 460. Created by statute in 1999. See Alaska Stat. § 42.04.010 (2020). Earlier iterations of 
the Commission existed beginning in 1960. Commission, Regul. Comm’n of Alaska (May 9, 
2018), http://rca.alaska.gov/RCAWeb/AboutRCA/Commission.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
H2TM-AP87]. 
 461. Created by statute in 1976. See Alaska Stat. § 44.83.020. 
 462. Created by state constitutional amendment in 1992. See Ariz. Const. art. XV. 
 463. The Arizona State Energy Program was created in 1975 but terminated in 2015. 
Ryan Randazzo, Arizona Shutters Energy Program; Remaining Workers Fired, Ariz. 
Republic (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.azcentral.com/story/money/business/energy/ 
2015/11/03/arizona-shutters-energy-program-remaining-workers-fired/75063004 
[https://perma.cc/NR7H-GF2X]. Some of the office’s responsibilities were transferred to 
the Office of Grants in the Department of Administration. See Energy, Governor’s Off. of 
Strategic Plan. & Budgeting, https://grants.az.gov/programs/energy [https://perma.cc/ 
9GKT-56HQ] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
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Siting board Power Plant and Transmission Line 
Siting Committee (in Corporation 
Commission)464 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  Arkansas 
Utilities commission Public Service Commission465 
Freestanding energy office? Department of Energy & 
Environment466 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  California 
Utilities commission Public Utilities Commission467 
Freestanding energy office? State Energy Resources Conservation 
and Development Commission (Energy 
Commission)468 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
                                                                                                                           
 464. Created by statute in 1971. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 40-360.01 (2020). The committee’s 
decisions are subject to review by the Corporation Commission. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 40-360.07. 
 465. Created by statute in 1919 as the Arkansas Corporation Commission. See 
Commission, Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, http://www.apscservices.info/commission-
history.asp [https://perma.cc/UX72-HMMK] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). The Commission 
was renamed the Arkansas Public Service Commission in 1945. Ark. Code Ann. § 23-2-101 
(2020). 
 466. Created by statute in 2019. See Ark. Code Ann. § 25-43-601.  
 467. Constitutionally created Railroad Commission’s jurisdiction expanded by statute 
to include electric and natural gas utilities in 1912. CPUC History & Organizational 
Structure, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/history [https://pe 
rma.cc/T6MT-R9PG] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). State constitution amended to include 
jurisdictional expansion in 1974. See Cal. Const. art. XII, § 3. 
 468. Created by statute in 1974. See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 25200 (2020). 
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  Colorado 
Utilities commission Public Utilities Commission469 
Freestanding energy office? Colorado Energy Office470 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body Office of Just Transition (in 
Department of Labor & 
Employment)471 
Other  
  Connecitcut 
Utilities commission Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (in 
Deparment of Energy & Environmental 
Protection)472 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board Connecticut Siting Council473 
Climate/transition body Governor’s Council on Climate Change 
(GC3)474 
Other Connecticut Green Bank475 
                                                                                                                           
 469. Created by statute in 1913. History, Colo. Dep’t of Regul. Agencies, https://puc. 
colorado.gov/puchistory [https://perma.cc/5SKR-376C] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). The 
state constitution was amended to provide for a Public Utilities Commission, or whatever 
agency the state legislature may otherwise designate to regulate public utilities, in 1954. See 
Colo. Const. art. 25. The state legislature codified the structure, jurisdiction, and procedures 
for the Public Utilities Commission in 1974. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-101 (2020). 
 470. Created by statute in 2008. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-38.5-101. The office was 
originally created as the Governor’s Office of Energy Management and Conservation in 
1977. Tim Hoover, Effort Advances to Recast Bill Ritter’s “New Energy Economy” Office, 
Denver Post (Mar. 28, 2012), https://www.denverpost.com/2012/03/28/effort-advances-
to-recast-bill-ritters-new-energy-economy-office (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last 
updated May 1, 2016). 
 471. Created by statute in 2019. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-83-503. 
 472. Department of Energy and Environmental Protection created by statute in 2011. 
See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-2d (2020). 
 473. Created by statute in 1971. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-50j. 
 474. Established by executive order in 2019. See Connecticut Executive Order, supra 
note 373. 
 475. Created by statute in 1998. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-245n(d). 
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  Delaware 
Utilities commission Public Service Commission476 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Division of Climate, Coastal & Energy 
(in Department of Natural Resources & 
Environmental Control)477 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
District of Columbia 
Utilities commission Public Service Commission478 
Freestanding energy office? Deparment of Energy & 
Environment479 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
Florida 
Utilities commission Public Service Commission480 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Office of Energy (in Department of 
Agriculture & Consumer Services)481 
Siting board Siting Coordination Office (in 
Department of Environmental 
Protection)482 
                                                                                                                           
 476. Created by statute in 1949. Del. Code tit. 26, § 103 (2020). 
 477. Division of Climate, Coastal and Energy, Delaware.gov, https://dnrec.alpha. 
delaware.gov/climate-coastal-energy [https://perma.cc/G4DF-X6RT] (last visited Jan. 30, 
2021). 
 478. Created by federal statute in 1913. History, Pub. Serv. Comm’n of D.C., 
https://dcpsc.org/About-PSC/About-the-Commission/History.aspx [https://perma.cc/W 
WZ6-L9V4] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). Current authority at D.C. Code § 1-204.93 (2020). 
 479. Created by statute in 2006. See D.C. Code § 8-151.03. 
 480. Created by statute in 1947. See Fla. Stat. § 350.011 (2020). 
 481. Office of Energy, Fla. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs., https://www.fdacs.gov/ 
Divisions-Offices/Energy [https://perma.cc/V9RR-H5FX] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 482. Siting Coordination Office, Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., https://floridadep.gov/ 
air/siting-coordination-office [https://perma.cc/K84J-GJQD] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
2021] AGENCY GENESIS 919 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  Georgia 
Utilities commission Public Service Commission483 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
State Energy Program (in 
Environmental Finance Authority)484 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  Hawaii 
Utilities commission Public Utilities Commission485 
Freestanding energy office? State Energy Office486 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  Idaho 
Utilities commission Public Utilities Commission487 
Freestanding energy office? Governor’s Office of Energy & Mineral 
Resources488 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
                                                                                                                           
 483. Created by statute in 1879. See Ga. Code Ann. § 46-2-1 (2020). The commission’s 
jurisdiction was expanded to cover electric utilities in 1907. See History and Mission of the 
Commission, Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, http://www.psc.state.ga.us/pscinfo/annual_reports/ 
1997-1998annualreport/hismis.htm [https://perma.cc/Z5K9-K3AN] (last visited Jan. 30, 
2021). 
 484. State Energy Program, Ga. Env’t Fin. Auth., https://gefa.georgia.gov/state-energy-
program [https://perma.cc/3N23-8CTD] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 485. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 269-2 (2020). 
 486. Created by statute in 2019. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 196-71. 
 487. Created by statute in 1913. See Idaho Code § 61-201 (2020). 
 488. Established by executive order in 2016. See Idaho Exec. Order No. 2016-03, 16-12 
Idaho Admin. Bull. 21 (Dec. 7, 2016). 
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Other  
  Illinois 
Utilities commission Commerce Commission489 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Office of Energy (in Department of 
Environmental Protection)490 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  Indiana 
Utilities commission Utility Regulatory Commission491 
Freestanding energy office? Office of Energy Development492 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body 21st Century Energy Policy 
Development Task Force493 
Other  
  Iowa 
Utilities commission Iowa Utilities Board494 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Iowa Energy Office (in Iowa Economic 
Development Authority)495 
Siting board No 
                                                                                                                           
 489. Created by statute in 1913. See Act of June 30, 1913, 1913 Ill. Laws 459 (codified as 
amended at 220 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-101 (West 2020)). 
 490. Office of Energy, Ill. Env’t Prot. Agency, https://www2.illinois.gov/epa/topics/ 
energy/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/ECD8-WM57] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 491. Commission given responsibilities over electricity and natural gas in 1913. See I. 
Leo Sharfman, Commission Regulation of Public Utilities: A Survey of Legislation, 53 Annals 
Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 1, 3 (1914) (citing Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 76, 1913 Ind. Acts 167). 
 492. Created by statute in 2013. See Ind. Code § 4-3-23-3 (2020). 
 493. Created by statute in 2019. See Ind. Code § 2-5-45-2. 
 494. Iowa Code § 474.1 (2020). Statute granted jurisdiction over the rates and service 
of public utility companies in 1963. See Act of Apr. 19, 1963, ch. 286, sec. 1, 1963 Iowa Acts 
357, 357; History of the Iowa Utilities Board, Iowa Utils. Bd., https://iub.iowa.gov/about-
us/history-iowa-utilities-board [https://perma.cc/26AP-74Z3] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 495. Iowa Energy Office, Iowa Econ. Dev. Auth., https://www.iowaeda.com/iowa-
energy-office [https://perma.cc/RQU2-K7PN] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
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Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  Kansas 
Utilities commission Corporation Commission496 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Kansas Energy Office (in Corporation 
Commission)497 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  Kentucky 
Utilities commission Public Service Commission498 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Office of Energy Policy (in Kentucky 
Energy & Environment Cabinet)499 
Siting board Electric Generation and Transmission 
Siting Board (in Public Service 
Commission)500 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  Louisiana 
Utilities commission Public Service Commission501 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Technology Assessment Division (in 
Department of Natural Resources)502 
                                                                                                                           
 496. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 64-601 (West 2020). The Kansas Legislature first created a PUC 
by statute in 1911. See Act of Mar. 14, 1911, ch. 238, sec. 1, 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 417, 417–
18. 
 497. Kansas Energy Office, Kan. Corp. Comm’n, https://kcc.ks.gov/kansas-energy-
office [https://perma.cc/3FWM-CWPB] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 498. Created by statute in 1934. Act of Mar. 1934, ch. 145, sec. 2, 1934 Ky. Acts 580, 583. 
 499. Created by statute in 2018. See Act of Mar. 27, 2018, ch. 29, sec. 1, 2018 Ky. Acts 
67, 69–70 (codified as amended at Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12.020 (West 2020)). 
 500. Created by statute in 2002. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 278.702. 
 501. Created by state constitutional amendment in 1921. La. Const. art. VI, §§ 3–9 
(1921) (reaffirmed by Constitution of 1974, La. Const. art. IV, § 21 (1974)). 
 502. Office of the Secretary: Technology Assessment Division, La. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 
http://www.dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm/page/36 [https://perma.cc/387T-XY3W] (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
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Siting board No 
Climate/transition body Climate Initiatives Task Force (2020)503 
Other  
  Maine 
Utilities commission Public Utilities Commission504 
Freestanding energy office? Governor’s Energy Office505 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body Maine Climate Council506 
Other  
  Maryland 
Utilities commission Public Service Commission507 
Freestanding energy office? Energy Administration508 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board Governor’s Task Force on Renewable 
Energy Development & Siting509 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
                                                                                                                           
 503. Established by executive order in 2020. See La. Exec. Order No. JBE 20-18, 46 La. 
Reg. 1197 (Aug. 19, 2020). 
 504. Created by statute in 1913. About MPUC, Off. of the Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 
https://www.maine.gov/mpuc/about/how_commission_works.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/DF2C-BFYP] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). Current authority at Me. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 35-A, § 103 (2020). 
 505. Created by statute in 2007. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 2, § 9 (2020). 
 506. Created by statute in 2019. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 577-A (2020). 
 507. Created by statute in 1910. See Public Service Commission Law, ch. 180, sec. 2, 
1910 Md. Laws 338, 342. 
 508. Created by statute in 1997. See Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 9-2002 (West 2020). 
Predecessor Office of Energy Policy established by executive order in 1973. Maryland 
Energy Administration: Origin & Functions, Md. Manual On-Line, https://msa.maryland. 
gov/msa/mdmanual/25ind/html/33energf.html [https://perma.cc/7ECZ-DZSF] (last 
updated Feb. 28, 2020). 
 509. Established by executive order in 2019. See Md. Exec. Order No. 01.01.2019.09 
(Aug. 14, 2019), https://governor.maryland.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Renew 
able-Energy-Development-and-Siting-EO-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6V2-H2ZE]. 
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  Massachusetts 
Utilities commission Department of Public Utilities510 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Department of Energy Resources (in 
Executive Office of Energy and 
Environmental Affairs)511 
Siting board Energy Facilities Siting Board512 
Climate/transition body No 
Other Massachusetts Clean Energy Center513 
  Michigan 
Utilities commission Public Service Commission514 
Freestanding energy office? No515 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Office of Climate and Energy (in 
Department of Environment, Great 
Lakes & Energy)516 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body Council on Climate Solutions (in 
Department of Environment, Great 
Lakes & Energy)517 
Other  
                                                                                                                           
 510. Board of Gas and Electric Light Commissioners established by statute in 1887. See 
Act of June 8, 1887, ch. 382, sec. 1, 1887 Mass. Acts 992, 992; Paul E. Osborne, Department 
of Public Utilities History 2 (2016), https://www.mass.gov/files/department-of-public-
utilities-history_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LXV-6YEU]. Current authority at Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. ch. 25, § 1 (West 2020). 
 511. About DOER, Mass.gov, https://www.mass.gov/about-doer [https://perma.cc/9A 
QA-U4GZ] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 512. Created by statute in 1973. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 164, § 69H. 
 513. Created by statute in 2008. See Mass Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 23J, § 2. 
 514. Railroad Commission authority expanded to electricity in 1909. Michigan Public 
Service Commission History, Michigan.gov, https://www.michigan.gov/mpsc/0,9535,7-
395-93218_93284_94865-505687--,00.html [https://perma.cc/SML9-JW7R] (last visited Jan. 
30, 2021). Current authority at Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 460.1 (West 2020). 
 515. Michigan Energy Administration merged into Public Service Commission by 
executive order in 1986. See Mich. Exec. Order No. 1986-17 (Oct. 30, 1986), 
https://cdm16110.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p16110coll2/id/105068/f
ilename/107944.pdf [https://perma.cc/4W5D-5UDR]. 
 516. Created by statute in 2019. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.99923. 
 517. Established by executive order in 2020. See Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-182 (Sept. 
23, 2020), http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2019-2020/executiveorder/pdf/ 
2020-EO-182.pdf [https://perma.cc/6X8W-ADW7]. 
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  Minnesota 
Utilities commission Public Utilities Commission518 
Freestanding energy office? No519 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Energy Division (in Department of 
Commerce)520 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  Mississippi 
Utilities commission Public Service Commission521 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Energy Division (in Development 
Authority)522 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  Missouri 
Utilities commission Public Service Commission523 
Freestanding energy office? No 
                                                                                                                           
 518. Created by statute in 1967 and authority expanded to electric and gas utility rates 
in 1975. History, Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, https://mn.gov/puc/about-us/history 
[https://perma.cc/72A8-JMP6] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). Current authority at Minn. Stat. 
§ 216A.01 (2020). 
 519. Minnesota Energy Agency created by statute in 1974. John Helland, Minnesota 
Major Environmental Laws in the 1970’s: A Summary from 1969 to 1979, at 9 (1981), 
https://www.leg.mn.gov/docs/pre2003/other/810456.pdf [https://perma.cc/3B39-KHQY]. 
Today, the agency’s functions are exercised by the Energy Division of the Minnesota 
Development Authority (see next row). 
 520. Energy, Minn. Com. Dep’t, https://mn.gov/commerce/industries/energy 
[https://perma.cc/PH8J-DR4M] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 521. Created by statute in 1938. See Miss. Code Ann. § 77-1-1 (2020). Commission 
jurisdiction expanded to electric and gas utilities in 1956. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Annual 
Report Ending June 2017, at 5 (2017), https://www.psc.ms.gov/sites/default/files/ 
Documents/MPSC%202017%20ANNUAL%20REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/X99H-JZ4X]. 
 522. Energy & National Resources, Miss. Dev. Auth., https://mississippi.org/services/ 
energy [https://perma.cc/X37R-2426] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 523. Created by statute in 1913. See A Century of Service: The PSC Turns 100, Mo. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n,  https://psc.mo.gov/General/Celebrating_100_Years#:~:text=Formed%20 
in%201913%2C [https://perma.cc/3BLF-9P9Y] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). Current 
authority at Mo. Ann. Stat. § 386.040 (West 2020). 
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Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Division of Energy (in Department of 
Natural Resources)524 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  Montana 
Utilities commission Public Service Commission525 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Energy Office (in Department of 
Environmental Quality)526 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  Nebraska 
Utilities commission Power Review Board (all utilities are 
publicly owned)527 
Freestanding energy office? Department of Environment & 
Energy528 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  Nevada 
Utilities commission Public Utilities Commission529 
Freestanding energy office? Governor’s Office of Energy530 
                                                                                                                           
 524. Division of Energy, Mo. Dep’t of Nat. Res., https://energy.mo.gov 
[https://perma.cc/LM6M-U4PX] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 525. Created by statute in 1913. See Mont. Code Ann. § 69-1-102 (West 2019). 
 526. Montana Department of Environmental Quality, Montana.gov, http://deq. 
mt.gov/Energy [https://perma.cc/SR7T-55Y5] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 527. Created by statute in 1963. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 70-1003 (2020). 
 528. Created by statute in 2019. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-15,254. The Nebraska Energy 
Office, which is now part of the Department of Environment and Energy, was founded in 
1973. Sadie Erdmann, Nebraska Energy Office 3 (2016), https://neo.ne.gov/info/ 
pubs/pdf/NEOWXevaluation2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QVW-BT37]. 
 529. Created by statute in 1919. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 703-020 (2020). 
 530. Originally created by statute in 1975. Transferred to Governor’s office in 1983. 
Renamed Nevada Governor’s Office of Energy in 2001. Office History, Nev. Governor’s Off. 
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Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  New Hampshire 
Utilities commission Public Utilities Commission531 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Energy Division (in Office of Strategic 
Initiatives)532 
Siting board Energy Facility State Evaluation 
Committee533 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  New Jersey 
Utilities commission Board of Public Utilities534 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  New Mexico 
Utilities commission Public Regulation Commission535 
                                                                                                                           
of Energy, https://energy.nv.gov/About/Office_History [https://perma.cc/J7LR-DCLB] 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 531. Created by statute in 1911. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 363:1 (2020). 
 532. Energy Division, N.H. Off. of Strategic Initiatives, https://www.nh.gov/osi/energy 
[https://perma.cc/RZ5Q-XXKX] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 533. Created by statute in 1991. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 162-H:3. 
 534. Created by statute in 1911. See Act of Apr. 21, 1911, ch. 195, 1911 N.J. Laws 374, 
374 (codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 48:2-1 (West 2020)). 
 535. The original state Public Service Commission was created and given authority to 
regulate utilities in 1941. Fred Nathan & Kristina G. Fisher, Think N.M., Rethinking the 
P.R.C. 9 (2011), https://www.thinknewmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/PRCReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SG4M-9QX2]. The modern Public Regulation Commission was created 
by state constitutional amendment in 1996. See N.M. Const. art. XI, § 1. 
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Freestanding energy office? Energy, Minerals & Natural Resources 
Department536 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body New Mexico Interagency Climate 
Change Task Force537 
Other Community Advisory Committee to 
advise on distribution of energy 
transition funds538 
  New York 
Utilities commission Public Service Commission539 
Freestanding energy office? New York State Energy Research & 
Development Authority540 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board Office of Renewable Energy Siting (in 
Department of State)541 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  North Carolina 
Utilities commission Utilities Commission542 
Freestanding energy office? North Carolina Energy Policy 
Council543 
                                                                                                                           
 536. Energy and Minerals Department created by statute in 1977. EMNRD, N.M. 
Energy, Mins. & Nat. Res. Dep’t, http://www.emnrd.state.nm.us/ADMIN/about.html 
[https://perma.cc/F7LD-94VD] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). The Energy Department and 
the Natural Resources Department merged in 1987. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 9-5A-3 (West 2020). 
 537. Established by executive order in 2019. See New Mexico Executive Order, supra 
note 117. 
 538. Created by statute in 2019. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 62-18-16. 
 539. Created by statute in 1910. See N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 4 (McKinney 2020). 
 540. Created by statute in 1975. See N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 1852 (McKinney 2020); 
History of NYSERDA, N.Y. State Energy Rsch. & Dev. Auth., https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/ 
About/History-of-NYSERDA [https://perma.cc/A28K-K6EM] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 541. Created by statute in 2020. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 94-c(3) (McKinney 2020). 
 542. Created by statute in 1933. See A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 
1933, 11 N.C. L. Rev. 191, 245–46 (1933). 
 543. Created by statute in 1975. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113B-2 (2020). 
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Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
North Carolina Energy Policy Council 
(in Department of Environmental 
Quality)544 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body Climate Change Interagency Council545 
Other  
  North Dakota 
Utilities commission Public Service Commission546 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
State Energy Program547 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other State Energy Research Center at 
UND;548 EmPower North Dakota549 
  Ohio 
Utilities commission Public Utilities Commission550 
Freestanding energy office? No 
                                                                                                                           
 544. State Energy Program, N.C. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, https://deq.nc.gov/energy-
climate/energy-group/state-energy-program [https://perma.cc/222C-24L3] (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2021). 
 545. Established by executive order in 2018. See N.C. Exec. Order No. 80, 33 N.C. Reg. 
1103, 1104 (Oct 29, 2018). 
 546. Created by statutory and constitutional provisions. See N.D. Const. art. 5, § 2; N.D. 
Cent. Code § 49-01-02 (2020); The Commission: About the Commission, N.D. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, https://www.psc.nd.gov/commission/about/index.php [https://perma.cc/E4 
PK-BABZ] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 547. State Energy Program, N.C. Dep’t of Com., https://www.communityservices. 
nd.gov/renewableenergyprograms/stateenergyprogram [https://perma.cc/5UWB-RVAX] 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 548. Created by statute in 2019. See N.D. Cent. Code § 15-11-40 (2020). 
 549. Created by statute in 2007 and made up of representatives from state energy 
industry. See N.D. Cent. Code § 17-07-01; EmPower North Dakota, N.D. Dep’t of Com., 
https://www.business.nd.gov/energy/EmPowerNorthDakota [https://perma.cc/X2EC-DY42] 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 550. Jurisdiction of Public Service Commission extended to electric and gas utilities by 
statute in 1911. Renamed the Public Utilities Commission in 1913. 100 Years and Counting: 
The History of the PUCO, Ohio Pub. Utils. Comm’n, https://puco.ohio.gov/ 
wps/portal/gov/puco/about-us/resources/history-of-the-puco [https://perma.cc/T35G-
ZW2K] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). Current authority at Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4901.02 
(2020). 
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Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
State Energy Program (in Development 
Services Agency)551 
Siting board Power Siting Board552 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  Oklahoma 
Utilities commission Corporation Commission553 
Freestanding energy office? Secretary of Energy & Environment554 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  Oregon 
Utilities commission Public Utility Commission555 
Freestanding energy office? Oregon Department of Energy556 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board Energy Facility Siting Council557 
Climate/transition body Interagency Working Group on Climate 
Impacts to Impacted Communities558 
Other  
                                                                                                                           
 551. State Energy Program (SEP), Ohio Dev. Serv. Agency, https://www.development. 
ohio.gov/bs/bs_seprogram.htm [https://perma.cc/AG39-45NP] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 552. Created by statute in 1972. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4906.02. 
 553. Created by state constitution in 1907. See Okla. Const. art. IX, § 15; Oklahoma 
Corporation Commission History, Okla. Corp. Comm’n, https://oklahoma.gov/occ/ 
about/history.html [https://perma.cc/UL5Z-7J9R] (last updated Nov. 20, 2020). 
 554. Established by executive order in 2015. See Okla. Exec. Order No. 2015-07, 32 
Okla. Reg. 551, 551–53 (Feb. 9, 2015). 
 555. Jurisdiction of commission extended to electric and gas utilities by statute in 1911. 
Celebrating More than 150 Years of History, Or. Pub. Util. Comm’n, https://www.oregon. 
gov/puc/about-us/Pages/History.aspx [https://perma.cc/4SM2-EXLG] (last visited Jan. 
30, 2021). Current authority at Or. Rev. Stat. § 757.105 (2020). 
 556. Created by statute in 1975. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 469.030. 
 557. Created by statute in 1975. See About the Council, Oregon.gov, https://www. 
oregon.gov/energy/facilities-safety/facilities/Pages/About-the-Council.aspx [https://per 
ma.cc/9SFL-BEWV] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). Current authority at Or. Rev. Stat. § 469.450. 
 558. Established by executive order in 2020. See Or. Exec. Order No. 20-04 (Mar. 10, 
2020), https://www.oregon.gov/gov/Documents/executive_orders/eo_20-04.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/F8F7-3658]. 
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  Pennsylvania 
Utilities commission Public Utility Commission559 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Energy Programs Office (in 
Department of Environmental 
Protection)560 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  Rhode Island 
Utilities commission Public Utilities Commission561 
Freestanding energy office? Office of Energy Resources562 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board Energy Facility Siting Board563 
Climate/transition body Executive Climate Change 
Coordinating Council564 
Other  
  South Carolina 
Utilities commission Public Service Commission565 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Energy Office (in Office of Regulatory 
Staff)566 
                                                                                                                           
 559. Created by statute in 1913. See History, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, https://www.puc. 
pa.gov/about-the-puc/history [https://perma.cc/D5KG-DYNF] (last visited Feb. 7, 2021). 
Current authority at 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 301 (2020). 
 560. Energy Programs, Pa. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., https://www.dep.pa.gov/Business/ 
Energy/pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/6PTE-MJJV] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 561. While public utilities in Rhode Island have been regulated since the late 1800s, the 
modern PUC was created by statute in 1981. Agency History, R.I. Pub. Utils. Com’n, 
http://www.ripuc.ri.gov/generalinfo/history.html [https://perma.cc/JFM2-3GYN] (last 
updated May 2, 2018). Current authority at 39 R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-1-3 (2020). 
 562. Created by statute in 2006. See 42 R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-140-2 (2020). 
 563. Created by statute in 1986. See id. § 42-98-5. 
 564. Created by statute in 2014. See id. § 42-6.2-1. 
 565. Created by statute in 1910. History of the Public Service Commission of South 
Carolina, S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, https://psc.sc.gov/about-us-0/history [https:// 
perma.cc/H4MP-HKNY] (last visited Feb. 26, 2021). 
 566. The South Carolina Energy Office, Energy.sc.gov, http://www.energy.sc.gov 
[https://perma.cc/Q383-5QB9] (last updated Jan. 30, 2021). 
2021] AGENCY GENESIS 931 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  South Dakota 
Utilities commission Public Utilities Commission567 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Energy Management Office (in Bureau 
of Administration)568 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  Tennessee 
Utilities commission Public Utility Commission569 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Office of Energy Programs (in 
Department of Environment & 
Conservation)570 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  Texas 
Utilities commission Public Utility Commission571 
Freestanding energy office? No 
                                                                                                                           
 567. Created by statute in 1939. See S.D. Codified Laws § 49-1-8 (2020). But the 
commission was not given authority over electric and gas utilities until 1975. Leni Healy, 
History of the South Dakota Public Utilities Commission 8 (2001), https://puc.sd.gov/ 
commission/Publication/PUC%20history.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BKQ-XYDY]. 
 568. Statewide Energy Management, S.D. Bureau of Admin., https://boa.sd.gov/state-
engineer/energy-management.aspx [https://perma.cc/TDB2-HQUF] (last visited Jan. 30, 
2021). 
 569. Created by statute in 1919. Valerius Sanford, Tennessee Public Service 
Commission, Tenn. Encyclopedia (Oct. 8, 2017), https://tennesseeencyclopedia.net/ 
entries/tennessee-public-service-commission [https://perma.cc/W9UJ-MD6M] (last up-
dated Oct. 7, 2019). Current authority at Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-1-101 (2020). 
 570. Office of Energy Programs, Tenn. Dep’t of Env’t & Conservation, 
https://www.tn.gov/environment/program-areas/energy.html [https://perma.cc/H639-
64PT] (last updated Feb. 2, 2021). 
 571. Created by statute in 1975. About the PUCT, Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 
https://www.puc.texas.gov/agency/about/mission.aspx [https://perma.cc/9HGM-LGVB] 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2021). Current authority at Tex. Util. Code § 12.001 (2019). 
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Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
State Energy Conservation Office (in 
Office of the Comptroller)572 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  Utah 
Utilities commission Public Service Commission573 
Freestanding energy office? Governor’s Office of Energy 
Development574 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  Vermont 
Utilities commission Public Utility Commission575 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Energy Office (in Agency of 
Administration)576 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body Vermont Climate Council577 
Other  
  Virginia 
Utilities commission State Corporation Commission578 
                                                                                                                           
 572. State Energy Conservation Office, Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, https:// 
comptroller.texas.gov/programs/seco [https://perma.cc/7D8A-6H65] (last visited Jan. 30, 
2021). 
 573. Created by statute in 1917. History, Utah Pub. Serv. Comm’n, https://psc. 
utah.gov/history [https://perma.cc/QX6D-6DNU] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). Current 
authority at Utah Code § 54-1-1 (2020). 
 574. Created by statute in 2011. See Utah Code § 63M-4-401. 
 575. Created by statute in 1909. See Act of Jan. 20, 1909, No. 116, sec. 1, 1908 Vt. Acts 
& Resolves 101, 101–02. Current authority at Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, § 3 (2020). 
 576. Energy Office, Vt. Agency of Admin., https://bgs.vermont.gov/commissioner/ 
energy-environment [https://perma.cc/Z8L3-FNVP] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 577. Created by statute in 2020. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 591 (2020). 
 578. Created by state constitution in 1902. Preston C. Shannon, The Evolution of 
Virginia’s State Corporation Commission, 14 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 523, 532–33 (1973); see 
also Va. Const. art. IX, § 1. 
2021] AGENCY GENESIS 933 
Freestanding energy office? Department of Mines, Minerals & 
Energy579 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body Clean Energy Advisory Board (for 
advising on loans or rebates for solar 
installations in low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods)580 
Other Various state authorities established to 
investigate and promote offshore wind 
energy,581 nuclear power,582 solar 
energy and energy storage,583 and 
energy development in southwest 
Virginia584 
  Washington 
Utilities commission Utilities and Transportation 
Commission585 
Freestanding energy office? No586 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Washington State Energy Office (in 
Department of Commerce)587 
Siting board Energy Facility State Evaluation 
Council588 
                                                                                                                           
 579. Created by statute in 1984. See Va. Code § 45.1-161.2 (2020). Division of Energy 
created by statute within the Department of Mines, Minerals and Energy in 1984. See id. 
§ 45.1-390. 
 580. Created by statute in 2019. See id. § 45.1-395. 
 581. Created by statute in 2010. See id. § 67-1201. 
 582. Created by statute in 2013. See id. § 67-1401. 
 583. Created by statute in 2015. See id. § 67-1501. 
 584. Created by statute in 2019. See id. § 67-1601. 
 585. Created by statute as Washington Public Service Commission in 1911. History of 
the Commission, Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n, https://www.utc.wa.gov/aboutUs/ 
Pages/history.aspx [https://perma.cc/9V5Z-HJXJ] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). Current 
authority at Wash. Rev. Code § 80.01.010 (2020). 
 586. State Energy Office created by statute in 1975. See Act of Mar. 19, 1976, ch. 108, 
sec. 4, 1975–1976 Wash. Sess. Laws 347, 348–49. It was eliminated in 1996. See Act of Mar. 
28, 1996, ch. 186, sec. 1, 1995–1996 Wash. Sess. Laws 720, 720. 
 587. Washington State Energy Office, Wash. State Dep’t of Com., 
https://www.commerce.wa.gov/growing-the-economy/energy/washington-state-energy-
office [https://perma.cc/5YXK-NL5E] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 588. Created by statute in 1970. See About EFSEC, Wash. Energy Facility Site Evaluation 
Council, https://www.efsec.wa.gov/about-efsec [https://perma.cc/JD7W-8VD2] (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2021). Current authority at Wash Rev. Code § 80.50.010–.904. 
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Climate/transition body No 
Other  
  West Virginia 
Utilities commission Public Service Commission589 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
West Virginia Office of Energy (in 
Department of Commerce)590 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body No [Bill currently pending in House 
would create Just Transition Office for 
timber/coal] 
Other Public Energy Authority created to 
promote mineral development591 
  Wisconsin 
Utilities commission Public Service Commission592 
Freestanding energy office? No 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
Office of Energy Innovation (in Public 
Service Commission)593 
Siting board No 
Climate/transition body Office of Sustainability & Clean Energy 
(in Department of Administration);594 
Governor’s Task Force on Climate 
Change595 
Other  
                                                                                                                           
 589. Created by statute in 1913. History of the Public Service Commission of West 
Virginia, Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., http://www.psc.state.wv.us/hist.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/Z2VW-RWGD] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). Current authority at W. Va. Code Ann. 
§ 24-1-1 to -8-2 (LexisNexis 2020). 
 590. Created by statute in 2007. W. Va. Code Ann. § 5B-2F-2. 
 591. Created by statute in 1985. Id. § 5D-1-4. 
 592. Created as nation’s first state utility regulatory commission in 1907. See Our 
History, Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wis., https://psc.wi.gov/Pages/AboutPSCW/History 
AndMission.aspx [https://perma.cc/HT7M-E4RT] (last visited Jan 30, 2021). Current 
authority at Wis. Stat. § 15.79 (2020). 
 593. Office of Energy Information, Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wis., https://psc.wi.gov/ 
Pages/Programs/OEI.aspx [https://perma.cc/HT7M-E4RT] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). 
 594. Established by executive order in 2019. See Wis. Exec. Order No. 38 (Aug. 16, 
2019), https://evers.wi.gov/Documents/EO%20038%20Clean%20Energy.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/CRQ6-EF42]. 
 595. Established by executive order in 2019. See Wisconsin Executive Order 52, supra 
note 118. 
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  Wyoming 
Utilities commission Public Service Commission596 
Freestanding energy office? Wyoming Energy Authority597 
Designated state energy office within 
other agency? 
n/a 
Siting board Wyoming Industrial Siting Council (in 
Department of Environmental 
Quality)598 




                                                                                                                           
 596. Created by statute in 1915. About Us, Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, https://psc. 
wyo.gov/about-us [https://perma.cc/U7ZW-7HKD] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021). Current 
authority at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-2-101 (2020). 
 597. Created by statute in 2019. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-5-502. 
 598. Created by statute in 1975. See id. § 35-12-104. 
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